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This study is a discussion of the political economy of development in the
Southwest province of Cameroon, West Africa, highlighting the role of the Cameroon
state in the agricultural development of this province. It is essentially a case study of
farmers in the Southwest province, which examines the role of Ahidjo’s economic
strategy of planned liberalism and the national economic development plan in the
economic development of the province.
Cameroon gained independence in 1960, and shortly after that the country’s
president Amadou Ahidjo adopted and implemented a national economic development
plan over a twenty- year period whose primary goal was to achieve rapid growth and the
sustainable development of the country. At the same time, Cameroon’s development was
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guided by an economic ideology of planned liberalism that emphasized a strong role for
the Cameroon state in economic development.
The findings from this analysis suggest that, the planned liberalism strategy under
Ahidjo contributed significantly to the economic development of the Southwest province
and the state of Cameroon. Ahidjo’s “big government” approach to economic
development, through planned liberalism was critical to development especially in the
agricultural sector. This study has shown that Ahidjo’s popularity and success during his
presidency was determined by his successful economic policies toward the farmers in the
Southwest province. Additionally, Ahidjo’s vision of a strong state capable of intervening
in development proved crucial in realizing Cameroon’s economic development.
In conclusion the study recommends that in order for the Cameroon’s efforts towards
economic development to continue, the country needs to increase the resources of the
rural poor. Secondly, the government has to provide better infrastructure and to support
economic development activities.
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It has been argued by notable scholars of Cameroon political economy, such as
Ngayap, Nicolas Van de Walle, Ndiva Kofele and J. F. Bayart, that Eui elite class
supported the Ahidjo regime and the Cameroon state. Ngayap refers to this group as the
“progressive clan,” while Nicolas Van de Walle calls them the “governing class.”
Whatever the label, this group accounted for the economic growth and stability of the
Cameroon state during Ahidjo’s regime from 1960-1982.
This study shows that the Cameroon state under Ahidjo was directed and
sustained by a broad coalition of “classes” and interest groups, that included the civil
servants and the farmers. The Ahidjo state created a class of home grown civil servants,
trained at a school for administrators, whose graduates were sent to the provinces to carry
out policies that guaranteed economic growth and support for the state and the regime.
Through implementation of a twenty-year development plan, Ahidjo was able to achieve
and sustain economic growth and development, that led to popular support for the state,
especially among farmers who formed the majority of the working population.
A case study of this process in the Southwest province of Cameroon would illustrate the
delicate balancing act that Ahidjo used to ensure the stability of the Cameroon state
during his twenty-year reign. The overwhelming support that Ahidjo and the state
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received from farmers in the Southwest province, as demonstrated by this study’s
findings, suggests that Ahidjo’s economic policies, most notably his agricultural policies,
were successful in the economic development of Cameroon. These findings further
suggest that Cameroon’s political stability was achieved because of the economic
successes realized under Ahidjo’s rule. This is consistent with the thesis that economic
growth and development is directly related to political stability.
1. The Statement of the Problem
Today in Africa, the nature of the state and its political and economic role is being
examined and questioned. The assumption and belief that the state is capable of
promoting economic growth and development is now in question. As an agent of
development, the state appears to be in crisis. In fact, as Bjorn Hettne argues, the inability
of third world governments to maintain levels of economic growth and development
commensurate with the basic needs of the people constitutes a crisis of survival.* This
assessment is consistent with the general perception that the state has failed as a prime
mover of development. In that respect, Africa’s domestic political instability has become
a major preoccupation among scholars who see it as a major cause of economic
stagnation.
Internal political and economic factors have historically played a significant role in
'y
the crisis of Africa’s development. A highly contentious study of the region by the
World Bank titled, “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” argued that, “for
' See Bjorn Hettne, “Three World of Crises for the Nation State,” Development 2, 3 (1998) 14-20.
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most African countries, the record of economic development is grim, and it is no
exaggeration to talk of crisis.” Slow economic growth and sluggish agricultural
performance, coupled with rapid rates of population growth and balance of payment
problems, are all indicators of economic trouble.^
Furthermore, the political problem of the region has been associated with the inability
of the African state to perform the function required of it."* The collapse of many African
states has been attributed to the extreme level of personalized rule on the part of African
leaders.^ The negative growth rate of many African economies and the poor living
conditions of the people suggest that economic policies in many countries have been a
failure. The terminal phase of this process of collapse is visible in the recent agonies of
Somalia, Zaire, and Rwanda.
This study focuses on the success of the Ahidjo regime in implementing policies that
led to Cameroon’s political and economic development. Cameroon presents a good
opportunity to revisit the thesis that state intervention in African economies has not
always been detrimental to the continent’s economic development. It shows how a strong
state characterized by personalized rule can generate economic growth and development.
Few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa can match the economic growth and political
stability that Cameroon has enjoyed from independence through the late 1980s. In 1981,
^ Of the thirty-three poorest countries in the world, nineteen are in Africa given in the World
Bank, World Development Report appendix, London: Oxford University Press, 1982.
^ World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (World
Bank, Washington D.C. 1981).
“ For a discussion, see William Zartman, ed.. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration
of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), Chapter 1.
^Ibid.
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the World Bank reclassified the country from a low income to a middle income country
with an economic growth rate through the 1970s and 1980s of well over six percent.^
Agricultural production grew at an annual average rate of 3.4 percent while population
growth was at 2.2 percent. The level of food production exceeded population growth,
thanks to the ‘green revolution program’ that was based on the production of high
yielding crops like rice, maize and cassava. Government policy was designed not only to
increase productivity in the agricultural sector, but also to improve the overall welfare of
the people. To this effect, other social programs were incorporated in the development
policy.
This study of the Cameroon experience unlike that of many African states seeks to
explain what was done correctly rather than what was done incorrectly. Luck is
frequently given as the main reason for the “Cameroon miracle,” while others attribute
the miracle to the oppressive nature of the Cameroon state under Ahidjo. A critical look
at the country’s economic performance under Ahidjo reveals that Cameroon succeeded in
accomplishing this objective by pursuing economic growth and development through the
incorporation of all classes in the development process of the country. This broad-base
support, made up of farmers, civil servants, and major interest groups was critical to
promoting the development strategy envisioned by Ahidjo, whose policy of inclusion,
rather than exclusion, was paramount in promoting economic growth and political
stability throughout his presidency.
® See West Africa, (1983) 596-7.
^ See World Bank, World Development Report, 1984.
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The questions addressed in this study are: What was the nature of the state during the
Ahidjo period? How did it affect politics in the Southwest province? What were the
major domestic policies at this time and what were the specific policies in the Southwest
province? How were the agricultural policies carried out and how did they influence the
support of farmers in the Southwest province on behalf of the state? Finally, what role did
external influences have on Cameroon’s development in general and on the development
of the Southwest province, in particular?
The significance of the above questions cannot be overstated. The nature of the state
is crucial in determining the course and success of development in the country. If the
state is narrow-based with a small ruling elite, then any development initiative will be
tailored to its interests. If, on the other hand, the state is broad -based, and its
development based on participation, then the question is: how did Ahidjo secure popular
participation in such development? This study suggests that state intervention in
agricultural development encouraged popular participation in development in the
Southwest province and the success of these policies accounted for the popular support of
the Ahidjo regime.
The Southwest province is especially important because of its historical, political and
economic significance to the country. Economically, the province is among the leaders in
cash crop production such as cocoa, banana, tea and oil palm. These products were and
are still necessary for the foreign exchange earnings that Cameroon accrued during the
1970s and 1980s. It is also the province that accounts for Cameroon’s crude oil
production. Historically, the region was among the first areas to come into contact with
Europeans. Located in the coastal region the province saw the arrival of Portuguese
traders as early as the 1400s. The province was the center of plantation industry with the
Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and Pamol accounting for a large portion of
cultivated land. Today, Del Monte has increased the number of companies engaged in
plantation agriculture in the province. Plantation agriculture was significant in that it
contributed tremendously to agro-industrial development and was the leading employer
in the province. Buea, the capital of the province was also the capital of the former West
Cameroon. It is therefore imperative to undertake an analysis of state intervention and its
impact on popular support for state survival. Such an analysis is possible if a case study
analysis is utilized.
2. Main Proposition and Objective of the Study
The purpose of this study is to critically examine the political and economic
development of Cameroon between 1960 and 1982, and to identify the policies and
priorities of its development strategy, as well as the institutional arrangements through
which the country achieved a remarkable degree of success in its political and economic
development. Specifically this study attempts to: a) evaluate the impact of economic
policy and development, particularly in the agricultural sector and assess the performance
of this sector in the Southwest province of the country, b) discuss the political
consequences of the agricultural policy on overall support for the state with emphasis on
farmers’ perception of the policy of the national government towards the Southwest
Province.
This study is premised on the thesis that the domestic policies pursued by Ahidjo,
especially his determination to build a strong state, and his pragmatic approach of state
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intervention through the ideology of planned liberalism, promoted economic
development in Cameroon. Economic success realized during this time accounted for the
popular support that was characteristic of Ahidjo’s presidency. In particular, the study
shows that Ahidjo used the increasing wealth of the country from the agricultural sector
in key provinces like the Southwest province to create and maintain a broad based
coalition of Cameroonians who supported and guaranteed the political stability of the
state.
A second consideration, closely related to the first, is that Cameroon’s agricultural
sector, more than any other sector, contributed to the economic growth of the country
during the Ahidjo presidency. Therefore being among the leading provinces in this effort,
the Southwest province was critical in the economic growth of the country.
3. Significance of the Study
There have been few studies in the field of African political economy that have
emphasized the positive contribution of the state to Africa’s development. Recent studies
have focused on the negative involvement of the African state in development as
expressed in excessive personalized rule on the part of African leaders and economic
policies that marginalize Africa’s development. Emphasis in these studies is on the
contribution of external factors in development and the need for external influence in
* For Ahidjo, national integration was a concept which entails the capability of any Cameroonian
to reside anywhere in the country and feel at home. It is this concept that made him appoint top civil
servants from different parts of the country to guide public policies in different provinces.
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Africa.^ These studies only underscore the activist nature of African state,
characterizing it as “overblown,” “collapsed,” and “marginalized.” This study reviews the
developmental situation in Africa, and Cameroon in particular, and supports the thesis
that some African states such as Cameroon adopted policies that led to economic growth
and development and ultimately to political stability. Through the ideology of planned
liberalism, the government was able to implement development policies over a twenty-
year period that raised the standard of living for the rural population. Ahidjo’s
administrative style of “big government,” with planned liberalism was successful in
achieving economic growth in Cameroon.
Contrary to studies on Cameroon during this period, this study debunks or refutes the
widely held notion that Ahidjo was a corrupt, power-hungry leader whose only objective
was to stay in power," and argues that Ahidjo was committed to the development of
Cameroon because only the state, at that time, had capital for investment. As a result,
Ahidjo pursued a state-building program of consolidating the powers of the president.
Through this measure, he was able to implement economic programs like the twenty-year
development plan which, as this study indicates, advanced the country’s development,
moving it from a low income economy in the 1960s to a middle income economy in the
1970s and early 1980s. Ahidjo understood that state-guided development could only be
^ For an analysis, see William Pffaf, “A New Colonialism? Europe must go back to Africa,”
Foreign Affairs, 74 (January and February 1995). This writer contends that Africans cannot manage their
affairs and therefore need colonial masters again.
See among others, Jeffery Cason and George White, “The State as Naive Entrepreneur: The
Political Economy of Export Promotion in Brazil and Tunisia,” Political Study Journal 26 (Spring 1988);
James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis and the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973); World Bank,
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (World Bank, Washington D.C.,
1982).
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achieved through collective contribution. It is for this reason that he initiated and
maintained a coalition of civil servants who were trained in the country’s school for
administrators (ENAM), and who eventually became critical in implementing the twenty-
year development plan in the provinces. This broad-based coalition suggested in this
study was composed of grass-root farmers and civil servants whose ultimate
contributions accounted for Cameroon’s development under Ahidjo. In contrast, it can be
argued that, it was the poor economic performance and the narrow-base support of the
Biya (Ahidjo’s successor) regime that accounted for the political discontent and
economic crisis in the country after 1990. Ahidjo’s coalition building skills helped create
a group of civil servants, trained at ENAM, who were central in implementing
development policies in the provinces and in perpetuating the state at a time when many
African countries were faced with the prospect of collapse.
Very little work has been done in the social sciences, especially in the field of policy
analysis that evaluates the impact of specific policies undertaken by the African states on
their population. Most of these studies have rather focused on the impact of structural
adjustment on a number of African states. This study addresses the impact of
Cameroon’s historical experience on its development with a focus on the impact of such
an experience on the nation’s development and particularly in the Southwest province.
Finally, this study serves as a basis for further research into the political economy of
the African states so as to determine their contribution to the stability ofAfrican states. It
also serves as a basis for reviewing the policies of these states toward development. The
" For a discussion, See J F Bayart, L’Etat au Cameroun (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale
des Sciences Politiques, 1979).
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contribution of this study to the field ofpolitical economy rests on the fact that popular
participation in development is critical for any effective development to occur. African
regimes that rely on this form of participation and are committed to it may often realize
sustainable development. This was the path taken by the Ahidjo regime.
4. Literature Review
Most scholars of the political economy of emerging states have acknowledged a
presumed link between economic prosperity and political stability. While their
conclusions suggest that there is a direct relationship between economic prosperity and
political stability, there is disagreement over the methods of achieving economic
prosperity. Some scholars strongly argue in favor of state intervention, while others argue
for a market inspired economic growth. The survival of the state in Africa depends to a
large extent on the ability of its leaders to find ways of promoting and maintaining
economic growth. Economic performance thus becomes a significant factor in citizens’
evaluation of their government and a strong factor in determining the political stability of
the country. This is particularly true of the Cameroon state during the period under
investigation because as the findings of this study suggest, economic prosperity in the
country superceded the authoritarian nature of the state accounted for the political support
and stability during Ahidjo’s regime.
See Nancy Benjamin and Sarah Lynch, Structural Adjustment and the Poor in Cameroon
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program, 1990), Photocopy.
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Today, the concept of development is ambiguous. In some spheres, this word has
been understood as modernization and change.'^ Uphoff and Warren noted that the term
development “is probably one of the most depreciated terms in the social science
literature, having been used more than it has been understood.”''^ Dudley Seers views
development as a normative concept, which entails complex problems of analysis.'^
Riggs reiterated this view and distinguishes between development as a process (which
implies rates of change), and development as a condition (which reflects the general level
of socioeconomic and political situation).'® Stuadt in a recent study titled “Managing
Development,” defines development as the means of transitive action and intransitive end
of action. Here development is construed as a process of enlarging people’s choices and
also as a means to carry out a nation’s development goals in promoting growth and social
justice.'^ While this definition of development is plausible, it falls short of some critical
issues plaguing the African continent; one of which questions why development is geared
only to the interest of a small group. As observed in many African countries,
development is centered either to sustain a certain group or it is implemented for the good
of a small section of the society. In a popular introductory text of economic development.
See, John Gunnel, “Development and Social Change and Time,” In Dwight Waldo, ed..
Temporal Dimension of Development Administration (Durham: Duke University Press, 1980).
See Norman T. Uphoff and Warren Ichman eds.. The Political Economy of Development
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
Dudley Seers, “The Meaning of Development,” in David Lelmann, ed.. Development Theory:
Four Critical Studies (London: Frank Class and Company Ltd., 1979).
For an analysis. See F.W. Riggs, “Development” in Social Concepts: A Systematic Analysis
G. Sartori, ed. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publication, 1984).
For an overview. See K. Struadt, Managing Development: State, Society and International
Context (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publication, 1991).
12
Todaro argued that development in all societies must have at least all the following
objectives; increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining
goods such as food, shelter, health and protection; raise the levels of living including,
higher income, better education and more attention to cultural values; and expand the
range of economic and social choice of individuals.'* His definition encompasses all the
goals of development but unfortunately such development is very expensive and requires
huge sacrifices for poor countries to realize this type of development.
In the context of this study, development is defined as a process in which policies are
introduced in order to improve the overall conditions of the people. Development here is
used in a general sense to refer to the improvement of the socioeconomic and political
conditions of a country. The critical question facing many countries in Africa, and
Cameroon in particular, is how to achieve a quick but balanced process of development
that embraces social, economic and political factors.
Two schools of thought dominate the debate concerning the study of the state and
development. The first school argues in favor of the state as an agent that fosters
development. For this school, the state is a credible force in the development process of a
country and should not be undermined. The second school is more concerned with the
political system type that enhances development. Here the debate shifts to the democratic
versus authoritarian types of regime. The first school is relevant to this study because it
examines various aspects of the state in development. The second school is also relevant
because it focuses on the debate over authoritarian versus democratic regimes and their
'* Micheal P. Todaro, Economics for a Developing World: An Introduction to Principles.
Problems and Policies for Development (London. 1977).
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relation to development. This is significant to the study because Ahidjo’s authoritarian
style regime was able to carry out policies that brought development in the country.
Appleby argues in favor of state intervention and suggests that by expanding the
American state apparatus, the New Deal government of President Roosevelt overcame
the economic depression of the 1930s. It was this policy of economic recovery through
state intervention that earned him re-election.'^ Keynes had earlier demonstrated that the
state could manage economic growth under capitalism through full employment and price
stability.^" The state, according to Keynes, provides the impetus for economic
development. While the above statements may demonstrate the situation in industrialized
countries, the argument has relevance for developing countries. Any state that is
committed to development can succeed in achieving it. This was the same conclusion
arrived at by Keynes.
Lewis also reached a similar conclusion when he observed that African states could
provide a wide range of essential public services, from education, transportation, public
health, and agricultural extension, to promoting and financing small industrial
development.^' This conviction shared by many international and bilateral development
assistance agencies became critical to Africa’s development in the 1960s, as evidenced
by the amount of loans charmeled through state agencies for development purposes. The
degree of state involvement was accelerated in the 1970s, when everywhere in Africa, the
state was seen as the dominant force in economic development.
For a detail analysis, see P. Appleby, Big Government (New York: Knopf 1945).
John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1936).
A.W. Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth (London: George and Allen and Unwin, 1955).
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Recent calls for a reduction of state intervention are consistent with the neoclassical
desire for a market-driven economy. State incompetence in the management of fiscal and
economic development programs, in the provision of public services, and in the
mismanagement of state corporations stemming from pervasive policies that inhibit
production and distort economic incentives especially in the agricultural sector, are
detrimental to the economy. Finally, widespread corruption on the part of public officials
has led to Africa’s poor economic performance, thus supporting the notion that the
African state is “overblown.” Accordingly, structural adjustment programs calling for a
market driven economy and a low level of state intervention is the centerpiece of the
current policy initiatives by the World Bank and the IMF.
The structure of the post-colonial state in Africa has become the principal focus of
scholarly discourse in the social sciences, especially in the wake of state collapse on the
i
continent. Hamza Alavi’s essay concluded that the post- colonial state is a subtype of the
capitalist state.^^ From this analysis, two issues emerge: the relationship between class
and state, and the role of the state in post-colonial formation. The relationship between
class and state in post -colonial society is an extension of the relations during colonial
rule. The difference is that metropolitan bourgeoisie (foreign and external) have been
replaced by national bourgeoisie who still represent the interest of the former. The
excessive power of control and regulation accumulated by the state is characteristic of it
being “overdeveloped.” This perspective differs from the classical Marxists analysis
H. Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,” New Left Review 74
(July/August, 1972), 59-81.
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which views the overdeveloped state as originating from internal class struggles.^^
Regarding the role of the state, Alavi maintains that it is involved in the production and
distribution process under the umbrella of national development while advancing the
interest of the dominant class. The state thus enjoys a centrality in post- colonial
• • 24
societies.
State-centered scholars have stressed the centrality of the state as a historical actor, or
the key collective agent of macro-political processes. They view the state as the central
organ for the extraction and distribution of resources, the determination ofbinding
principles for society, and the maintenance of external and internal principles for society
as well as social harmony and political and economic wellbeing.
The nature of the state and the type of regime are therefore critical for this analysis.
Regime’s ideology is very important. In a study of the relationship between democracy
and development. Lane and Savante concluded that there is no clear relationship between
the two. While they observed that a positive relation exists between democracy and the
quality of life, which can be stable over time, a negative relation was observed between
democracy and economic growth, in the degree of income inequality. They argued that it
Ibid.
For a critique of this analysis, see the work by H. Goulbome, “The Problem of the State in
Backward Capitalist Societies,” Africa Development 1. 1 (January- April, 1981) 45-70 ; Also see C. Leys,
“The Overdeveloped Post-Colonial State; A Re-evaluation,” Review of African Political Economy 5
(January-April 1976) 43. Ley for instance dismisses the notion of centrality as empty since the State is
central in all societies.
For a discussion. See Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical
Statement,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 17, 1 (1975).
See Ersson Savante and Jan-Erik Lane, “Democracy and Development: A Statistical
Exploration,” in Adrin Leftwich ed., Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice (Cambridge,
Mass.: Polity Press 1996).
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was premature; however, to conclude that democracy and development is a one-way
causal relationship. Adam Prezworski et ah, concluded that economic success is not well
explained by regime type, rather the evidence suggests that rapid economic development
tends to occur in societies characterized by high levels of socio-political stability and low
levels of uncertainty.^^
The definition ofpolitical stability has been problematic and defined in a variety of
ways in the literature. There is no consensus on its definition. Hurwitz identifies five
distinct approaches to stability which he summarizes as follows: stability as the absence
of violence; stability as government endurance/longevity; stability as the existence of
legitimate constitutional order; stability as the absence of structural change; and stability
as a multifaceted social attribute. Huntington has suggested that the concept of political
stability contains two elements: order and continuity. He argues that order involves the
relative absence of violence, force, coercion and disruption in the political system.
Continuity for him denotes stability with relative absence of change in the political
system.^^ Huntington and Hurwitz approach political stability from a multidimensional
viewpoint.
For Bulge and Farlie, political stability is defined as regime continuity.^® For them the
continuity of basic features of a regime seems to form the only viable and tmly general
See Adam Prezworski and Fernando Limongi, “ Political Regimes and Economic Growth,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (Summer, 1993), 51-69.
Leon Hurwitz, “Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability,” Comparative Politics 5
(April, 1973), 449-63.
S. P. Huntington and Dominiquez J. I., “Political Development,” in Handbook of Political
Science 3, F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 1-114.
See I. Buldge and Farlie D. J., “Predicting Regime Change: A Cross-National Investigation with
Aggregate Data 1950-1980.” Quality and Quantity 15 (1981), 336-64.
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definition of stability, while their non-continuance constitutes regime change. This
definition suggests that political stability occurs only if a regime’s basic features are
changed or endangered. Gurr equates political stability with the persistence of political
institutions. He argues that, “a stable political system is one whose political authority
pattern remain similar over a long period of time.” The above definition is adopted in this
study because the authority pattern and presidential domination in Cameroon remained
the same from 1960 to 1990. Stability is equated to peace, hence, Cameroon under
Ahidjo was conceived as a peaceful country.
Many political economists have argued that authoritarian regimes have economic
advantages over democratic regimes. For instance, it is practical for an authoritarian
regime to initiate and execute reform, if it so desires; however, this situation is
problematic for a democratic regime, which needs to consider a whole range of factors
before implementing reform. The successes of the regimes in Latin America have been
cited as examples. During the 1970s, while many developing nations were struggling,
Latin American countries with authoritarian regimes experienced an increase in their
economic growth. The general consensus was that regimes of this nature were practical
and could deliver better results in economic growth.
This view has fueled an ongoing debate. Arguing for the importance of economic
growth, Prezworski et al. suggests that economic development have a strong effect on the
probability that a democratic regime will survive. In their survey of democratic regimes.
See T. R. Gurr, “Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971,” American Political
Science Review 68 (1974), 1482-504.
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they observe that countries with per-capita income of less than $1,000 are extremely
fragile while countries above $6,000, are expected to live forever.
Lipset, Olson and Huntington suggest that rapid economic growth is destabilizing to
any democratic country,^^ because it can destabilize a regime as new social groups, such
as the middle class, increase in size and power. These new classes make economic and
political demands for greater participation in government and for a larger share of the
material economic goods realized in the society. Any attempt by the regime to suppress
these demands may lead to social unrest and political instability. However, as the
literature suggests, rapid growth is essential for regime survival. Citizens judge the
performance of their government by the economic performance of the country. During
rapid expansion with more jobs, low interest rates and a growing economy, the
government in power always gets the credit.
The findings of Londrgen et al. support the argument cited above and is critical to the
study of Cameroon’s political economy during the Ahidjo regime.^"* In their study of
developing countries, they concluded that countries with a reasonable level of economic
growth were less likely to have ‘coup d’etats,’ which are a rampant phenomenon in
Africa, where poor economic performance was usually cited as the reason for military
takeover of government. The reason for military takeover in many African countries has
For an analysis of this view, see Adam Prezworski, Micheal Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and
Fernando Limongi, “What makes democracies endure?” in Consolidating The Third Wave Democracies:
Themes and Perspectives, Larry Diamond, Marc F. Platter, Yun-Han Chu and Hung-Mao Tein ed.
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1997), 343.
” See S. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press 1981); Mancur Olson, “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,” Journal of Economic History 23
(1963) 453-72; S. P. Huntington Political Order in Changing Societies.
For an overview, see John Londregan and Keith T. Poole, “Poverty, the Coup Trap and the
Seizure of Executive Power.” World Politics 42 (January 1990), 151-83.
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been the lack of viable development programs under civilian governments; however,
Cameroon has been fortunate not to experience military rule because Ahidjo, who was a
civilian, initiated economic policies that provided lasting results throughout his
presidency. His economic policies doubled the per capita income of the country between
1970 and 1980.
From the above analysis, therefore, one can agree with Larry Diamond and Juan Linz
that “economic crisis represents one of the most common threats to political stability.”^^
Economic growth and development are important for the survival of a regime. In fact, the
faster the economy grows, the more likely the regime will survive. This was the
experience of the Ahidjo regime and this study suggests that the country experienced
rapid growth in its agricultural sector as a result of a twenty- year development plan
initiated by Ahidjo. Cameroon, under Ahidjo, embraced development by adopting
‘planned liberalism’ as its development strategy.
The resurgence of political economy as an important field in Africa’s development
reflects the inextricable link between politics and economics. When Cameroon gained
independence, the free market strategy was rejected as ineffective or irrelevant to the
problems of the country’s development. Ethnic, religious, political, and language
differences in the country called for a centralized strategy of development. Arguing
strongly for planning, Rosenstein- Rodan wrote, “the automatic responses of the market
economy does not ensure an optimum allocation in two out of four markets. Markets
See Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin
America,” in Democracy in Developing Countries 4, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset eds. (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 1-58.
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allocate efficiently stocks of consumer goods, and supplies of these goods flowing from
stocks of equipment, but they do not function efficiently in the field of investment..
Planned Liberalism was the development strategy the Ahidjo government adopted. Its
significance in Cameroon was that it became the political, economic and social
development strategy. It accounted during this period for the efficient utilization of
Cameroon’s scarce resources for development because it called for measured and
predetermined targets to be realized. Economically, it promoted and encouraged private
initiatives, but assigned the state to mobilize resources. Politically, it provided the state
with the necessary tools to guide the country’s development. It is for this reason that the
nature of the Cameroon state is crucial in the realization of Planned Liberalism, defined
as a calculated strategy for development towards measured and predetermined goals.
Such a definition accepts the need for a realistic objective in development plaiming,
which during the twenty -year development plan doubled the per capita income of
Cameroon and increased the level of productivity.
Doubling the per capita income in Cameroon in itself meant more disposable income
for individuals and more revenue for the state in the form of taxation, which was used for
the improvement of education, health, and other infrastructures. Increasing the level of
productivity meant more foreign reserves, which Ahidjo used to create a new class
through the school of Administration and Magistracy. These graduates were loyal to the
state and were eventually sent to the provinces to implement the twenty-year
For further discussion see P N Rosenstein-Rodan, “Programming in Theory and in Italian
Practice,” in Investment Criteria and Economic Growth. MIT Center for International Studies (Cambridge;
Asian Publishing House, 1961).
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development plan that raised Cameroon’s economic performance and perpetuated the
regime during the Ahidjo presidency.
The Southwest province had abundant resources, but colonial rule limited its
development to only plantation agriculture, with the revenues used to sustain the colonial
administration rather than developing the poor infrastmcture of the province. It was,
therefore, evident that upon independence the post-colonial state was left with the burden
of developing the Southwest province. Until its creation in 1972 by a presidential decree,
politicians from the ‘grassfield’ region of the country heavily dominated the area.^’ The
political economy of the Southwest province presents a mixed bag of progress and
failure. The twenty-year development plan provided an elaborate development strategy
for the province, especially in agricultural development. As will be discussed, the first
agro-pastoral show in the country was held in 1973 in the province and suggests that the
state and Ahidjo recognized the importance of the province and its contribution to
agricultural production in the country.
With the lack of an indigenous entrepreneurial class, state intervention in the
development of the province proved to be the only alternative within this period for the
people, who generally consisted of farmers, to attain a desirable level of social comfort.
Ahidjo’s “big government” approach to administration was visible in the agricultural
sector of this province. Through govermnent programs, Ahidjo was able to rally farmers
of the province to support the state.
For a discussion see Chapter V of this study.
5. Research Methodology
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This study is exploratory in its intent and utilizes evaluative and descriptive methods
to develop and support its premise on how the state under Ahidjo interacted with society
to promote economic growth, and how the Cameroon state survived. The study focuses
on the Southwest province in order to show how state intervention through public policy
(during Ahidjo’s rule) motivated famiers in Ndian and Meme divisions to support the
state. Both primary and secondary data are used to analyze the Cameroon experience and
to review the nature of the Cameroonian state, as well as its development plan with
specific interest in the agricultural policy within this period. The secondary sources
include, but are not limited to, journals, books, magazines, newspapers, and other
research on Cameroon.
Primary sources in this study include government documents, speeches of the
president on development policies in general, and agricultural policies in particular, as
well as other related sources. A study of this nature articulates the policies critical for the
development of Cameroon. To this effect, a clear distinction has been made between
official pronouncements and actual implementation of agricultural policies. Interviews
with a selected number of policy makers were also undertaken. To assess the impact of
agricultural policy on farmers in the Southwest province, questionnaires were
administered to a sample of farmers in Meme and Ndian divisions (Appendix). The
questionnaire was administered to farmers from these areas to determine their overall
perception of the state and support from and for it. Another questionnaire (see Appendix)
was administered to civil servants that were supportive and responsible for the
implementation of the policies of the Cameroon government.
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The use of an exploratory approach in this study calls for both quantitative and
qualitative data analysis. While basic quantitative data have been used to support the
argument in this study, qualitative data have also been used to further enhance the
descriptive aspect of the study and to identify the underlying linkages between
agricultural productivity and economic development in the context of the political
economy of Cameroon. The complexity of Cameroon society demands the use of the
qualitative method because many of its attributes and relationships cannot be quantified.
Also, the perception of society and the nature of the Cameroon state are historically
determined, because each cultural group has its own unique experience. Consequently,
any analysis of this nature also demands a more flexible and subjective approach.
To obtain reliable information during collection of data, unorthodox methods such as
asking hypothetical questions were employed. The political tension that Cameroon faces
today and the rivalry between supporters of the “old regime” (Ahidjo’s regime), and the
“new regime” (Biya’s regime), calls for such a method to be used. The reason many
Cameroonians are afraid of talking is fear of losing their jobs. Interviews were scheduled
only after a series of family contacts with the individuals in question. Qualitative analysis
complemented by tables, figures and statistical data help determine general trends in the
political economy of Cameroon’s development.
A major limitation of this methodology is that information is collected only from one
single case study. The case study analysis is a reliable method of analysis but its narrow
scope is sometimes not a true reflection of the entire society.
6. Organization of the Study
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This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the subject of study. It
states the problem, objective of the study, its significance, literature review, research
methodology, organization of the study and limitations of the study. Chapter II discusses
the theoretical framework of the study. This includes a discussion of the theory of the
state and political economy. The discussion on the theory of the state includes a review of
literature on the capitalist state theory and the theories of the African state, with emphasis
on the Cameroon state under Amadou Ahidjo. The political economy theories examine
the dominant approaches of development in the field of modernization and dependency
theories.
Chapter III discusses the historical and political evolution of Cameroon. It reviews
the nature of the Cameroon state today by tracing its historical nature from colonial to
post- colonial era, and tries to answer questions such as: How unique was the post¬
independent state under Ahidjo? What were the significant characteristics of the state
during Ahidjo that made it undertake development reforms? This chapter provides the
basis for the argument that the state under Ahidjo was committed to development in
Cameroon, as indicated in its adoption of a twenty-year development plan.
Chapter IV examines the political economy of development in Cameroon. Part one
deals with the twenty-year development plan formulated by the state during the
presidency of Ahidjo. It provides an overview of Cameroon’s economy in general and the
agricultural sector in particular. It specifically reviews the development policies of the
colonial period and evaluates their effects on the overall economic development of
Cameroon and contrasts it with the policy under the twenty-year development plan.
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particularly in agricultural policy during this period. Agriculture is considered a major
sector of the economy, and its impact in terms of its contribution to the economy is
critical, in this analysis. Four critical areas in the agricultural policy are reviewed: land
tenure, investments by the state, credits and marketing.
The second part focuses on the political economy of the Southwest province. It deals
specifically with the economic implications of political actions in the province and
provides an overview of the province’s economy, especially the agricultural sector. It
examines the progress made in the province within the context of the twenty-year
development plan.
Chapter V discusses the success of Cameroon’s development program. An evaluation
of the performance of the economy during the Ahidjo regime is undertaken in this
chapter. The focus is on the extent to which policies of the state resulted in the
development of the Cameroon economy and in particular the economy of the Southwest
province that ultimately led to the popular support for the Ahidjo regime.
Chapter VI presents the data collected during a survey of the political attitudes of
farmers in the Southwest province and civil servants in Yauonde. This information will
also be analyzed to support the argument that Cameroon’s economic performance won
the regime support and this support contributed to the political stability of the country. In
contrast, the economic hardship that befell the country from 1987 to the present has
accounted for a reduction in state support, resulting in political tension and instability.
Chapter VII concludes the study by focusing on the lessons learned and the
implication of these lessons for future development policy in Cameroon, especially as the
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country grapples with a serious economic crisis. This section offers recommendations
that hopefully will guide the future development of the country.
7. Limitations of the Study
Several challenges were encountered in the course of this research. First, the political
climate was not conducive to undertake the study. Although the writer had a letter
introducing him as a researcher, most of the officials contacted were reluctant to provide
the relevant information. This was particularly common among government workers who
may have suspected that the writer intended to promote the Ahidjo regime in the wake of
the economic and political crisis confronting the present president. The 1984 coup
attempt in the country, in which Ahidjo was named a suspect, led to the destruction of
valuable historical documentation on the Ahidjo presidency. As a result, the writer had to
rely on scanty information. A lot ofvaluable information critical to the study could not be
presented because of the current domestic politics of the country.
Another limitation of this study is its duration. Studies of this nature require lengthy
field studies to collect information and to interview potential informants. Only a few
officials were interviewed and sampled. A questionnaire was given only to a sample of
farmers in the Meme and Ndian divisions of the Southwest province, which represents a
small percentage of the total number of farmers in the province. A major problem for the
study was the lack of financial resources that ultimately limited the scope of the study.
The total cost of the study was borne by the researcher and as such, limited financial
resources could not permit an extensive research as required.
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However, these limitations are not expected to diminish the value of the study. The
number of farmers surveyed provided a large enough sample to permit reasonable
conclusions about the support of farmers for the regime. This study, therefore, provides
the impetus for further research on the state and development in Cameroon and to the




This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that can better explain the
Cameroon experience in state building. To explain the involvement of the state in the
process of development in developing countries, two theoretical models are examined.
The theory of the state that attempts to explain the nature of the state and its involvement
in society, and the political economy theories use modernization and dependency
paradigms to explain the political economy of development in Africa and in Cameroon.
The essence here is to understand the dynamics of underdevelopment and the
international economic dependence of Cameroon’s development on the global economy.
The chapter also explores how political economic theories have conceptualized
the relationship between economic and political forces of development within the context
of the state. For African countries characterized by weak indigenous entrepreneurial
classes and market forces, a weak demand and consumption pattern eauses the state to
become an important factor in providing the necessary capital for investment
In the study of Cameroon’s political economy, the role of the state is central in
explaining economic growth and development. This relationship emerged because of the
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nature of the post-colonial state in Cameroon and the enormous responsibilities imposed
on it by colonial exploitation and neglect
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2.1. Resurgence of the Statist Theories
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Interest in the state and its role in development have increased in the last decade.
Statist theorists, who emphasize the independence of the state and its control over
society, have challenged the conventional pluralist view that regards government as a
neutral bargaining arena of societal forces and government policy. One reason has been
advanced for their interest in state and development issues. The argument of revisiting the
state theory by neo-Marxists such as Poulantzas and Miliband was respected in the early
1970s, and their views encouraged young political scientists to study the role of the state
in the political economy of nations. Although many scholars differ in their analysis of the
state’s role in development, especially in the contradiction between productive forces and
the mode of production, there is a consensus among these scholars to reintroduce the role
of the state in development.*
Interest in the role of the state and its activities further increased in recent years
in response to changes in the world economy. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the
industrialized world experienced rapid economic growth and expansion, African states
became increasingly marginalized because of their role in the world economic system in
which they served only as suppliers of raw materials. In this situation, the nature of the
state and its interaction with society to foster development became critical.
The traditional Marxist instmmentalists view the state as no more than an
instrument of the ruling class. Ralph Miliband’s critique of the state as instrumentalist in
nature and form, was an important development paradigm considered by some African
' For a discussion, See B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, “On the road toward a
more adequate understanding of the State,” in In Bringing the State Back In.ed. Evans et al. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 346-66.
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states. Miliband’s view of the state goes far beyond that of simple instrumentalist
thinking. In criticizing the relationship between the state and the ruling class, Miliband
examined the social origin of the members of the state apparatus on the one hand, and
their interpersonal relations with the members of the same class on the other. He assessed
the direct and precise relationship between the state and capital, that, he concludes was a
direct reply to bourgeoisie ideologies.
For structuralists like Poulantzas, the relation between the capitalist class and the
state is not so important because it is a relationship between the bourgeoisie class and the
state, hence an objective relation. The state represents the capitalist interest in principle,
by reason of the system itself and not because of the direct influence of the bourgeoisie.^
According to Poulantzas, the state is not an independent actor in the class struggle
between capital and labor. The state is nothing but, ‘a resultant of the relations of power
between classes within a capitalist formation,’ or ‘ the condensation of relations of a
class relation.’ The state itself does not have power; it only reflects power relations of the
capitalist and working classes. The state as the representative of the general interest is an
ideological fiction or is generally limited by its characteristics of being a class state.
Criticizing both instrumentalist and structuralist theorists. Block argues that there
is a division of labor between non-class-conscious capitalists and those who manage the
«
state apparatus. Capitalists do not pursue class interests in general, but rather their own
personal interests. They are conscious of what is necessary for the reproduction of the
78.
^ See Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quarterly Books 1973).
^ See Nicos Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” New Left Review, 58 (1969), 67-
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socioeconomic order/ He concludes that the source of independent power of the state
is its monopoly over the means of violence. Further, the state is dominated by the
capitalist class but is independent and ‘state managers collectively are self-interest
maximizers, interested in maximizing their power, prestige and wealth.^ Those who
manage the state apparatus are forced to concern themselves, to a greater degree, with the
reproduction of the social order because their continued power rests on the maintenance
of political and economic order.® State managers, he maintains, do not constitute a class.
Skocpol, Krasner and Nordlinger further analyzed the above view in a number of
studies.’ In criticizing pluralism and neo-Marxism as society-centered theories, they
proposed a state-centered theory that argues that, unlike other societal groups, the state is
not merely an independent actor. It is above other forces and can change and restructure
society by using its monopoly of violence.
Furthermore, Stepan concludes that:
... the state must be considered as more than the ‘government.’ It is the
continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system that
attempts not only to structure relationships between civil society and public
authority in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relationships within
civil society as well.*
For an analysis, See Fred, Block, “The ruling Class does not Rule,” Socialist Revolution 7, 33
(1977), 6-28.
^ Block, “Beyond relative autonomy; State managers as Historical subjects,” in Socialist Register.
ed. Ralph Miliband and J. Saville (London: Merlin Press, 1980), 227-42.
^ See Block, 1977.
’ For a discussion. See Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press 1981); Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis
in Current Research,” in In Bringing the State Back In ed. Evans et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1985); and also Stephen Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Concepts and Historical
Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16 (1984), 223-46.
® For a detail discussion, see Alfred Stapan, State and Society, (Princeton; New Jersey; Princeton
University Press, 1978).
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Although there are many goals that the state pursues, it is generally considered that the
state functions to realize the public interest.^ The state provides conditions for capital
accumulation in order to realize the most fundamental public interest, which is economic
development. The drastic increase of state intervention in the economic life of African
countries indicates the importance of states in these countries. The Cameroon state was
no exception.
From the above therefore, the following conclusions can be made about the
Cameroon state under Ahidjo. First, the state under Ahidjo was an instrument utilized by
him to achieve his goal ofpolitical and economic development. Second, the Cameroon
state presented a unique characteristic in that, unlike the structuralist as posited by
Poulantzas, the Cameroon state did have powers because the state was embodied in
Ahidjo. State managers were mere instruments used to achieve the desires of Ahidjo.
2.2. Theory of the African State
Claude Ake characterizes the state in contemporary Africa as a purely generic
phenomenon.'*’ He argues that the state is a specific modality of class domination. This
domination is mediated by commodity exchange such that the system of institutional
mechanisms of domination, which is different and disassociated from the ruling class and
society, appears as an objective force alongside society. In other words, the state is an
independent actor. The African state, he maintains, is essentially a capitalist
’ See Stephan Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and U. S.
Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978).
See Claude Ake, “The Future of the State in Africa,” International Political Science Review 6,
1 (1985), 105-114.
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phenomenon. The essential feature of state domination is autonomized and becomes
increasingly independent of the social classes including the hegemonic class." What
makes this possible is the generation of commodity production and exchange, since it
gives the state the appearance of objectivity and it is this objectivity upon which liberal
theories of the state capitalize in a rather misleading way.*^
Ake concluded that African states seen as modes of domination are a living
contradiction of interests of power and of social forces, since the style ofpolitics
associated with them produces governments that are lacking in legitimacy. Without an
element of legitimacy, the government is alienated from society. He claims that, ‘since
the people see the state as an alien force, they make no commitment to its policies, but
rather, seek to exploit the state to their own advantage.’" It is this lack of connection
between society and the state that fuels the underdevelopment of Africa, because
development requires total participation by all the parties in state and society.
Contemporary theories of the state in Africa show a lack of systematic treatment
of the concept. To a certain extent, the absence of a theory of the state in Africa is a
positive development, since there are inherent dangers in generalizing about theories of
the state. The approach that is widely used by scholars of political economy is that which
conceives of the state as an actor." By viewing the state as an actor, one is able to explain
" Ibid.
For an analysis, See Juluis Ihonvbere ed., The Political Economy of Crisis and
Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake (Lagos, Nigeria: JAD Publishers Ltd., 1989).
Ibid.
For a recent discussion on this, see C. Bennett Douglas and Kenneth E. Sharpe, (1985); also see
Juluis E. Nyang’oro, The State and Capitalist Development in Africa: Declining Political Economies (New
York: Praeger, 1989).
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why the state has the interest it does. It also means explaining particular characteristics
within a political economy framework by examining issues as state intervention in the
economy and the success of state policies.
In the Cameroon context, the building of the state in the first place respected
considerations of efficiency. For Ahidjo, Cameroon had to be a “modem and strong
state,” capable of assuming the historical tasks that befell her, that is to say, principally to
accelerate national unification and “to carry out development with lucidity and
firmness.”'^
In Ahidjo’s view:
if state intervention in the economic field is in the nature of things in our
time, we should not however lose sight of the fact that in underdeveloped
countries, this intervention is so far reaching as to make the state in the long
run, the principal economic agent in these countries.
From the above statement, the following conclusion can be drawn. Ahidjo
understood the level of development at the end of colonial mle. He also understood that
poverty, a weak demand and the lack of an entrepreneurial class in the country left the
state solely responsible for any development initiative. For Cameroon to move forward in
its development effort, the state must be the prime mover. Also, total participation was
critical for Cameroon’s development. To prevent any signs of alienation of society from
the development process, Ahidjo engaged every sector of the economy especially the
agricultural sector that employed the majority of the population. It is for this reason that a
Presidential statement on general policy, edition of the fourth congress of the Union
Camerounaise political party (Ebolowa, 1962) 13; also see Amadou Ahidjo, Contribution to National
Construction (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1964), 33.
See Amadou Ahidjo, 1964.
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critical look at his agricultural policy and its effect is necessary. To pursue this avenue
the state created institutions that were responsible for promoting development. To move
the country out of underdevelopment, policies for development were implemented, with
planned liberalism as the ideology guiding development. How did the state approach its
economic development? What theories best explain the interaction between politics and
economics in the political economy literature? The next section examines theories of
modernization, dependency and economic development, and critically evaluates their
significance for Cameroon in general and for the Southwest province in particular.
2. 3. Modernization Theory
This theory emerged from classical theorists like Adam Smith and Joseph
Schumpeter. Classical laissez-faire economists argued that the best path to economic
growth is the unrestricted operation of the market. Schumpeter is an important classical
theorist whose theory is elaborated in a text titled Theory of Economic Development.'^
His approach to development rejects the characterization of development as a gradual,
harmonious process and places more emphasis on the significant role of the entrepreneur.
This is a major departure from modernization scholars who view development as
a harmonious process. The entrepreneur, he argues, combines the various factors of
production (land, labor, and capital), to achieve growth. Development can be achieved by
emphasizing highly motivated managerial activity. The critical question here is that if the
entrepreneur is considered the prime mover in economic growth, why then has the
See J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge; Harvard University
Press, 1934).
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African state been criticized by this theory? The answer lies in the ideology
underpinning this theory which is that economic growth and development must continue
to remain the domain for the market and not the state. This study contends that the
Cameroon state was capable of achieving growth and development under the Ahidjo
regime, supporting the fact that states can be engines of development.
The modernization theorists also argued that Western Europe’s economic
development was largely sustained by the action of the market. The more the market is
allowed to function without restriction the more rapid the level of development.
Following this school of thought, government policies that support free markets do not
only stimulate economic efficiency, but they also lead to economic growth. Growth is
seen as a gradual process, which is harmonious, and only possible through savings geared
for investment.
Modernization theory suggests that western societies are models for development.
It assumes that by following prescribed paths, developing countries will eventually
develop. Rostow, a leading proponent of this school claims that the process of economic
growth and development passes through five stages: the traditional society, the
precondition for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity and the high mass
consumption stages.'*
In this view, traditional society operates within a limited production framework
because its central feature is a ceiling on the level of attainable output per head. This is
the stage that many colonial territories had attained. He considers the take-off stage as the
See W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc.,
1954).
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watershed in the life of modem societies because resistance to steady growth is finally
overcome. He claims that industrialization and development are gradual processes that
every society must pass through, as exemplified in the case of Europe. Africa must follow
the same path that Europe took to develop. Rostow is thus suggesting a general theory of
development for developing economies.
Capital is the most important factor for economic growth and development, and
for modernization scholars, the market must be the provider and the optimal institution
for efficiently allocating scarce resources. This is in line with the classical assumption
that the “invisible hand,” of the price mechanism, must be freed from government
intervention. Western Europe developed because state intervention in the economy was
minimal. Capital accumulation through technological change is paramount in this
theory.'^ Increased productivity through reliance on the market to allocate resources is
critical for this school. The pervasive interventionist nature of African states is blamed
for the problems facing the continent. Poor economic performance has been linked to the
interruption or non-existence of the price mechanism in allocating resources.
The prescription for Africa’s poor economic performance has been Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP). These policies attempt to stimulate supply and growth by
enhancing the productive capacity and creating a more efficient and market oriented price
system.^*’ In terms of price structure, this theory argues that state intervention in the
economy has distorted prices and thus created a problem. Robert Bates contends that it is
For a discussion see J. E. Meade, A Neo-Classical Theory of Economic Growth (London:
George and Unwin, Ltd., 1961).
See World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, (Washington D. C., 1990), 45.
37
the biased state action that has made agriculture an unprofitable venture for farmers?'
He concludes that given the necessary incentives, the agricultural sector is capable of
generating the required resources for development. This biased character of the state is
exemplified in policies against rural producers in favor of import-substituting industries.
Another aspect of state intervention that explains the pervasive inefficiency of the
African state is in the area of State Owned Enterprises (SOE). The inefficiency of these
ventures in Africa made it SAP’s prime target. SAP calls for the privatization of these
enterprises and a reduction in the number of public sector employees. The rationale here
is that freeing capital tied in inefficient state- run ventures and cutting the state budget for
salary payment of unproductive civil servants, provides the necessary capital to invest.
This would further allow the market to redistribute the resources as well as the income
accruing from economic growth. Also, the hidden agenda is to structure these economies
so that they can pay back foreign debts; however, the interesting fact is that the new
owners of these ventures in most ofAfrica today happen to be western capitalists who, as
history has demonstrated, are more interested in exploiting the resources of the continent
than in developing it.
The impact of SAPs has far reaching repercussions on African societies. Many
African scholars have criticized it because of the effects it has had on the rural poor,
whom it was originally intended to protect. For others, the measures are too drastic.
Streeten argues that there are no mechanisms to protect farmers especially with cuts in
expenditure on infrastructure and extension services, that make farmers to become
For a detail analysis, see Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political
Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press 1981).
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vulnerable under SAPs.^^ He concludes that expenditure reduction in a low- income
country will tend to hit the poor most, especially those in the rural areas who are
generally biased against urban dwellers, if they are not specifically protected or
compensated.
Modernization theory has been widely credited for economic growth in the newly
industrialized countries in Asia; however, its application to Africa has been criticized in
that reductions in state intervention in a continent still suffering from declining growth,
decreasing prices of raw materials and unstable political systems are devastating. The
critical question of underdevelopment has not been addressed in this theory. Furthermore,
there is ample evidence suggesting that SAPs and their market-oriented strategy has been
destabilizing in Africa. The recent conditionalities imposed by SAPs on African states,
asking them to democratize their political systems, undermines their economic growth
and development on the one hand, and democracy and stability on the other. The
democratization process in Africa and Cameroon in particular has caused the emergence
of factionalism. Tribal politics has taken precedence. This situation divides rather than
unites the population that is critical for the development process.
In Cameroon, the inability of the Biya regime to achieve economic recovery and
development has been one of the reasons for recent political disturbances in the coxmtry.
Those bureauerats, who benefited from the excessive government expenditure during the
late 1980s forcing the country to borrow capital, were very reluctant to give up their
benefits. In fact, as Van de Walle suggests, it was impossible for the state to undertake a
See, P. Streeten, “Structural Adjustment: A Survey of the Issues and Options,” World
Development 15, 12 (1987), 1469-82.
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recovery program because the ruling elite was strongly opposed to any reform.^^ The
political crisis that Cameroon has experienced in the 1990s has partly been due to
external factors, but also to poor economic performance that has led to widespread
economic hardship that was hardly visible during the Ahidjo era.
If modernization theory is to be applied in Africa to move the continent from its
present state of underdevelopment, then it must incorporate traditional historical aspects
of Africa’s political economy within the context of the international economic system.
This aspect includes Africa’s subjection to colonial rule and exploitation, a unique
experience that undermines modernization theory’s claim of a general theory of
development. Countries with a history of colonization experienced a rather destabilizing
phenomenon in political as well as economic development. Politically, the process of
state formation, which in other societies went from the feudal to the nation-state, was
interrupted in Africa. Economically, colonization reduced the continent to the production
of raw materials and to become a subordinate player in the world economic system. The
continent of Africa must thus be understood within the context of all its complexities. It is
this significant factor that makes the dependency approach to development critical in the
study of the political economy of development in Africa and in Cameroon.
2. 4. Dependency Theory
The dependency school originated in Latin America in response to the failures of
the programs of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ELCA),
in the early 1960s. Raul Prebiseh, who was the head of ELCA, criticized the outdated
For a discussion, see Van de Walle, “The politics of non-reform in Cameroon.”
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scheme of the international division of labor, which provided for Latin America to
produce food and raw materials for the greater industrial center.^'' For Prebisch, this was
the root cause of underdevelopment in Latin America. He argued that reliance on the
export of food and raw materials led to deterioration of the terms of trade.
His strategy for development called for Latin America to move away from the
one-sided division of labor that was imposed by the international economic system
causing underdevelopment, to a strategy of rapid industrialization. Industrialization was
to be accomplished through import substitution and the production of raw materials
geared for exports critical for foreign exchange, and an increase in government
involvement in the industrial process necessary to break the vicious cycle and to
transform the region. Government had to play a major role in providing the necessary
capital and support in the industrialization of the economy.
The major argument of the dependency school has been based on the failure of the
modernization school to explain underdevelopment, with regards to Africa. Andre
Gunder Frank’s argument is that the modernization school focuses only on the economic
factors essential for Africa’s development prospects, while ignoring the historical
experience of the continent.^^ According to Frank, developing countries could never
follow the development path of western countries because they experienced colonialism.
He identifies a major stage in this development in which developing countries in the
periphery were incorporated into the world economic system at an early stage of their
For a discussion, see Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its
Problems (New York: Lake Success, 1950), 88-116.
Andre Gunder Frank, Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 21-94.
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development. Colonialism thus prematurely brought these areas into an already
developed world system.
Frank argued that the underdevelopment of these countries could only be
explained by the historical experiences of colonialism and foreign domination. He
concludes that the transfer of economic surplus from developing areas to the centers
produced underdevelopment in the former colonies while the historical process that
generated development in the center also simultaneously generated underdevelopment in
the periphery.
Dependency scholars call for a redefinition of development, arguing that such a
definition should not be limited only to advocating for more industry, output and raising
the level ofproductivity as the modernization scholars advocate. It should be defined in
terms of improving the living standards of all the people in the periphery. Development
programs should not focus on elite and urban dwellers only, but should attempt to satisfy
the human needs of the rural peasants who form the bulk of the population in the
periphery. This is particularly significant and relevant to the Cameroon experience. The
growth brought about by the agricultural sector increased the GDP, and improved the
living conditions of many Cameroonians during this period. To this effect, increase in life
expectancy, higher educational levels, more medical facilities and better nutrition in the
rural areas were all products of the policy initiated by the Cameroon government.
Another aspect of the dependency debate is the development of periphery
capitalism and unequal development. Samir Amin, a leading exponent of this view
argued that the developed country’s impact on the eeonomies of Africa created what he
called ‘peripheral capitalism,’ a social system in which total accumulation of the
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capitalist mode is hindered, resulting in distorted economic development.^^ For him,
underdevelopment is not a transitional stage as the modernization school claims, but
rather a persistent condition that will last as long as unequal exchange exists between the
center and the periphery. The periphery concentrates on its production for exports, not
because it lacks internal markets, but because the center compels it to be a
complementary supplier of agricultural and mineral products.
This argument was echoed at the United Nations when many developing countries
called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), to regulate the ‘biased’ world
economic system. Also the many rounds of trade negotiations carried out between the
north and south are all efforts to reduce the widening trade gap. The south failed to obtain
meaningful concessions and reforms with the north thus sustaining the argument that
developing countries will remain dependent as long as there is unequal exchange. To
make matters worse, deteriorating terms of trade for export products significantly
undermine any effort by government to expand the productive capacity of the state.
Amin claims that the international pattern of demand and supply, in terms of raw material
and finished goods is proof that Africa was forced to produce what it could not consume
and consume what it did not produce. This means the perpetuation of African
dependence on the economies of Europe.
For a discussion, see Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of
Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
27 Ibid.
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Walter Rodney provides the most incisive analysis of Africa’s systematic
impoverishment that he linked to European colonialism and impenalism. He argued that
colonialism not only brought Africa into the global economy, it did so in a structurally
unequal manner. Rodney, highlighting Europe’s contribution to Africa’s
underdevelopment, explored the inherent relationship between Africa’s
underdevelopment and colonialism and concluded that the relationship between Africa
and the west was a dependent one in every aspect.
Immanuel Wallerstein, in his world systems theory, advanced this argument
further by stating that it is not possible theoretically for all states to ‘develop
simultaneously.’ Since global relations are closed and rigorously structured, if one
country or area advances, then the progress of others must, perforce, be impeded.^^ His
analysis suggests that dependency will remain a condition of the periphery if western
countries maintain the current situation. Developing countries will only advance if the
center decides to halt its pace of development. This unrealistic situation is critical to
explaining the persistence of underdevelopment in developing countries. The structure of
the world system makes dependency of the periphery eminent.
Theotonio Dos Santos also articulated the idea of structural dependence of
developing countries on developed countries. He argued that the existing structure of
international trade constrained the success of many developing countries while
See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington D. C.: Howard
University Press, 1974).
Immanuel Wallerstein and Terrence K. Hopkins, World-System Analysis: Theory and
Methodology (Beyerly Hills: Sage Publication, 1982).
accelerating the success of developed countries because of the power of the latter to
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determine who trades what and at what price.
Dos Santos claims that colonial economic policies perpetuated the
institutionalized vulnerabilities of developing states to external economic forces, and
constrained the freedom of African leaders after independence to pursue an independent
economic relationship with the West.^' If a country has no control over major decisions
affecting its economy, it is considered relatively dependent. As Dos Santos contends:
dependency extends to internal social structure, ideology, cultural beliefs
and internal decision-making apparatus. The internal class structure is
dominated by a small group of political economic elite closely tied to
foreign interest. Local elite diverts the surplus generated from the developed
cash crop production overseas through export profit, or internally into
conspicuous consumption with limited amounts being invested in capital-
intensive technology or import-substitution.^^
In essence, a developing country has national institutions that are often forced to
give up their capacity, power and ability to make and implement critical decisions
affecting their entire economy and other sectors of the state. Cameroon is an exception in
that the creation of the ‘progressive clan,’ by Ahidjo gave him complete control over
decision-making. This group had little or no influence from foreign interest. There were
no competitive elite groups in Cameroon that could have had ties with foreign interests.^^
Everybody in the country had an interest in Ahidjo, who was the embodiment of
See Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” American Economic Review 60,
(May 1970), 231.
Ibid.
For a discussion. See Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Crisis of Development Theory and the
Problems of Dependence in Latin America,” in Underdevelopment and Development, ed. H. Berstein
(Penguin Press, 1973).
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Cameroon’s development. His coalition building and ‘shifting alliance,’ strategy was
critical in ensuring economic growth and political stability in the country.^'* This policy
made it possible for the state to eliminate ‘pork barrel’ expenditures that could have
increased the debt of the country.
The recent international debt crisis has been identified by the dependency school
as further explanation of the exploitative relationship between the center and the
periphery. For these theorists, the debt crisis is a means for the developed countries to
transfer wealth from the periphery to the center. In such a situation, interest payment to
creditors takes place in the form of siphoning off surplus from the periphery, thereby
Off
creating a form of ‘debt-trap.’ The consequence is that there is a free flow of capital to
the international markets, instead of to badly needed domestic investments necessary for
economic growth and development, further widening the gap between the center and the
periphery. The current external debt of developing countries reflects the contemporary
form of their exploitation by external powers.
2. 5. Summary
State and political economy theories discussed in this chapter help us to
understand the various aspects of development in Cameroon. The interventionist nature
” Informal discussion with a retired senior government official in Yaounde.
Ahidjo never allowed one top official to hold a position for more than four years. He constantly
shuffled his cabinet to prevent any one person to have power and threaten his command. This was
indirectly helpful because it prevented the development of an elite that was tailored to sustain foreign
interest in Cameroon.
For a discussion, see R. P. Dweitt and J. F. Petras, “Political Economy of the International Debt;
The Dynamics of Financial Capital,” in.. Debt and the Less Developed Countries, ed. J. D. Aronson
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 191-215.
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of the state created a situation that made it easy to strike a balance between economic
growth and development on the one hand, and political development on the other.
Ahidjo’s creation of a ‘class’ known in French as “ENAMARDS,” implemented his
policies in the provinces and benefited from the state thereby supporting his regime and
giving it its vaulted stability. The policies implemented also benefited farmers of the
Southwest province who supported the regime. Issues of institution building, poverty
reduction, and improvement in the general welfare of Cameroonians become paramount
in the discussion.
Cameroon’s desire to develop is rooted in the nature of the Cameroon state and
its effort to balance all the conflicting forces of ethnic, linguistic, tribal and religious
persuasions in the country, to make it a strong entity with the ability to contain such
conflicting forces. The political economy approach facilitates the discussion of
development in Cameroon, while modernization theory helps in the analysis of
Cameroon’s movement from the traditional to a modem society. Improvement in
agricultural production through the green revolution and other agricultural policies was
significant in advancing the country’s growth and development efforts even though the
country was still dependent on the international economic system. The country’s reliance
on agricultural production though undermined by fluctuating prices empowered the
Cameroon state to be fully involved in economic growth and development. In particular,
the political economy approach helps one understand the situation in the Southwest
province where the interplay between economic and political factors has been critical for
its development and why support for the Ahidjo regime was strong among farmers in the
Southwest province.
CHAPTER III
THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CAMEROON STATE
(1885- 1990)
The Cameroon state is the product of a series of distinct historical stages; the
traditional society, the colonial state, and the post-colonial state. This chapter examines
the nature of the Cameroon state within a broader perspective of the development of the
state on the African continent. The analysis begins with an overview of Cameroon’s
political evolution. The focus here is to understand the nature of the traditional society
and the factors that shaped its existence.
Germany colonized the country in 1885 during the partition of Africa and
introduced colonial rule in Cameroon that led to the development of an administrative
system designed to incorporate Cameroon into the world economic system. Colonial rule
under Germany, France and Britain enables us to examine the nature of the colonial state
and its influence on Cameroon’s post-colonial state formation.
The nature of the post-colonial state was defined by the Ahidjo regime that was preceded
by the evolution of party politics in Cameroon, characterized by the localized practice of
multiparty politics after independence and the collapse of the post-colonial state. The
birth of a single party, the Cameroon National Union Party (CNU) in 1966 was critical to
the development of the Cameroonian state envisioned by Ahidjo. It introduced
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a new phenomenon critical to the study of the state and development in Cameroon. The
corporatist nature of the Cameroon state contrasts with the nature of other states in
Africa. The Cameroon state under Ahidjo was committed to the development process and
through a twenty-year development plan it achieved success in economic growth and
development.
3.1. The Traditional Society
Most Cameroonian societies before colonial domination were sophisticated
socio-economic and political organizations whose pattern of authority was hierarchical
with kings as heads of those institutions. The kings ruled societies with divine powers
that were hereditary in nature. These traditional societies were grounded in agriculture
and were primarily patrimonial in nature.' Land was the only means of production in
society, and subsistence agriculture like shifting cultivation, ‘bush- burning’ and crop
rotation were the dominant agricultural practices in these societies. The stratified nature
of these societies also influenced division of labor within them. Land ownership was
limited to men while women played more of a supporting role in cultivating the land.
Two significant forces however, changed the nature of the traditional society in
Cameroon. The first was the force of internal economic change. With increased
international commerce, the coastal regions became less involved in agriculture and more
focused on trade. The importance of trade to the regions of Douala and Bimbia^ was
overwhelming. It not only increased the availability of goods in the region, it also
' For a discussion on pre-colonial societies, see Max Weber, Economy and Society vol. Ill, ed.
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968), 1010-38.
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changed societal composition in tenns of the emergence of a new class called the
middlemen or traders. This phenomenon changed the traditional structure of
Cameroonian coastal societies and was complemented by colonialism, which eventually
changed the traditional ways of life of these coastal societies.
The second force that destabilized the traditional society in Cameroon was
colonialism that led to the premature introduction of Cameroon’s economy into the world
economic system. The increasing interaction between the coastal inhabitants of
Cameroon and the early Europeans led to the development of trade that culminated in the
colonization of Cameroon in 1885 by the Germans. The unwillingness of colonial rulers
to sanction patron-client ties that had been developed in the traditional society further
eroded the traditional authority in these societies. This change was critical in
transforming the traditional society in Cameroon especially around the coastal regions.
3.2. The Colonial State
The first Europeans to have direct interaction with Cameroon were Portuguese
traders in the 1400s. However, the first major foreign influence was the arrival of British
missionaries. In 1844 Joseph Merrick headed the Baptist Mission that established a
station at Bimbia.^ The following year, Alfred Saker started another station in Douala. By
1870, missionary stations had penetrated Cameroon, setting up mission churches and
schools. As some scholars suggest, after the church came the guns and colonial
administration in Cameroon and Africa. Shortly after this Africa was partitioned by
^ Bimbia was the original name of the area called Victoria after the missionaries arrived. It is today
called Limbe. This region served as a gateway for trade and is located in the Southwest province, in the
case study area. Douala is the country’s economic capital.
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European powers in 1884. This partition gave Cameroon to Germany because the
British who had established churches in Cameroon were reluctant to enter the country
despite numerous pleas from missionaries. The British were interested in other territories
where their control was complete. Germany, however, had very few territories in Africa
because they came in late to the scramble for Africa. In 1885, Germany declared a
protectorate over Cameroon and called the country “Kamerun.”
Cameroon experienced three major colonial rulers from 1885 to 1960. Germany
officially colonized the country from 1885 to 1916, when they were defeated in the First
World War. During the inter-war period the League of Nations handed Cameroon, to
France and Britain. Germany again briefly regained control of the territory until its
formal defeat in 1945. The United Nations then placed Cameroon under the trusteeship of
France and Britain. An understanding of colonial rule in Cameroon is important because
it introduces us to the nature of the post-independence state, which eventually emerged at
the end of colonial rule. The dynamics of British, German and French colonial rule and
its respective impact on the formation of the state in Cameroon is significant because the
post-colonial state formation in Cameroon was directly shaped by colonial rule as well as
by Ahidjo’s perception of the role of the post independent state.
3.2.1. German Colonial Administration
Cameroon (Kamerun) was ruled for over forty years as a German colony. Of the
many years that Cameroon was subjected to colonial rule, German colonial
administration played an important role in the early formation of the post-colonial state.
^ For an analysis, see Fuabeh Fonge, Modernization Without Development In Africa: Patterns of
Change and Continuity in Post-Independence Cameroonian Public Service (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa
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Colonial administration was strictly hierarchical; six governors in all, appointed by the
Emperor, ruled in the country during this period and their powers came directly from the
Emperor. These Governors issued decrees to control the state’s property and colonial
subjects.
Initially, German rule was military in its intent because of the resistance from the
people in the interior and remote parts of the country. As more interior areas were
incorporated in the coastal administration, colonial administrative rule was expanded.
Military rule that had characterized early German occupation slowly gave way to civilian
rule, with police replacing soldiers to maintain law and order. This was significant in that
it changed the focus of German administration from that of military control to that of
exploitation.
Of all the six governors in Cameroon during German rule, the most interesting
and sometimes controversial governor was Puttkamer. His view was that the purpose of
colonial administration was to further the economic exploitation of the colony. Many
have described his method of governing as severe and ruthless. Forced labor was very
common during his rule. His exploitative initiatives however, saw a significant
improvement of Cameroon’s economic condition. Puttkamer played a major role in the
expansion of plantation agriculture in what is today called the South West Province. It is
therefore not surprising that the province was among the leading areas in agricultural
contribution to the colonial economy.
German colonial rule was also remarkable in the area ofplantation agriculture. It
served as a foundation for the development of a peripheral capitalist economy especially
World Press, 1997), 30.
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in agricultural development. Cameroon was slowly introduced to foreign currency with
the ‘German Mark” replacing the “cowry shells” as the medium of exchange. Trades with
the people before colonial rule was by barter, a system of exchange that was unequal,
cumbersome, and exploitative. Ivory, palm oil and palm kernels were exchanged for
cloth, arms, gun- powder and liquor. German traders profited tremendously from this
system and were defiant when the government introduced money as a medium of
exchange.
To complement commerce and trade with the interior parts of the country, the
Germans developed a transport system, which resulted in the high loss of Cameroonian
lives through forced labor. Roads, railways and ports were constructed to facilitate the
movement of products from the hinterland to the coast. As early as 1911, the Germans
had opened 160 kilometers of the northern railway line, to traffic between Bonaberi in
Douala and Nkongsamba in the Western province. In addition, the ports of Victoria,
Douala and Kribi were improved for easy access to ships. The Germans were
instrumental in the construction of roads linking Victoria in the Southwest province to
Bamenda in the North West Province. Significant road constructions as the Kumba to
Mamfe road as well as the Bamenda ring road were carried out during this period. It is
interesting to note that these roads are still in existence today. Bridges constructed by the
Germans as the Bonaberi, Edea and Mungo bridges are still in operation today.
Plantation agriculture was significant during German administration. The
Woerman trading company was located in Bimbia to establish plantations in the colony.
Plantation agriculture had an important influence on Cameroon’s development during
German administration. The fact that Germany was only interested in the economic
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exploitation of the colony meant that its development initiatives were limited to areas
of importance to the colonial economy, hence the development of plantations. Today the
Southwest province is dominated by plantation agriculture.
German rule in Cameroon was direct and strong; the colonial state directed trade
and plantation agricultural initiatives for the benefit of the German economy. In this
process however, Cameroon saw a significant development of infrastructure designed to
transport goods from the interior to the coast. Overall, the development of Cameroon
under German rule was minimal. Cameroonians were trained as interpreters and stayed in
that capacity. The level of education was low and the standard of living marginal.
German administration in Cameroon was significant because it created a lasting
impression on the minds of many Cameroonians in its legacy of administrative buildings
and in the use of brutal force. Today the buildings that were constmcted by the Germans
are used for administrative services in present day Cameroon.
3.2.2. British Colonial Administration
British Cameroons was divided into two parts: the northern area was completely
administered as part of the three provinces of Northern Nigeria, while the southern part
was initially attached to Eastern Nigeria and administered as a province in the Southern
Province of Nigeria, which later become a province in Eastern Nigeria. The discussion in
this section will be limited to the Southern Cameroons because in 1961, through a
plebiscite, it opted for unification with East Cameroon to form the Federal Republic of
Cameroon.
British administration in Africa in general and Southern Cameroons in particular
is significant because of its unique system of indirect rule. This indirect administration
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was achieved through a process of recruitment of an elite class especially made up of
people of status such as the educated and the wealthy such as Dr. Endeley who later
became a prominent political figure in the region.
Colonial officers were generally less concerned with the local system of rule
particularly if it had an established system. In Southern Cameroon where traditional rule
seldom extended beyond the village, the British established “Native Authority,” through
which they could rule indirectly. The West Cameroon “House of Chiefs,” and the “Native
Authority Courts” were two significant bodies that emerged during British colonial rule.
The ‘House of Chiefs’ comprised of imposed paramount chiefs from the region who were
incorporated into the legislative branch of the West Cameroon government in Buea. Their
responsibility included, but was not limited to, drafting legislation. The ‘Native Authority
Court’ system was an incorporation of the customary laws of the colony into the British
legal system. This organ served as a forum for the settlement of disputes, which the
British officers were reluctant to get involved in, especially disputes having to do with
land and traditional practices. It later became part of the judicial establishment in West
Cameroon until it was abolished in 1972 following the reunification of the French and
English Cameroons.
Southern Cameroons was not directly administered from London. Its status as a
trusteeship territory made it even more difficult for any effective British rule. As a result,
the administration of the region was centered in Nigeria. The greater flexibility given to
the political leaders in Southern Cameroons was instrumental in the creation of a local
civil service.'* Although British colonial rule was limited in the area of administration, it
For a detailed analysis, see Fonge, 51.
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provided the framework for the development of a colonial civil service that played an
important role in sustaining the state in post-colonial Cameroon.
Another important result of indirect rule by the British was the introduction of
party politics. This limited form of freedom under colonial rule led to the development of
political parties in Southern Cameroons. The intensity of political debates in the region
especially when it came to important questions like reunification with Cameroun showed
the level of political development in the region during this period.
The colonial economic policy was supposedly non-interventionist because the
region was administered as an integral but abandoned part of the Nigerian colony. With
no separate administrative structures setup the development of the region was limited to
the desires ofNigeria rather than the particular desires of the people in the region. British
exploitation of the region was dependent on the expansion of primary export crops
through plantation agriculture already developed by the Germans. The Cameroon
Development Corporation, was the dominant agency in plantation agriculture.^ This
corporation controlled a large section of arable land in the region, especially in the
coastal areas. It also employed a vast majority of the working population. Between 1950
and 1960, the CDC provided the major tax revenues and supplied between 40 and 50
percent of total export earnings in the region. The financial benefits of the CDC made the
British government invest substantially in the company. A significant number of loans
were secured to finance the development of more plantations. As a result, banana, tea and
^ The CDC has over the years grown into a major corporation. Today is it the number two largest
Employer in the country after the State. Its strategic location in the Southwest province is critical in this
study.
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rubber plantations were added to the already existing palm oil and palm kernel
plantations.
As mentioned earlier, domestic development was limited in this region during
British administration. In the area of infrastructure, little was done to improve the roads,
railway and ports left by the Germans. In fact, the buildings constructed by the Germans
became the administrative offices and residence of British officers. Road and railway
maintenance was minimal and the Kumba to Mamfe road as well as the Bamenda ring
roads slowly deteriorated. British colonial rule was significant in that it introduced party
politics in the political development of the region. It also provided a mechanism for
recruitment into the civil service. The incorporation of customary law into the new
British law was important in the transition from a traditional to a modem judicial system.
While economic development in the region was dismal, the political evolution was
significant in that it entailed a complete display and practice of the democratic process.
This was important in that it demonstrated the level of readiness of the people in the
region for self- determination.
3.2.3. French Colonial Administration
French colonial rule in Cameroun was by far more interventionist than British mle
in West Cameroon. Cameroon^ along with Togo, also a trusteeship territory given to
France by the United Nations, were associate territories of the French Union, while other
French colonies were member territories of the French Union. The trusteeship status of
Cameroon stipulated that the territory was not to be ruled as a colony, but France
® Cameroun is the French name for Cameroon. It will be used sometimes to denote French
Cameroon in this section.
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however, administered Cameroun as a French colony. The following contention by B.
Berman is significant in the study of French colonial administration in Cameroun.
According to Berman:
the most striking characteristic of the colonial state was the contradictory
character of its structure and process, which in turn reflected the
contradictory social force of colonial society. The colonial state can only
be adequately understood if its role in the political economy of
colonialism is considered.... ’
The colonial policy of the French was based on the paternalistic superiority of the
French culture. Their goal was to assimilate all the colonial people into the French
culture. The politics of assimilation was directed to groom, educate and coerce the
colonial people to act, dress and speak like the French. In a 1943 conference France
committed itself to a series of political, social and economic reforms in itsclons.*
These reforms had tremendous impact on the colonial state formation under France and
were later significant in the formation of the post-colonial state in Cameroon.
French colonial administration was instrumental in the development of an
administrative apparatus in Cameroon. The centralization of administrative units and the
creation of “prefectures” and districts in Cameroun were also a result of colonial rule.
The post-colonial Cameroun state under Ahidjo was in fact tailored to continue France’s
colonial administration. However, the significance of French colonial rule is more
reflected in the economy. The historical involvement of the French in Africa has always
been to make a profit from cheap raw materials and to create markets for their
’ For a detail analysis, see B. Berman, “Whose State: State and Capitalist Development in
Nigeria.” Review of African Political Economy 23 (January-April 1982), 37-51.
* For a discussion, see Micheal Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule (London: Hutchinson
University Press, 1980), 500-1.
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manufactured goods. French investment in colonies was thus to acquire more profits.
To this effect, French colonial investments were limited to the improvement of the
lucrative agricultural sector. Industrial development was minimal because the French
feared that indigenous capital accumulation would compete with the colonial sector. The
fear of a powerful indigenous economic class competing with them forced the French to
adopt the divide and rule policy in this sector of the economy.^
William Adloff pointed out that between 1946-1957, the dominant activities in the
colonies and the type of projects proposed and implemented were those that promoted
integration of the economies of the colonies with that of France rather than those, which
sought to develop viable internal economies.''’ French colonial rule was based on the
notion that public investment in infrastructure and agriculture would produce conditions
favorable for the flow of private capital from colonial development projects to the home
economy." Such private capital would also reduce the colonial government’s financial
involvement in the development of the colony.
Revenue sources were significant, and as colonial rule was imposed on an
agricultural population, a system of revenue collection was important for the success of
the administration. A policy of direct and indirect taxation was the means of raising
revenues to run the colony as well as for appropriating surpluses for repatriation to
’ This practice introduced distrust for rival tribal groups and forced all groups to look up to the
colonial state for support. It was significant during French colonial rule and also in the early stages of post¬
colonial state formation under Ahidjo.
For a discussion, see William Adloff, French West Africa: Yesterday and Today (New York:
Holt-Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 243-46.
" Discussion of colonial investment policies is found in the work of Claude Pannouillot, La
France D’Outre-Mer: Politique Economique et Sociale (Paris: Institute d’etude Politique, Universite de
Paris 1956/57), 241-65.
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France. Table I gives an indication of the major sources of income in the French
colonial budgets for 1938 and 1944. The pattern demonstrated by the two examples is
indicative of what happened throughout French colonial administration in Cameroun.
Furthermore, the pattern of taxation, by the colonial administration, especially of the poor
farmers who could barely support themselves was exploitative and was not limited to
French colonial rule only. The British and Germans carried out the same practice to
support their respective colonial administrative systems
TABLE 1
Major Sources of Revenue Receipts in Cameroun, 1938 and 1944 (million francs CFA)
REVENUE SOURCE 1938 1944
Direct taxes 44 111
Pool tax (paid by locals only 25.5 44
Income tax (paid by Europeans mostly) 0.7 32
Other taxes (paid by both Europeans and
Locals)
17.8 35
Indirect taxes 45.6 92.1
Import duties 18.9 49.1
Export duties 3 26.2
Other custom duties 23.7 16.8
Total direct and indirect taxes 89.6 203.1
Source: Annuaire Statistique du Cameroun, 1939-45 (1947)
From the above table the following conclusion can be drawn. The local
population carried the burden of taxes paid to the colonial state. Of the 44 million francs
CFA paid in direct taxes in 1938, 25.5 million francs was poll tax paid by locals only.*^
These locals were Cameroonians taxed during French colonial rule.
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This represented approximately 58 percent of the direct taxes that the colonial state
received in that year. By 1944, local contribution to state revenue increased. Also the
activities of the state had increased and there was need for more revenue, of which local
contributions could not be relied upon because of poverty. The statistics provided here
support the claim made by African scholars that colonial rule was exploitative and not
beneficial to the local population.
French administration in Cameroon performed two basic functions; it amplified
the conditions for the extensive exploitation of raw materials and the accumulation of
capital by France, and it also provided a framework for a stable political order and
effective control over the population inherent in the administrative machinery it created.
This further perpetuated the dependence of Cameroon on France. The introduction of the
franc CFA as the new medium of exchange not only replaced the German mark, but it
also brought an important element critical to the notion of underdevelopment. The new
currency was backed by the French Franc under a fixed exchange- rate system. This
system of a fixed exchange- rate continued to dominate Cameroon’s monetary policy up
to 1992, when France devalued the currency. This practice further marginalized
Cameroon because it depended on France for its monetary policy, with France controlling
its currency. Control over Cameroon’s monetary policy became critical to the
development of the country even after independence.
In conclusion, the colonial state had successfully implanted peripheral capitalism
in Cameroon as the dominant mode of production. Berman argued that metropolitan
states left the colonies when they could identify and negotiate with the new local class
who, like their predecessors took upon the responsibility to perpetuate the capitalist
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system.' The treatment of Cameroon as a colony and not as a state by the Germans,
British and French meant that the interests of the colonial power surpassed those of
Cameroonian nationals. At independence, therefore, the type of state that emerged from
the rubbles of three colonial administrations was critical for the survival of the post¬
colonial state. An attempt is made next, to trace the emergence of a new post-colonial
state in Cameroon, against the backdrop of its traditional societies.
3.3. The Post-Colonial State
Post-colonial Cameroon evolved between 1960 and 1982. For Ahidjo, the first
president of the country, the state in the first place was shaped by considerations of
efficiency. It had to be a modern and strong state, capable of assuming the historical task
that befell her, which was principally to accelerate national unification and development.
The state played a significant role in stimulating, orientating and controlling major
aspects of development. At independence, the state was faced with the problems of
institution building and development, in addition to ethnic, linguistic, religious and
cultural diversity brought about by history and colonial rule. The authoritarian character
of the political system that the state assumed was an attempt at unifying and developing
an identity for Cameroon. This characteristic, however, has been dismissed by many
scholars who viewed it as a means of perpetuating the capitalist system and strengthening
Ahidjo’s rule in Cameroon.
Cameroon became independent in 1960, and in 1961, a referendum placed
Southern Cameroon in a federation with Cameroon. From 1960 to 1982, Amadou Ahidjo,
For a detail study, see B. Berman, “Imperialism and Capitalist Transformation: Critique of a
Kenyan Debate,” Review of African Political Economy 19 (September- December 1980), 46-62.
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who has been hailed by many as a pragmatic, conciliatory and experienced president,
ruled Cameroon.'"* His presidency came to an end in 1982 when he resigned from office
and handed power to Biya Paul who is still in power. This forthcoming discussion is thus
concerned with the nature of the Cameroon state between 1960 and 1982. It examines
Ahidjo’s efforts in developing and building the apparatus of a modem Cameroon state
that was able to withstand the economic and political chaos experienced by many African
states.
When Ahidjo became president, he was more interested in building a state than a
nation. For him, the nation would emerge over time. The construction of a strong state
was therefore a precondition for a Cameroon nation. Given the ethnic, linguistic,
religious and cultural diversity of Cameroon society, only a modem state stmcture could
hold it together. A practical statesman, not a politician, was required and Cameroon was
lucky to have had Ahidjo. As Willard Johnson concludes, Ahidjo exemplified the hopes
that Cameroonians had for justice, peace and progress.'^ Johnson contends, “Cameroon
had been remarkably successful in consolidating the state. By doing so it has given itself
an even chance for some day becoming the ‘one Cameroon nation’.”'^
The above assessment supports the contention by others that the institutional
process of development in Cameroon was affected under the Ahidjo regime. Three major
''' For an overview, see Victor Le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1971), 179-84; also see Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political
Integration in a Fragmented Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 370-85.
See W. Johnson, 1970.
Ibid., 374.
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qualities were instrumental in the consolidation of the Cameroon state. They included
centralization, coalition building and repression.
Centralization of state authority was the most important strategy of the state
within this period. Significantly, it became the overwhelming characteristic of the
Cameroon state. It had numerous aspects, including the development of a strong single
political party, the concentration of administrative decision making in one city, the capital
Yaounde, the dissolution of the Federation to form a unitary system of government and
the use of the constitution to funnel authority to the president.Centralization gave the
president supreme authority over most of the political economy. The 1972 constitution,
for instance, gave the president the sole authority to appoint and dismiss ministers,
without legislative approval. The constitution established the independence of the
president and the executive branch. The implication of this was that all powers were
vested in the president, a legacy that represents the nature of the Cameroon state today.
As a result, the whole concept of checks and balances that is characteristic of a
presidential system of government in the United States, for example, is absent in
Cameroon even though in principle, Cameroon subscribes to a democratic political
system. As Mbu Etonga acknowledges, Ahidjo’s control of all aspects of government was
so complete that most members of parliament were not even aware that they had the right
to initiate legislation.'^ Similarly, in an interview with the press in the early 1990s, S.T.
’’ For an analysis, see Mark Delancey, Cameroon Dependence and Independence (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), 51.
See the constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon June 1972.
For a discussion, see Mbu Etonga, “An Imperial Presidency: A Study of Presidential Power in
Cameroon,” in An African Experiment in Nation-Building: The Cameroon Federal Republic Since
Reunification, ed. Kofele-Kale (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980).
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Muna who for many years was the speaker of the House of Assembly acknowledged
the fact that Ahidjo’s word was final and no one in the parliament could challenge him. It
supports the claim by scholars that during Ahidjo’s presidency Cameroon had a rubber
stamp parliament, which never debated the bills tabled before it. The legislature was
practically intimidated by Ahidjo.
Centralization was also visible in the formation of a single political party in 1966.
The Cameroon National Union party was formed as a result of the collapse of the many
political parties in Cameroon shortly after independence. The formation of a single party
cemented the centralized character of the Cameroon state. Although the party played a
significant role, the focus of the state as the dominant element in Cameroon never left
Ahidjo’s sight.
Coalition building was another quality that characterized the state. To bring all the
dissenting factions together, Ahidjo used his bargaining skills to create a strong and
modern state. Although not an intellectual, he was able to form the most lasting coalitions
in the country by bargaining with and coercing intellectuals to support the state. As Mark
Delancey maintains:
coalitions based on a variety of local and regional leaders, the bureaucracy
and the military as well as other elements of the petite bourgeoisie, urban
dwellers and a variety of northern-based elements were pulled together by
several means, including the development of an extensive client-patron
system, co-optation and buying off opposition force and the use of the
State security apparatus, the control of appointments and nominations, the
strategy of divide and rule, and the skillful use of ethnic balancing. . .,in
the appointment process.
See Mark Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1980), 58.
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This suggests that Ahidjo, who masterminded the creation of a strong state, was
willing to use all the resources at his disposal for state formation. It also brings out a
significant aspect of the post-colonial state in Cameroon. The state borrowed from the
nature of the traditional society before colonization that was heavily stratified. Another
significant aspect of the state in this period was the fact that no single ethnic group
dominated the political process. Although individuals from the northern section of the
country occupied political positions, people from the southern part also played a major
role. As a matter of fact, the rule of thumb was that as long as Ahidjo was president, the
second in command came from the southern part of the country. It is this characteristic of
the state that has led it to be viewed as a corporatist state. To further incorporate all in the
state structure, Ahidjo became sensitive to the language issue. There was growing
concern over the treatment of West Cameroonians as second-class citizens that made
Ahidjo to increase their representation in government. This problem also compelled him
to make great efforts at achieving a true bilingual state by personally speaking in
English.^' This symbolic gesture by the president was greeted by the people with respect
and was translated by them in their support for the state.
Ahidjo’s determination to build a strong modern state further forced him to build
an international coalition especially with France. Financial and other support was
guaranteed by the French government through the accords that were negotiated with
Cameroon, the most important being military assistance in case of an emergency. This
suggests that Ahidjo like many other African leaders was perpetuating the interest of
The most important gesture of Ahidjo during his presidency was during his swearing in
ceremony when he answered in English “I So Do Swear.”
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France. However, in an interview with a former U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon during
the 1960s, Ahidjo was described as a positive president whose objective was to develop
Cameroon. He contends that Ahidjo was a strong and independent president who
operated without the influence of France. He gives as an example, the case that after a
United Nations session in the 1960s, while most Francophone African presidents went to
France for debriefing, Ahidjo flew directly to Cameroon.^^ This characterization of
Ahidjo by a person who understood the politics at that time dismisses any argument by
critics who contend that Ahidjo was a puppet of France. In fact, his independence in the
management of the affairs of Cameroon from France, forced the French to mislead him
into a premature resignation.^^
The final quality of the Cameroon state under Ahidjo is one that draws different
conclusions. Takongang et al. suggest that the stability of the Ahidjo regime and the state
in Cameroon was based on the widespread use of repression and suppression of human
rights. Delancey has argued this point in his study of Cameroon’s dependence.^"^
Compliance was through the legislature and the institution of torture. Legislation was
amended to suit the authority of the president. The constitution allowed the creation of
opposition parties, but it was technically difficult, if not impossible to create one because
Article 4 of the same constitution prohibited the formation of groups or associations.
Interview with Ambassador Payton, U.S. Ambassador to Cameroon from 1967-1969. This
interview took place in Indianapolis, April 22, 1999.
There have been many discussions in private circles that Ahidjo was deceived by his French
doctors that he was seriously ill and no longer able to rule the country because the French wanted him out.
For an analysis, see Joseph Takongang and Milton Krieger eds., African State and Society in
the 1990s: Cameroon’s Political Crossroads (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press ,1998), 53-55; also see
Mark Delancey, Cameroon: Dependence and Independence.63.
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having an exclusively tribal of “clanic” character that might endanger the national
interest of unification and integration. The institution for maintaining the state of fear
were Service de Documentation (SEDOC) which in 1975 became the Centre National de
Documentation (CND), and the Brigade Mobile Mixte (BMM). These institutions
became household names as symbols of repression. The former served as the political
police with the special task of spying on potential enemies of the regime, while the latter
was the institution for torturing political non-conformists. Censorship of the press was
common practice within this period especially if the literature was critical of the regime.
Overzealous agents of the party police were said to be eager to arrest and detain anyone
found in contempt of possessing such literature because of the potential for remuneration.
This state of fear made some foreign observers refer to Cameroon as a “police state,” or
an authoritarian state. However, as others maintain, the apparent toughness ofAhidjo’s
regime derived from his religious beliefs. Being a Muslim, Ahidjo exemplified the
characteristic of a fair but strict president, who would support every constructive
criticism but crush any destructive tendencies.
Such repressive tendencies strongly influenced the relationship between the state
and society. On the one hand, this apparent dislocation of the socio-political structure
through repression was also inherent in French rule, which had instituted a similar
mechanism of repression called the “French Surete.” As some have argued, Ahidjo
combined the complex nature of the traditional society with the brutal and forceful nature
of colonial rule to form a sophisticated strong and modern state in Cameroon. On the
1967.
For further discussion, see the Cameroon constitution, Article 4 of Law No.67/LF/19 of June
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Other hand, the highly interdependent structure of state and society in post-colonial
Cameroon was Ahidjo’s creation. The nature of the state in Cameroon is thus rooted in
the apparatus that it utilized to reproduce itself In this light, an analysis of the evolution
of party politics in Cameroon is critical to further understand the nature of the state. The
single- party structure dominated Cameroon’s political system from 1966 to 1990, and it
is therefore imperative, to discuss its inception, structure and the reasons for its rejection
in 1990.
3.4. The Evolution of Party Politics
The debate about the state and political parties has always revolved around one
critical question: Which is effective, the one party or multiparty system? In his analysis
of political parties, Giovanni Sartori expressed doubts that the functional performance of
one-party systems is significantly superior to, or as good as, that of other types of
systems.^^ In another study, Robert Kauffman et al., found that one-party dominant
systems were superior to multiparty and no-party systems in controlling turmoil and
communal instability in the mid 1960s. Both scholars however conclude that the party
system is insignificant in the study of African politics.
Contrary to the above view, some observers claim that Africa’s trend is towards
authoritarianism and the weakening of the party structures. Claude Ake sees
“departicipation” as a technique utilized by sections of the dominant class to protect their
Interview with Ambassador Payton.
For an analysis, see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A framework for Analysis I
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 244-54.
For a discussion, see Robert E. Mckown and Robert E. Kauffman, “Party System as a
Comparative Analytical Concept in African politics,” Comparative Politics 6 (October 1973), 47.
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class interests against challenges from other sections of that class and from subordinate
classes. For Coleman and Rosberg, the one- party regimes were widely accepted in
tropical Africa because the older generations of Africans were subjected during most of
their lives to authoritarian political systems and were given only brief exposure to
multiparty politics in the last stage of colonial rule. They concluded that only the one-
party system was effective in integrating and stabilizing the political system.^'’
Kauffman’s dismissal of the significance of party politics in Africa is not only
premature, but it also fails to take into consideration the historical context of party
politics as Coleman and Rosberg have done. Political parties play a significant role in
Africa’s development. This is particularly true of the Cameroon situation where party
politics is important in obtaining jobs, promotions and getting good contracts for
business. In other words, being a tme militant could land one a good job in the country.
Shortly before independence, West and East Cameroon each had a distinct
multiparty system. In West Cameroon, all the political parties exercised equal powers in
the system. The parties were parochial in orientation and localized in support. This made
the party system fragmented, thus contributing to its collapse in 1966. The major parties
during the last years of colonial rule in West Cameroon were: the Kamerun National
Congress (KNC), with Dr. Endeley as the leader; Kamerun People’s Party (KPP); One
Kamerun (OK); and the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), with Foncha as
the leader. The two leading parties during the 1950s were the KNC and the KNDP.
See Claude Ake, “Explanatory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa,” Journal of Modem
African Studies 4 (March 1976), 9-15.
For a discussion, see James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg eds.. Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1964), 659.
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These parties were polarized over two critical issues with lasting implications
for the political economy of the regions: the question of secession from the Nigerian
Federation, and the issue of reunification with East Cameroun or Nigeria. While KNC
and KPP, which later united to form the Cameroon Peoples National Convention (CPNC)
favored reunification with Nigeria, the KNDP and OK championed reunification with
East Cameroun. Ahidjo had no problem in dealing with the fragmented party system and
in convincing them to form a one party system that was realized in 1966. As has been
suggested, party leaders in this region were either ignorant or greedy and were quick to
promote Ahidjo’s demands for a one party system, because of the benefit they hoped to
obtain from the system.
East Cameroon’s party system was dominated by two political parties: Union
Camerounaise (UC), Ahidjo’s party and the Union des Population du Cameroun (UPC).
The UPC was an opposition party that was instrumental in Cameroon’s struggle for
independence but never benefited, as did other political parties in Cameroon that had
•7 1
been at the forefront of the struggle for independence. The revolutionary tendency of
the UPC was a major factor for the French colonial government forcing it to ban the party
in the country. Unlike the localized party structure of many parties is West Cameroon the
UPC was broad-based. In fact after independence, the UPC had support in West
Cameroon with offices in the town of Kumba. Through coercion and serious bargaining,
Ahidjo was able to incorporate all other parties in the region to the UC party to form the
CNU.
For a detail analysis, see Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroon: Social Origins of
the UPC Rebellion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
Ahidjo’s call for a one- party system was grounded in three principal factors:
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the importance of economic progress, the wasteful nature of multiparty politics and the
volatile nature of such a system. Multiparty systems required substantial economie
resources to maintain them and were contrary to the ideology of planned liberalism in
Cameroon that called for an efficient use of scarce resources. Multiparties were also
considered a hindrance to effective governance and could lead to anarchy and civil strife,
detrimental to Cameroon’s desire for development (the rivalry between West Cameroon
party leaders was an example of the deteriorating situation). Finally, it was only through a
single- party system that Cameroon’s integration could be guaranteed. The single party
could be a framework for mass mobilization and control. From the above, one can
conclude that Ahidjo used the single- party system to consolidate his personal rule in
Cameroon. But a critical look at the political climate, with tribal politics at the forefront
and the threat of confrontation eminent, made a single- party system necessary. A regime
seeking major change requires a strong party, an organizational weapon capable of
penetrating and mobilizing mass support. This was achieved by the creation of the
Cameroon National Union in 1966.
The CNU was created on September 1, 1966, with the objectives of: consolidating
the union of Cameroon people, safeguarding fundamental liberties (especially equality
before the law) and contributing to civic and political education while promoting
economic and social interest of Cameroonians. The birth of the CNU was also another
step at consolidating the power of Ahidjo. With a single party, Ahidjo and the state
For a discussion, see Cameroon National Union, Text of the Cameroon National Union (Paris:
Presses de la S.I.P.E., n.d. 1966), article 2.
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became the dominant actor. The CNU played more of a supporting role. In this
capacity, the Ahidjo regime controlled the society with the help of mass mobilization by
the party. Ahidjo was able to reconcile the different interests in Cameroon through
coercion and a sophisticated patronage network to form a strong personal relationship
with all sectors of society including opposition members who were willing to
■JO
compromise their individual agendas to work with Ahidjo. This significant quality of
Ahidjo was important in developing the Cameroon state as a corporatist state.
3.5. The Corporatist State in Cameroon
The state in Cameroon has been conceived as a class, ethnic, clientist or
patrimonial state, a characterization that reflects the colonial properties imposed on the
African state. From 1960 to 1972, Ahidjo set about building a strong state, a process that
now appears to have resulted in the construction of what some experts call a corporatist
political framework. Corporatism gained widespread currency among social scientists
concerned with certain patterns in third world politics.
Timothy Shaw characterizes corporatism as a form of rule particular in
independent, peripheral political economies, reflecting the dependent nature of their
economies. African states typically adopted corporatism as, “a pattern of relationship
between the state and interest groups that involves such elements as state restructuring of




Many people substituted the name Ahidjo for president. It is alleged that when he resigned
many Cameroonians were asking for the new ‘Ahidjo’ and not president.
For a discussion, see Timothy Shaw, “Beyond Neo-Colonialism: Varieties of Corporatism in
Africa,” Journal of Modem African Studies 20 (1982), 255.
73
Modem political systems are corporatist in some aspects. Andrew Shonfield in
analyzing Western Europe, describes the post World War II plarming process in the
following terms:
the major interest groups are brought together and encouraged to conclude
a series of bargains about their future behavior, which will have an effect
of moving economic events along the desired path. The plan indicates the
general direction in which the interest groups, including the state in its
various guises, have agreed that they want to go.^^
The above statement refers to “societal” corporatism, which connotes the extent to
which interest groups penetrate or act upon an existing state to link themselves to
ongoing processes of governance. As a contrast, “state” corporatism is that resulting from
imposition from above by those in control of an authoritarian state. A major explanation
for the development of corporatism in Cameroon is articulated in the writing of Alfred
Stepan who views corporatism as an elite response to social and political fragmentation
arising from modernization. He argues that the corporatist ideas of unity are not a
function of unity or continuity but that they appeal to the ruling elite because they
perceive a widespread threat of fragmentation. The corporatist idea comes into play when
the elite fears that the old modes of domination are breaking down and they need new
mechanisms to link the lower classes to the state. For him, the argument for unity, and the
legitimacy of common good over individual interest and the role of the state in
development is a natural response by African politicians in need of new modes of
domination.^^ The fragmented society in Cameroon and the end of colonial rule coupled
For a discussion, see Andrew Shonfield, ed.. Modem Capitalism: The Changing Balance of
Public and Private Power (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965), 231.
See, Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 58.
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with the need for development required the state to become a corporatist state because
of the overwhelming variation of interest groups in the society. The state had to be strong
to deal with all the political, social and economic differences inherited from colonial rule.
Coalition building was utilized by Ahidjo and continued by the Biya regime to maintain
peace and unity in the country. The above analysis highlights the state’s response to
socio-political and economic weaknesses and reaffirms the need to reevaluate the nature
of the state in Africa and Cameroon in particular. Thus far, the corporatist character of
the Cameroon state under Ahidjo made it possible to deal with certain development
problems.
In the following chapter, the political economy of development from 1960 to
1982 is examined. An overview of Cameroon’s economy, with particular attention to the
role of the state in agricultural development under the twenty-year development plan
developed by the state, is presented. The critical factors that contributed to economic
growth and development are examined as well as the external assistance in securing a
healthy economy for the country.
CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT IN CAMEROON
Ahidjo ruled Cameroon from 1960 to 1982 when he resigned as president of the
country. He came to power following the attainment of independence by East Cameroon
in 1960. As president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon from 1961, his task of
national construction and unification was overwhelming following years of
underdevelopment and structural dependence initiated by colonial rule in Cameroon. As
indicated in Chapter III, colonial rule perpetuated the dependent nature of the country and
marginalized it by prematurely incorporating Cameroon into the world capitalist system.
Colonial rule facilitated the exploitation of Cameroon’s resources especially in the
agricultural and trade sector by European interests.
Cameroon’s development during colonial rule was slow and its international
status limited by its trusteeship status under France and Britain. The people were poor,
with low per capita incomes; they were uneducated and reduced to either plantation
workers or subsistence farmers. As President, Ahidjo vowed to break the poverty cycle
and bring Cameroon into the international scene along a new path of economic and
political development. As previously indicated, the development of a strong state was
Ahidjo’s precondition for Cameroon’s development. Lack of capital and the absence of
an indigenous entrepreneurial class compelled the Cameroon state to increase its
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involvement in the economy. This chapter evaluates Ahidjo’s economic development
policy with particular regard to the agricultural sector. Part one explores the political
economy of Cameroon in general, while part two looks at the Southwest province in
particular.
In undertaking this analysis, the following questions need to be addressed. First,
was it possible and realistic for the Cameroon state, just emerging from colonial rule to
implement policies for the development of the country? Second, given the institutional
structure of the country at independence (a fragmented federation struggling to cope with
the question of unbalanced economic development and political rivalry), could the Ahidjo
regime promote development in the country? In other words, was development the
objective of the Cameroon state or was it just political rhetoric? Answering these
questions would provide a clear picture of the intentions of Ahidjo and the Cameroon
state during this period.
Part I discusses the domestic policies of Ahidjo using the twenty-year
development plan as a guide. It shows that the agricultural policy outlined in the
development plan was a major success and was instrumental in Cameroon’s economic
development efforts. The following section presents an overview of Cameroon’s
geography, as a backdrop to the economic activities undertaken in the country. A brief
review of the colonial development policy shows how the country was exploited. With
low per capita incomes and a weak demand inherited from colonial rule, the post-colonial
state under Ahidjo had to adopt realistic development policies, not only to increase
productivity, but also to enhance the development of the country.
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4.1 .Geography of Cameroon
Cameroon’s political economy has been shaped by its changing geographic
condition. Today it lies between latitudes 9 degrees N and 13 degrees N and longitude 9
degrees E and 16 degrees E. It covers an area of 475,442 square kilometers (183,569
square miles), which is equivalent to 4/5 of the land area occupied by France. It shares a
common boundary with six countries: to the south with Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and
Congo Republic; to the east with Central African Republic (CAR); to the north with
Chad; to the west with Nigeria and to the south west with the Atlantic Ocean. This gives
Cameroon a strategic position in the central African region since it serves as a gateway
for the landlocked countries of Chad and CAR.
Cameroon has marked climatic and ecological differences. Temperatures reinge
from 68 degrees Fahrenheit around the foothills of the extreme northern sections of the
country.' Rainfall varies from 400 inches a year in the coastal line to an insignificant
amount at the Sahel region of the extreme north. Debuntscha in the Southwest province is
the second rainiest place in the world. The vegetation pattern of Cameroon comprises of
all the vegetation patterns in Africa, giving it the name “Africa in miniature.” From the
equatorial forest and coastal mangroves in the south, through the Savannah and plateau in
the central region, to the Sahel in the north, it presents a mosaic of African vegetation
pattern. The population is estimated in 1999 at 14.8 million with armual growth rate of
2.8 percent.
' For a detail analysis, see Faubeh Fonge, Modernization without Development. 25.
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Cameroon is divided into ten administrative provinces. It has evolved from a
federation of West and East Cameroon having five administrative provinces with greater
autonomy, to a Unified Republic with seven provinces and finally to a Republic having
ten provinces. The state played a predominant role in the economic development of the
country. Through the ideology ofplanned liberalism, the Ahidjo government was able to
guide the development of the country to success. Cameroon has moved sharply from a
low- income country during colonial rule to a prosperous country after independence
(1960 to 1985), and back to economic decline in the 1990s. Throughout, the Cameroon
state has been a prime factor in the development of the country. To show how this was
done, the political and economic context within which development is pursued needs to
be examined.
4.2. Structure of Cameroon’s Economy
The structure of the economy is dualistic and reflects a juxtaposition of traditional
and modern features. This structure came into existence during colonial rule, a period
which experienced the emergence of an export-oriented economy based on the
commercialization of crops like bananas, cocoa, coffee and palm oil, produced mainly
through plantation agriculture. Until the mid-1980s, Cameroon was among the few
African countries to have achieved a steady and positive economic growth, which
averaged approximately 7.5 percent per aimum beginning from the late 1970s. Two major
sectors accounted for the positive performance of the Cameroon economy: a diversified
agricultural sector with a wide variety of cash and food crops, and a broad- based
^ The provinces are North, South, Littoral, Center, East, West, Southwest, Northwest, Far North
and Adamawa.
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industrial sector supported by the production of oil in the Southwest province. A strong
state policy of guided development through the ideology of planed liberalism
complemented economic growth and development.
4.2.1. Agriculture
This sector has long been the mainstay of the economy and was responsible for its
healthy growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s, long before the exploration of oil.
About 70 percent of Cameroon’s population is engaged in either subsistence or
commercial agriculture. Up until 1990, cash crops (cocoa, coffee, palm oil, and banana)
accounted for an estimated 41 percent of export revenue.
Cocoa is grown principally in the Center, South and Southwest provinces of the
country, covering about 450,000 hectares of cultivated land. Cameroon is among the top
seven world leading producers of cocoa. In 1990 its production reached 100,000 tons.
Besides the export of cocoa beans, a large amount is processed locally by an agro-based
industry referred to as Chococam. Small farmers dominate cocoa production.
Coffee occupies an area of about 400,000 hectares, with the West and Southern
provinces leading in its production. Coffee has experienced an increase in production
following its introduction in Cameroon. Its production increased from 35,480 metric tons
in 1961 to 72,338 metric tons in 1979, an increase of over 35,000 metric tons. Two types
of coffee are cultivated: Robusta and Arabica. Robusta coffee accounts for well over 85
percent of total production because of its international demand, while Arabica accounts
for only 15 percent. Coffee is also processed locally to finished products.
Cotton is produced mostly in the northern provinces of Cameroon because of the
favorable climate. Its production is exclusively by small farmers. In spite of its late
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introduction into the economy, cotton has made great progress in terms of its
contribution to cash crop production. Cotton export increased from 504 metric tons in
1961 to 11,845 metric tons in 1979. The government enterprise SODECOTON is
responsible for the marketing of this product in the country.
Banana used to occupy a dominant position on Cameroon’s export during colonial
days and the early post-colonial years. In 1961 banana exports had reached 51,280 metric
tons, while coffee and rubber exports were only 35,480 and 4,940 metric tons
respectively. However, by 1969 banana export fell to 46,510 metric tons. It is produced
mostly in the Southwest and Littoral provinces. This crop is mostly reserved for
plantation agriculture. Few farmers, however, engage in banana cultivation for local
consumption. After many years of neglect, banana was given a big push and by the 1970s
when its export increased from 46,510 metric tons in 1969 to 80,000 metric tons in 1979.
The leading producers of banana in the country are Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC), Del Monte in the Southwest province, and the Organization Camerounaise du
Banane (OCB) in the Littoral province.
Other aspects of the agricultural sector include food crops that generally satisfy
domestic demand with some surplus for export to its neighboring countries. Food crops
include rice, maize, plantains, yams, cocoyams and cassava. Livestock production in
Cameroon includes cattle, pigs, goats and poultry. Production is limited to domestic
consumption. The forestry sector is significant in the agricultural sector. Cameroon’s
dense forest covers an area of about 22 million hectares, equivalent to about 47 percent of
the national territory. Of this area, 17.4 million hectares are exploited and have attracted a
wide range of logging and timber companies. The impact of deforestation on the
environment continues to dominate the current debate on the role of structural
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adjustment programs in the development of the country.
4.2.2. Industry
This sector includes manufacturing, mining and energy. Between 1964 and 1965
this sector accounted for 21.6 percent of the total GDP and in monetary terms earned an
estimated 36.2 billion francs cfa. By 1980/81, it contributed 522 billion francs cfa to the
Cameroon economy representing 25.6 percent of the GDP. Also, between 1974 and 1980,
the industrial sector accounted for over 40 percent of the country’s imports. Since
agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy, it is not surprising that industrial
development in Cameroon is concentrated in the processing of agricultural products.
Many industries in the country are tailored for agricultural products. Examples include
the CDC palm oil factories which process palm oil for local consumption and export; the
rubber factories located in the Southwest province and Chococam in the Littoral province
that processes chocolate.
There is an aluminum plant in the country. The plant is located in Edea.
Aluminum is manufactured by Alucam, which utilizes bauxite from the Republic of
Guinea in West Africa. The Aluminum Company is the only heavy industry in the
country. Alucam is a joint venture between the Cameroon government and a French
company. However, the French have a majority of 50 percent of shares. Until the late
1980s, Alucam was under the tight control of the French. While local consumption of
aluminum has steadily increased, it is mostly exported to other Central African countries.
With the discovery of oil in the country, the industrial sector has substantially increased
its contribution to GDP. Oil officially entered the economy in 1978 with a total output of
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625,000 tons. However, stories have it that oil production began long before 1978. The
importance of oil to this sector and the economy in general soared by 1982/83, when
output increased to 5.75 million tons making the country an important player among non-
OPEC countries.
On the eve of independence, Cameroon’s GDP was 113.6 billion francs cfa, and
agriculture accounted for over 45 percent of total GDP. By 1965 however, Cameroon’s
GDP had increased to 167.7 billion francs cfa. In 1975, GDP more than doubled to 437.7
billion francs cfa. This increase was made possible by the objectives of the twenty-year
development plan. Table 2 shows the evolution of GDP in Cameroon by sector for
selected years. It demonstrates that the primary sector contributed greatly to the country’s
economic development.
TABLE 2
Evolution of Gross Domestic Product in Cameroon by sector (in %)
Sector Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services Total
1965 34.9 21.6 8.9 34.6 100.0
1968 35.1 21.2 9.0 34.7 100.0
1971 35.0 21.9 7.9 34.2 100.0
1975 35.9 20.9 8.2 35.0 100.0
1980 30.5 22.6 7.9 39.0 100.0
1985 22.8 25.7 10.9 40.6 100.0
1991 24.6 28.2 12.1 35.1 100.0
1992 25.9 28.5 11.5 35.1 100.0
1993 25.4 28.1 12.5 34.0 100.0
Source: Ministere de I’Economie et du Plan, Compte Nationaux du Cameroun
Direction de la Statistique et de la comptabilite Nationale, Yaounde, Cameroun.
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The importance of the agricultural sector to Cameroon’s development cannot be
overstated. Between 1965 and 1975, the sector was the highest contributor to the GDP.
The discovery of oil in the late 1970s added an impetus to the development process, but
agriculture still played an important role. During the 1965 to 1981 period, the economy
enjoyed higher annual growth rates. The 1965 and 1971 period was part of the second
development plan during which time the total real growth of the economy was 4.0
percent. From 1971 to 1976, the rate of growth of the economy was 4.5 percent. The
reason for this slow down (only 5% increase) of the rate of growth of the Cameroon
economy could be traced to the international economic decline which was triggered by a
series of oil shocks. However, the Cameroon economy bounced back with the discovery
of oil and by the fourth development plan, it was steaming at 5.8 percent.^
Cameroon became a successful economic growth and development model in
Africa, registering a 7.0 percent growth rate by 1985. This performance was made
possible by strong state intervention guided by the ideology of planned liberalism. The
Cameroon state was thus a critical factor in the economic growth and development of the
country during the Ahidjo presidency.
^ For a discussion, See Wilfred Ndongko, Reflection on the Economic Policies and Development
of Cameroon (Yaounde, Cameroon: MESRES, 1985), 157.
4.3. Population and Economic Growth
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Simon Kuznets contends that a population possesses characteristics that enable it
to be a production agent giving it a unique role in the development process.'* Population
growth therefore has a significant impact on economic growth.
The 1965 population census estimated the total population of Cameroon at a little
over 5.2 million people. By 1990, the population had doubled and is today estimated at
about 13 million. Table 3 shows the evolution of the population of West and East
Cameroon from 1965 to 1970 and the total population of the country between 1980 and
1985.
TABLE 3
EVOLUTION OF THE CAMEROON POPULATION (In Millions of Inhabitants)
Region 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1980 1985
East 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6 - -
West 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 - -
Total 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.8 8.7 9.9
Sources: Comptabilite Nationale du Cameroun. Direction de la Statistique,
Yaounde, Cameroun; World Bank, World Tables.
As indicated in Table 3, East Cameroon has 4/5 of the total population of
Cameroon. It also has the larger surface area of the territory. From the data presented, the
average growth rate during the period of the Cameroon federation was about 2 percent.
By 1990 however, the growth rate of the population increased to 3.0 percent. The
discrepancy in the population data of Cameroon stems from the referendum of 1972. The
See, Simon, Kuznets Economic Growth and Structure (London: Heineman Educational Books,
Ltd., 1965), 123-41.
85
unification of West and East Cameroon resulted in the combination of the population
figures of the two sections of the country. Recent population growth increases have been
a prime concern for the state. The major factors accounting for this high population
growth rate are declining mortality and higher fertility as a result in improved health care
conditions. Population growth pressures the state to double its spending on consumption
goods thereby reducing its spending in investment. This impedes economic growth as
production of consumer rather than producer goods take precedence in the economy.
Population distribution is also very critical to economic growth because it dictates
the nature of production, which is crucial for growth and development. In Cameroon like
in most developing countries a significant portion of the population comprised of the
young do not contribute to economic growth. The significance of this young population
structure lies in the proportion of the total population that can be considered capable of
undertaking productive activity in the economy in the future. The dependency ratio of the
younger population to the working population is high. A dependency ratio is the
proportion of the unproductive population in relation to the labor force. If this ratio is
high, then the population is highly dependent on the work force. High ratios place a
heavy burden on the energies of the work force. It is aggravated if a substantial
proportion of this force is engaged in activities of relatively low productivity especially in
agriculture where about 70 percent are employed.
The above demographic situation suggests that Cameroon is confronted with three
levels of dependency; dependency by age distribution whereby a significant proportion of
the population depends on the work force; secondly, dependence of the economy on
agriculture, and thirdly, dependence of the urban population on the rural and agricultural
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population. Such dependencies greatly hamper development efforts as it retards the
process of accumulation and puts pressure on the state to increase consumption.
The development process requires the continuous creation of productive jobs for a
country’s work force. Critics of Cameroon’s political economy argue that the
unemployment problem is essentially an urban phenomenon, and the direct result of the
excessive influx of young people, especially school graduates in towns, in response to
higher urban wages. Recently, there have been attempts to encourage the youth to “return
to the land,” with training and the allocation of farms as well as credit to youths to start
up farms. This is a means by the government to induce young people to stay in the rural
areas and reduce overcrowding in the urban areas.
In spite of an apparent abundance of labor, Cameroon was confronted with the
problem of insufficient supply of trained labor at independence. The development plan
followed by Ahidjo was specifically designed to address this question. Since 1960,
Cameroon’s educational system has expanded at a spectacular rate. Free education was
instituted to increase the level of education from primary to imiversity education.
Enrollment in primary schools more than doubled between 1960 and 1980. Secondary
and university education also experienced dramatic increases.
4.4. External Trade
External trade plays a crucial role in Cameroon’s economic development in that it
provides the country with the needed foreign exchange. Trade with the rest of the world,
especially with France, Germany, Japan and the U.S.A., accounted for Cameroon’s
economic growth, which averaged 7 percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Agriculture was the main source of growth and foreign exchange earnings until 1978,
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when oil production became the cornerstone of economic growth. To a large extent, the
deterioration of the external terms of trade estimated to have declined by 60 percent in
the late 1980s had a great impact on the economy. The structure of external trade has
remained virtually unchanged. Exports were dominated by cash crops such as cocoa,
coffee, bananas and cotton. However, by 1981, crude oil began to show signs of
competing with the agricultural sector. The bulk of imports, on the other hand, consisted
of manufactured goods and foodstuff By 1974, Cameroon became food self-sufficient
and reduced its dependence on imported food.
France remains Cameroon’s leading trading partner. Exports to France stood at
42.8 percent in 1990, while only 2.3 percent went to the USA and 2.4 percent to
Germany. Within the same period imports from France were at 35.5 percent, 5.9 percent
from the USA and 9.4 percent from Germany. It is interesting but not surprising that
trade with Cameroon’s neighbors is insignificant. Many African countries are engaged in
the cultivation and production of virtually the same goods. It makes it difficult for any
country to engage in trade with the other. These countries are therefore condemned to
trading with European countries in exchange for finished goods. Regional integration in
Africa is therefore an issue that continues to intrigue economists. The consensus among
scholars is that countries producing the same products are targets for trade diversion
rather than trade integration and because these countries produce competing goods it
becomes difficult for trade to be organized between them. The slow pace of regional
integration reduces the great opportunity that Cameroon could have exploited as a
member of the “Union Douaniere et Economique de L’Afrique Centrale” (UDEAC). The
reason is inherent in the structure of the economy. Integration through UDEAC would
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have been a great opportunity for Cameroon to further expand it trading partners. It is
interesting to note that, trade between Cameroon and the other UDEAC members is less
than 2 percent. Such low trade statistics makes it difficult for integration to be achieved.
Cameroon plays a major role in the region. The country serves as the only seaport for the
landlocked countries of Chad and CAR. This location is therefore important to the
Cameroon economy and its impact is significant in terms of the revenue it generates.
The issue of trade deficits with its trading partners has become a chronic feature
of the external sector. The relatively unsatisfactory performance of Cameroon’s exports
has been largely attributed to a decline in export prices rather than to decreases in the
volume of exports. For instance, while the volume of cocoa has tended to increase, the
net gain in value terms has been marginal thus Raul Prebisch has referred to this situation
as a secular decline in terms of trade of the developing countries.^
Critics have attempted to establish that there is no conclusive evidence in support
of this thesis.^ Morgan, after re-examining the British data used by Prebisch concluded
that, “the data do not show any general worsening of the primary producers.” Regardless
of this point of view, the evidence so far seems to support the view that world prices of
primary products have been characterized by wild cyclical fluctuations. The volatility of
these prices has had a damaging effect on the growth of the economies of developing
countries and Cameroon is no exception. Caimcross, in a similar study, concluded that,
“the prices of primary products are notoriously volatile while the damaging effects of
^ See, Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems
(Lake Success, 1950).
* Theodore Morgan, “The Long Run Terms of Trade between Agriculture and Manufacture,”
Economic Development and Cultural Change (October, 1959).
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such volatility on the economies of the exporting countries are beyond questioning.”’
Cameroon’s experience supports the view that trends in external trade are closely related
to terms of trade. The more favorable the terms of trade the better the external trade and
the more surpluses a country can obtain.
Another economic indicator that continues to be problematic in Cameroon is the
debt issue. Today, Cameroon suffers because a large amount of its GDP is used to service
debt. About a third of its GDP is used to service its debts. Cameroon did not fall in the
debt trap during the Ahidjo era because it was considered a modest borrower. About 80
percent of the Cameroon budget in the late 1970s, was financed from domestic resources.
This was because of the pragmatic nature of Ahidjo’s management. However, the
external shocks from world recessions and mismanagement during the Biya presidency
forced the country to increase its borrowing which, given its relatively clean credit
history was easily available. Cameroon’s external debt has increased sharply since 1985,
and has amounted to about 90 percent of its GDP. During the 1990s, Cameroon
experienced difficulties in servicing its external debts. The ratio of debt financed by
exports increased from 33 percent in 1989 to 51 percent in 1993. The country’s declining
economy and growing economic crisis increased government borrowing and in the first
part of the 1990s, the national debt stood at $6.6 billion, or 72 percent of GNP. This was
an alarming rate for a country like Cameroon and continues to be a problem for the new
regime. Cameroon was considered a success story in the African region in the late 1970s
28.
See A.K. Cairn Cross, Factors in Economic Development (London: Allen and Irwin, 1962), 214-
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and early 1980s, with an economic growth rate of 7 percent and to experience a
downhill in its economic endeavor was alarming.
The above discussion addresses two important issues relevant to this study. The
first issue stems from the terms of trade imposed on agricultural products mainly from
Cameroon and other developing countries. Cameroon is an agricultural country and the
revenue obtained from exporting its products is crucial for its development. Fluctuating
terms of trade for these products undermines any development projection. The second
issue, which is tied to the first, is the debt issue. Debt servicing has consumed a large
portion of Cameroon’s export earnings from 33 percent to 51 percent between 1989 and
1993, and such a large proportion of the earnings spent to service debts reduce the total
amount spent on development. This is a situation that Ahidjo did not face during his
presidency because as mentioned earlier, Cameroon during Ahidjo’s rule was considered
a modest borrower. In summary, agricultural exports played a critical part in Cameroon’s
development within this period thus the revenues from exports as well as the debt
situation of the country become crucial in Cameroon’s development.
4.5. Planning and Economic Growth
The relationship between planning and the rate of economic growth has been well
articulated in what is called the “Lewis Paradox.” Lewis pointed out that the rate of
growth might be inversely related to the sophistication of planning. By studying some
African countries, he concluded that;
* See Aurthur Lewis, Some Aspects of Economic Development (London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd, 1969).
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in some African countries, which have elaborate plans, the economies
have either stagnated or grown at a rather slow pace, whereas in other
countries that have rudimentary plans, the economies have experienced
surprisingly rapid rates of growth.
His analysis focuses on the fact that, in many countries the development plans
were simply put aside as soon as they were officially adopted, implying that they were
only a propaganda tool, or were used to serve other political purposes. Public officials
never seriously envisioned the use of the plans as guides for the direction of long- range
policy. Lewis concluded that the principal role of a development plan was to create
favorable conditions of growth. He further stated that, “if the plan does this, it is good, if
it does not, it is irrelevant to growth, however elaborate it may be.”*° This next section
examines the colonial development plans and the twenty-year Cameroon development
plan under Ahidjo to see if they meet Lewis’ conclusion of assisting in economic growth.
4.5.1. Colonial Development Policy
Economic growth policy in Cameroon from 1914 to 1960 can be characterized as
export-oriented growth policy." Very little information on West Cameroon is available
because as mentioned in the previous chapter, this region was administered as part of the
British colony ofNigerian during this period. By colonial development policy, this paper
refers to the French development policy in Cameroon. When Cameroon became
independent the same policies applied to East Cameroon were applied to West Cameroon
® Ibid., 37.
'“Ibid.
" The economic and political aspects of French colonial policies are analyzed in detail by Samir
Amin in L’Afrique de L’Ouest Bloquee: L’Economie Politique de la Colonisation, 1880-1970 (Paris: Les
Editions de Minuit, 1971), Chapter 1, 23-64.
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because French experts drew up the initial development plans. The French Law of
April 30, 1946, marked the beginning of formal planning in Cameroon and other French
dependencies.'^
Two four-year development plans of the French Overseas Territories were
implemented between 1946 and 1957. The first was originally a five-year plan (1946-
1951), which was modified into a four-year plan for the period 1948-52. The second plan
encompassed the period 1953-57. The French planning document was referred to as
“Fond des Investissements pour le Development Economique et Social des Territoires
d’Outres-Mer” (FIDES), and it was the financial blueprint of the colonial planning
system.'^ The second plan was an integral part of the plan for the development of France.
This approach was intended to strengthen the political and economic integration of the
colonies into France under the terms outlined in the French constitution of 1946.'"'
The financing of the development plans for the overseas possessions was
managed by the “Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre-Mer” (CCFOM), an autonomous
public institution established during the Second World War. The FIDES was an agency
of CCFOM. CCFOM’s resources consisted for the most part, of advances from the
French Treasury.'^ Table 4 shows the transfer of investment funds from France to
Cameroon. Since economic planning during this period was undertaken to support the
interests of France, most of the funds were directed to exploit Cameroon’s natural
For a discussion of Planning before 1949, see Barbu, Niculescu, Colonial Planning: A
Comparative Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), 70-73.
See, Teresa Hayter, French Aid (London: Overseas Development Institute Ltd., 1966).
14 Ibid.
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resources and therefore concentrated on infrastructure accounting for over 60 percent
of investment and only 40 percent of agricultural production.
Table 4






1946-49 57 2956 2619 369 Na
1950 16 3998 3241 768 1516
1951 103 5574 4399 1599 1115
1952 197 7256 5564 1469 1725
1953 270 6597 4420 1042 1697
1954 233 5251 4268 1337 7178
1955 692 5952 3807 1440 1677
1956 829 6198 3502 1910 1005
1957 988 6435 3646 2288 1862
1958 776 4392 2476 2160 327
1959 863 3898 1275 Na Na
Source: Ngango Georges, Les Investissement d’origine Exterieur en Affique
Noire Francophone: Statut et Incidence sur le developpment (Lyon, 1971),98-119.
From Table 4, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding French
investments in Cameroon. France committed a very small amount of its budget to the
development of Cameroon in the early stages of French rule in the country. This is true
because the goal of French development in West and Central Afriea including Cameroon
was to exploit the country’s resources rather than foster its development. Secondly, as
French rule gradually came to a close in Cameroon, there was ample reduction of the
investments and funds flowing into the country. Emphasis was placed on the
For an analysis, see Claude Pannouillot, La France d’Outre-Mer: Politique, Economique et
Sociale (Paris: Institute d’etudes politiques, Universite de Paris, 1956/57), 241-65.
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development of an infrastructural network to permit the transportation of goods and
services in and out of Cameroon.'^ FIDES funds which were at 2,619 millions francs in
1946 dropped to 1,275 million in 1959, indicating a major reduction of funds at the eve of
Cameroon’s independence.
Ngango Georges supports the above conclusion that, the distribution of
investment resources by France between 1946 and 1959 focused development on
transportation and communication networks (roads, bridges and railways), which
facilitated the movement of raw materials to Europe, and encouraged the importation of
French manufactured goods to the country. Table 5 shows that from 1951 to 1959,
Cameroon’s economy was dominated by the agricultural sector. It strengthens the claim
that colonial development policy was structured to improve the agricultural sector for
exports of raw materials to Europe.
TABLE 5
CONTRIBUTION TO GDP BY SECTOR 1951 AND 1959 (Billions of francs CFA)
Sector Total Cameroon West Cameroon (i) East Cameroon (ii)
1951 1959 1951 1959 1951 1959
Primary 44.7 54 7.7 8.2 37 45.8
Secondary 5.2 11.3 0.8 2 4.4 9.3
Tertiary 19.7 36.3 2.5 4.9 17.2 31.4
General Government 3.1 9.1 0.4 0.8 2.7 8.3
Domestic Service 0.5 1.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.3
Total 73.2 112.4 10.8 16.3 61.6 96.1
Sources: (i) Nigerian National Account, 1962; (ii) Comptes Economiques du
Cameroun, 1963 et 1965.
See Wilfred Ndongko, 170 for a discussion.
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Between 1951 and 1959, total GDP rose from 73.2 billion francs CFA to 112.4
billion francs CFA. In the primary sector, mostly agriculture, GDP rose from 44.7 billion
francs to 54.0 billion francs representing almost a 10 percent increase. Modernization of
economic structures was faster in East Cameroon, where the linkages between agriculture
and exports were visible. Agriculture therefore continued to dominate the primary sector
of colonial development policy. The most important crop was bananas, with cocoa
showing a significant increase. Before its decline in the early years of independence,
bananas were an important crop in terms of volume of production and revenue. In 1958,
the CDC in the Southwest province produced 63 percent of all bananas exported from
Cameroon. Table 6 shows the volume of production of some selected export crops during
colonial rule in Cameroon. It further emphasizes the reason why a diversification of crops
was necessary during this time.
TABLE 6
PRODUCTION OF EXPORT CROPS (Thousand Tons)
Crop Bananas Coffee Cocoa Oilseeds Cotton Rubber
1951 127 9 51 34 Na 4
1957 187 19 61 26 6 5
1959 130 33 63 35 7 7
1960 123 34 70 25 7 7
Source; United Nations, Trade Statistics, 1962.
As Table 6 shows, coffee production increased dramatically from 9 thousand tons
in 1951 to 34 thousand tons in 1960. The importance of banana exports is also well
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represented in table 6 with exports of bananas increasing in 1957 by 47 percent. Cocoa
accounted for 31 percent of total exports and coffee occupied second place representing
19 percent of the country’s total exports.'^
Development was minimal in Cameroon during colonial rule. While there is
evidence suggesting an increase in agricultural production (particularly export crops),
during this period it was not accompanied by corresponding structural change and
improvement in Cameroon’s agricultural sector. The land- tenure system was in disarray,
farmers had little or no credit to move from the subsistence level of farming to higher
levels, and marketing agencies were structured to exploit farmers. Plantation agriculture
was the major activity of colonial rule. Michael Crowder best describes Cameroon's
experience during colonial rule, by observing that:
the colonial regimes did very little to improve growing techniques of low
value export crops. They remained the same as in the pre-colonial
times.... Thus peasant, whether working for himself or working on the
farm for another, did not gain any new knowledge of agricultural
techniques under colonial rule... .'*
Cameroon was a good example of the above. Rudimentary tools were widely used
by farmers in the country and fertilizer was also rarely used. Consequently, the main task
of the post-colonial state centered on promoting real development, which for many years
had been neglected by the colonial state.
” For a discussion, see P Robson and D.A. Lury eds., The Economics of Africa (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1969), 248.
For an analysis see, Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule (London: Hutchinson
University Press, 1980), 348.
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4.5.2. Post-Colonial Development Policy: The Twenty-year Development Plan (1960-
1980)
The twenty-year development plan adopted by the Cameroon government in 1960
was divided into four five-year plans. French experts, because of the lack of qualified
Cameroonians wrote the first two plans in the early 1960s. These plans had two major
problems: 1) they demonstrated France’s inability to understand Cameroon’s
administrative practices, and 2) they failed to include West Cameroon as an integral part
of the plan. The third plan (1971-76) was entirely written by Cameroonians. It took into
consideration all the realities of Cameroon society.
The responsibility of the government was to set objectives of economic growth and
development. A major objective was to raise the standard of living of the population by
doubling the per capita income by 1980. About 85 percent of the population were
engaged in agriculture by the end of colonial rule, thus government development focused
on this sector of the economy. Accordingly Amadou Ahidjo emphasized that:
. . .agriculture organized, diversified and shielded from the hazards
inherent in a one-crop economy, agriculture modernized, rendered more
productive and competitive, and the state coming in only to complete rural
effort and to stabilize prices in certain sectors. Such is our objective. This
intervention will be affected by the spread of new ideas among the masses
by well-framed permanent teams ofpropagandists..
Another objective was to increase the production of agricultural commodities for
the purpose of earning foreign exchange to finance domestic production. Finally, self-
sufficiency in the production of food so as to reduce Cameroon’s dependence on food
Amadou, Ahidjo, Contribution to National Construction (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1964), 79.
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imports was crucial. Ahidjo’s agricultural policy focused on four strategic aspects of
development policy by creating incentives for farmers through a fair land tenure system
and making credit accessible; ensuring stability through the marketing of farm products at
guaranteed prices, and increasing productivity through direct government investment
initiatives.
4. 5. 3. Land Ownership in Cameroon
Land ownership in Cameroon is important in the agricultural sector. A critical
factor for rural production and economic development is the access to land. Traditionally,
all land was communally owned, with the chief or king acting as its principal custodian.
Land ownership was equivalent to tribal identity. All tribal members were entitled to
work on land within the village boundaries. That is why there were wars during this
period to expand boundaries and acquire more land for farming. Losers had to leave the
area and start afresh in some other part of the jungle. However, descent, patronage and
friendship to wealthy owners also defined access while tenancy on the basis of a fixed
annual amount to a landlord was acceptable. Leasing was also common in the form of a
“two-party” system, whereby a farmer could farm on a piece of land and pay a proportion
of the proceeds to the owner of the land.
Colonial rule dismpted the above practice. German land policy through an
imperial decree, laid down the conditions for land transaction between Cameroonians and
Europeans. All unoccupied land was declared crown land. The land tenure legislation of
For more see C. N. Ngwasiri, “Agricultural Policy Analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in
Proceedings of an International Symposium, ed. R. Max Langham and Fran9ois Kamajou (University
Center of Dschang, Cameroon, 1991).
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1939 was a colonial attempt at distributing land in Cameroon. This legislation
specifically targeted state land and property without an owner, or land that had not been
occupied for a fairly long period of time. The problem with this law was its conflict with
the communal notion of land ownership. Furthermore, its method of redistribution did not
take into consideration the cultural practices of the people, and was seen as another
colonial policy to further destroy traditional systems of land tenure.
At independence, policy makers in Cameroon were aware of the 1939 law and
were very concerned about the question of land ownership. One of the goals of the
development plan was to increase access to land and to consolidate existing land- holding
practices. As Ahidjo declared:
land reform is a national imperative. It entails bold action in the sense of a
return “en masse” to the land in order to put an end to rural exodus. The
state could then put in practice a policy for settling certain areas and for
reorganizing the territory. It should bring about a fair allocation of land
and respond more effectively to offers from foreign investors.
In 1964 a presidential decree defined a comprehensive land ownership system.
This policy outlined the regulations regarding private and state lands into four main
provisions:
a) It differentiated private land from state land;
b) It differentiated communal land from individual land;




d) It abolished the traditional forms of land holding in favor of modem land
holding practices.^^
In the context of agricultural plarming, this policy was a promising step towards
guaranteeing access to land for agricultural production. It also served as a means of
reducing rural exodus as more and more people in the rural areas had access to land. This
measure was critical for raising agricultural production. Access to land meant farmers
who formerly worked for pay could work for themselves. This was important because it
not only increased the self-esteem of many farmers, who prior to this policy had no land,
but it also inspired them to work harder. Through this policy the state was unconsciously
or consciously developing the social fabric of society. Economically, this policy provided
a source of steady income as well as subsistence for many families that before, had to
seek wage employment. Having land gave a sense of hope to families that had never
owned land. Also, it was a source of revenue for the state. As more people acquired some
form of employment through ownership of land, production increased and taxes paid to
the state also increased.
Politically, this policy was instrumental in forming modem towns especially in
the Western province. The land- tenure system also organized people in this region, who
were widely dispersed as a result of their farming habits, by regrouping them into towns.
This was significant in that it made it easier for the state to control people from this
region who as history show were more inclined to live in dispersed communities.
Acquisition of land meant loyalty to the state because people came to acknowledge that
the state was their only hope to a better way of life. They therefore had to support the
See, Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, Fourth Five-Year Development Plan.
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endeavors of the state. The land- tenure policy had more ramifications than the basic
right of ownership. It meant independence, greater income and hope for the people. The
Southwest province was greatly affected by this policy. Colonial land policy had
encroached into communal land forcing people to seek wage employment and these
plantations owned by the colonial state were their last hope of subsistence. The new
policy made land available to farmers in the province by separating private from state
land.
4. 5. 4. Agricultural Credit
One major objective of the state’s agricultural policy was to provide farmers with
credit. During the first development plan, little attention was paid to the provision of
credit to farmers. It was not until the creation of the Cameroon Development Bank
(CBD) during the second development plan of 1966-71, that a National Agricultural
Credit Bank was created to provide direct credit to farmers for agricultural production,
industrial production and consumer credit. This broad mandate limited the provision of
credit for agricultural production desperately needed by farmers. The bank was created to
provide agricultural, industrial and consumer credit and it was not mandated to support
farmers’ needs in the production of agricultural goods as demonstrated by its lending
practices. For example, between 1965 and 1970, 62 percent of the loans went to the
marketing of agricultural goods, 16 percent to industrial investment and only 5 percent
was reserved for agricultural production.
It can be concluded from such a distribution of credit that the lending activities of
the bank were not directed to meet the needs of farmers such as to provide them with
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fertilizers, but on activities well beyond the farm level. Most loans for agriculture and
marketing of produce were short term. For instance, between 1966 and 1970, short-term
loans accounted for well over 72 percent, while long-term loans were only 6 percent.^^
Furthermore large-scale farmers were more likely to get loans than small farmers who
constituted the majority in this sector.
The inability of the CDB to meet the needs of farmers was further noted in the
nature of the loans it disbursed. Short- term credits accounted for more than half of the
total loans disbursed, while long-term credit represented only a small percentage of total
loans. In pursuing its policy of loan disbursement, the bank failed to consider the type of
goods produced. Unlike food crops, cash crops took many years to grow. Cocoa plants
for instance, take at least five years to mature. The use of short-term loans meant that
many farmers were placed in a precarious position to repay the short-term loans before
their crops matured. Consequently, only wealthy farmers were targeted for loans because
they were able to repay, if they ever paid the loan. Finally, the first two plans prepared by
French experts did not take into consideration the realities of the local farmers because no
provisions for their support through a credit system were made.
These shortcomings were corrected in the third and subsequent plans, prepared entirely
by Cameroonians. The plan took into consideration the plight of the farmers and in a
policy speech Ahidjo outlined the following measures in the agricultural credit section of
the plan:
For a detail discussion, see Wilfred, Ndongko, Planning for Economic Development in a
Federated State: The Case of the Cameroon Federal Republic. 1976.
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a) A centralization of all credit operations of the CBD and a reorganization of
its credit activities in favor of small farmers;
b) A 500 million francs CFA grant to the CBD as funds for credit to farmers;
c) A fair distribution of long and short-term credits to farmers;
d) A reorganization of rural credit structures to facilitate credit provision and
24
repayments.
The desire of the government to restructure the credit system led in 1973, to the
creation of the “Ponds National de Developpement Rural” (FONADER). Its main role
was to provide a mechanism whereby capital could be provided to farmers. FONADER
was required to provide loan guarantees to farmers, make funds available for financing
farm improvement, regeneration of plantations and the financing and management of
rural development projects. FONADER intervened in the agricultural sector through its
non-reimbursable and reimbursable aid. It had a special place for rural development
given that it was created as an auxiliary government agency to handle the green
revolution project. Despite the original objective of FONADER to serve the needs of
small farmers, its lending practices also indicated that only about a quarter of the credits
were given directly to small farmers. Most of the credits went to finance large scale and
sometimes highly- funded international agricultural development projects. As Virginia
Delancey suggests, “about one-sixth of the credits were channeled through the
cooperative system for redistribution to members of individual cooperatives.”^^ The
For further discussion on the credit policy, see president Ahidjo’s policy speech in Cameroon’s
Third Five-vear Development Plan. 1971-76 (August 11, 1971), 8.
Virginia Delancey, “Cameroon Agricultural Policy: The Struggle to Remain Food self
sufficient,” Paper presented at Annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Washington D.C.
November?, 1982.
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Strategy of FONADER to provide loans directly to farmers led to the significant
development of cooperative organizations. Initially, cooperatives were set up as farmers
associations to purchase cash crops as well as distribute inputs like fertilizers. Loan
disbursement increased the importance of the organizations and led to the politicization
of cooperatives in Cameroon. Cooperative organizations played an important role in
mobilizing farmers to increase production and to increase their incomes. It is for this
reason that the state attached much importance on cooperatives, which generally prepared
farmers to gradually master the production process.
Two factors accounted for the use of cooperatives as the agency for credit
disbursement. The first is the lack of a viable credit delivery and recovery system
especially in the rural areas where FONADER had no branches. Repayment of loans was
a crucial factor because it not only ensured the availability of credit for future loans, but it
also ensured the viability and sustainability of the lending institution. As a result,
cooperatives with strong farmers’ associations served as a means of guaranteeing the
repayment of the loans accorded to farmers. The ability of cooperatives to command such
influence in the rural areas was important to the lending agency. The second factor was
that most farmers were uneducated. The low level of education of many farmers hindered
a direct one on one interaction between FONADER managers and farmers because in
most cases, managers were unable to understand farmers who for the most part spoke in
their local languages. It was thus imperative for the lending agency to work through
cooperatives that had trained local personnel who could interact with farmers.
FONADER increased its credit disbursement from 1,124 million francs CFA in 1975/76
to 1,618 million francs CFA in 1976/77 fiscal year.
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By 1986, FONADER had been transformed into a true farmer’s bank
consistent with the objectives in the fifth development plan but its lending policies and
practices had deteriorated in favor of large-scale farmers and it encountered a major loan
repayment problem. In the early 1990s, following mismanagement, the agency was
liquidated. Its biased lending practices led to the resurgence of traditional alternative
lending institutions such as “Njangi” groups, which were popular among women
farmers, because they were generally not favored in the lending policies of FONADER.
4. 5. 5. Agricultural Marketing Policy
The government’s marketing policy was one step by which the institutions of the
state- controlled agricultural production. The government’s control of agricultural pricing
policy was an attempt at stabilizing prices of agricultural products and providing
incentives to farmers. It was aimed at accumulating revenue for the development of other
sectors of the economy. The continuous fluctuation of agricultural prices on the
international market necessitated a mechanism to stabilize home prices and reduce the
adverse effect of lower prices on production. Higher prices meant more profit for
producers who would increase their production. Farmers in Cameroon were no exception
to this golden rule, and the government did everything possible to guarantee an increase
in the production of agricultural crops, which was critical in realizing development
through payment of bonuses to farmers.
Njangi groups are organizations with the objective of collecting funds and financing realistic
projects tabled by a member. They are usually interest free and require prompt payment so as to finance
other projects.
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Liberal theorists have criticized this policy of agricultural pricing in many
African countries including Cameroon, by stating that the policy fails to recognize the
significance of international price fluctuations and its impact on production. Recent
proposals under structural adjustment policies call for non-intervention in the pricing
policy of agricultural products by African states. The basis is that it is responsible for the
creation of disincentives and the distortion of the market prices. This however, fails to
address the real issue of distortion in agricultural prices in the world market. Price
fluctuation of international prices is at the heart of this debate. In reality, prices of
agricultural products fluctuate in response to international demand and supply all because
of their weak terms of trade on the world market. Some form of price stabilization is
therefore necessary to offset this situation and the claims of distortion of domestic prices
by market oriented advocates is to a certain extent, baseless because price distortion
comes from the unfavorable terms of trade of agricultural products on the world market.
In fact, at the international level, the need to stabilize the fluctuation of
agricultural prices was addressed at the ACP and EEC convention during the Lome
treaty negotiations^* and STABEX was created under the Lome convention to deal with
this issue. STABEX operated like the system in Cameroon, designed to control price
fluctuations. STABEX was controlled and directed by Europeans. African Caribbean and
Pacific member countries were paid an amount equal to the fall in the revenue of the
agricultural product when commodity prices fell. What the Cameroon government was
ACP stands for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries while EEC was European Economic
Community. It is known today as European Union.
ACP and EEC member countries signed the Lome convention as an attempt to reduce trade
friction between developing and developed countries. It has been analyzed by some as a tool to perpetuate
the dependent nature of developing countries.
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doing was merely attempting to reduce the hardship that such fluctuations had on the
rural farmers. Although the state’s practice was not entirely correct, it guaranteed farmers
a steady income as well as a bonus during Christmas and New Year. The strategy and
leadership for dealing with the issue ofprice fluctuation in West Cameroon was carved
out by the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB).
The marketing policy for agricultural goods was implemented by a specialized
agency called the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB), which determined and set
prices for export crops such as cocoa, coffee and tea. The board bought produce from
farmers at fixed prices set by bureaucrats. These prices were below world market prices
and were guaranteed if world prices fell. The NPMB resold the produce at higher world
market prices. A stabilization fund was established which subsidized farmers in situations
where world market prices dropped below the nominal prices. Also in a situation where a
surplus was realized, it was reserved and later paid to farmers as bonuses. This policy
guaranteed farmers a fixed income regardless of the prices on the world market.
To maximize the effect of stabilization on the entire agricultural sector, other
institutions were established, to complement the NPMB. The Organization Camerounaise
de la Banane (OCB) purchased and exported bananas at guaranteed producer prices,
while the Societe Camerounaise de Palmeraies (SOCAPALM) was in charge of
marketing palm produce, and the Societe de Developpement de Coton (SODECOTON),
purchased and marketed cotton using the same strategies as the NPMB.
As indicated earlier, the main objective of state intervention in agricultural pricing
was to stabilize prices, guarantee stable prices high enough to encourage farmers to
increase production and thereby increase revenue for the development of other sectors.
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Cameroon’s experience was mixed. From the farmers’ perspectives, this policy did
lead to stable prices, because regardless of lower world prices farmers received
guaranteed prices. On the other hand, it contributed to the development of a new type of
business, which was rampant in Cameroon and West Africa. Smuggling of crops like
cocoa, coffee and cotton increased because farmers could receive a much higher price
from unscrupulous middlemen who could buy at prices higher than what the government
was offering. This not only reduced government revenue but it skewed the accounting of
the total production of agricultural crops every year.
Also, increasing or guaranteeing the prices of cash crops without substantial
increases in the prices of food crops changed the production practices of many farmers.
Higher prices in the cash crop market pushed farmers into cash crop production.
Consequently, by 1971, Cameroon became heavily dependent on food imports. This had
a negative impact on foreign reserves as well as on savings for investment causing a
dependence on food imports which would have deepened had not the state in 1973,
launched the “green revolution” campaign to make Cameroon less dependent on food
imports. Through the use of better techniques of production and the adoption of high
yielding crops and a diversification of the agricultural base, the state succeeded in
increasing food production. This objective was complemented by the creation of
institutions such as the food development authority (MIDVIV), in 1973. Its function was
to encourage food production, through a system of food price stabilization, to develop
research and to implement projects for food production.^^
4. 5. 6. Government Investment in Agriculture
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Another objective of Cameroon’s agricultural policy was to maintain a steady
increase in exportable surpluses through the expansion of export and food crops to meet
the needs of the population and reduce the country’s dependence on food imports. To
attain this objective, modernization and industrialization of the agricultural sector was
necessary. At independence this sector was dominated by a small number of corporations,
producing cash crops and a large rural population involved in subsistence agriculture. To
modernize, this sector required large amounts of government investments that could only
be attained through planned liberalism.
In the course of implementing the first and second plans of the twenty-year
development plan, the government invested a small amount of money in the agricultural
sector. Two reasons can be attributed for the low level of government investments. First
of all, the plan was drawn by the French experts who were unaware of the importance of
government investments in agriculture and more specifically, to the share of investment
necessary for the agricultural sector. Second, government policy during this period was
more oriented towards industrial rather than to agricultural development. This emphasis
was underscored by the assertions of modernization experts who championed
industrialization in the developing world (including Africa) as a critical strategy for
economic growth and development. Several modernization theories at that time pointed
to the importance of industrial development as a precondition for economic development.
Cameroon also fell into the temptation of opting for more investment in the industrial
rather than the agricultural sector. Table 7 shows the evolution of government
See Cameroon Agro-Pastoral Show (Bafoussam, 1977), 7-89. For a discussion of the function of
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investments for various sectors of the economy. It demonstrates how government
investment varied through the twenty-year period of the plan.
TABLE 7










Agriculture (I) 13.1 24.6 32.3 19.6 25.5 9.1 106.2 15.3
Industry (II) 3.6 6.9 39.4 24.3 70.3 25.1 216.7 31.6
Infrastructure 24.9 46.8 41.8 25.3 57.3 20.5 156.8 22.9
Trade & Services (III) Na Na 17.9 10.9 42.4 15.1 36.6 5.3
Studies & Research 2.4 4.5 3.5 2.1 3 1.1 4 0.6
Health Services 3.6 6.7 4 2.4 6.7 2.4 11 1.6
Education 1.5 2.8 10.4 6.4 21.6 7.7 3.4 0.5
Sources: Compiled from Cameroon, First. Second, Third and Fourth five-year
Development Plans. 1960-1981.
I) Includes livestock, forestry, hunting, fishing and wildlife.
II) Includes Mining and power.
III) Includes private transport and trade services.
Table 7 shows a steady decline in the percentage of capital investment allocated
for agricultural investment from the first plan (1960/65), to the third plan (1971/76).
However, government investment registered a dramatic increase of 6.2 percent in the
fourth plan, moving from a low 9.1 percent between 1971 and 1976 to 15.3 percent
between 1976 and 1981. This percentage increase was due in part to the intensive
campaign by the government to increase agricultural production and also the fact that the
government earned a substantial income from the production of oil at the end of the
MIDVIV.
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1970s. The profits from the sale of oil coupled with government’s decision to
encourage people to be involved in the agricultural sector increased government
investment in agriculture. In monetary terms, this translated into huge sums of money
invested by the government. A comparison of the increase in monetary investments
between the first and fourth plans, shows that government investment rose from 13.1
billion francs CFA between 1960 and 1965 to 106.2 billion francs CFA in 1976 andl981,
an increase of over 90 billion francs CFA. As a comparison, the industrial sector saw a
steady growth of government investment during the same period, from 6.9 percent
between 1960 and 1965 to 31.6 percent between 1976 and 1981. In monetary terms,
government investments increased by 146.4 billion francs CFA between 1971-76 and
1976-81.
Government involvement in the agricultural sector was through the funding of
major agricultural projects. Typically, these projects included equipping the rural farms
to assist them in their agricultural efforts. These investments were designed to raise the
production levels of farmers through direct government investments, in agriculture such
as extension services, research, and credit provision. The investments also enabled the
effective use of productive inputs to provide incentives to farmers, encouraged an easy
access to farmland and ensured a guaranteed return to farmers in the form of price
stabilization.
In summary, this section has examined Cameroon’s twenty-year development
plan with a special focus on the agricultural sector, which was the dominant sector in the
economy during this period. The constraints facing the government at independence in
achieving industrialization slowed government’s involvement in agricultural
112
development as seen in the amount of investment allocated to agricultural
development. However, the critical objective of increasing the standard of living of the
people through doubling the per capita income of Cameroonians in twenty years was
realized. As will be demonstrated in chapter five, the performance of the economy during
this period was impressive. Through high production in the agricultural sector, increase
production of cash and food crops, Cameroon’s balance of payment position improved
and made it a success story in Africa. Impressive increases in industrial production,
especially the production of oil, which by 1982 had become a major contributor to the
GDP of the country also supported this development.
The twenty-year development plan encouraged the efficient allocation and
exploitation of resources in ways consistent with the ideology of planned liberalism. The
question whether the dual pursuit of economic growth and development was possible in
Cameroon has been articulated and shows that Ahidjo was successful in pursuing both
objectives. What this section further demonstrates is that planning as a strategy of
economic development was possible in Cameroon because of the existence of a strong
state. This lends credence to the premise of the study: that state intervention in the
Cameroon economy was critical in attaining economic growth and development during
Ahidjo’s presidency. The commitment of the state to the development plan made
progress in the country a reality within this period.
PART II
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The Political Economy of Development in the Southwest Province
The Southwest province was created by a presidential decree in 1972, splitting the
former West Cameroon into the Northwest and Southwest provinces. As mentioned in the
preceding chapters, there were significant disparities among the provinces, in terms of
level of economic and social development and political involvement. Considerations of
socioeconomic disparities encountered were important in the political orientation of the
people in the Southwest province. The political domination of the Northwesterners over
the Southwesterners was the catalyst that led to the division of this region into the
Southwest and Northwest provinces.
This section evaluates the development policy of Ahidjo in the Southwest
province arguing that state intervention through public policy led to economic progress of
farmers in the province, leading subsequently to the farmers constituting themselves as a
“class” whose support was instrumental in ensuring the survival of the Ahidjo regime.
This analysis attempts to answer a number of questions: First, how important was
the economy of the Southwest province to the Cameroon economy, to have necessitated
state intervention? Second, given the political culture of the people in the province, was it
possible for them to constitute a significant force to advance the development of the
province? In other words, were the elite capable of initiating and implementing
development policies in the province? In responding to these questions, I argue that the
middle class mainly civil servants were involved in ensuring the success of Ahidjo’s
policy in the province. The discussion examines the political and economic development
of the Southwest province under Ahidjo. It shows that the agricultural policy of the
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government was a major success and was critical in the economic development of the
province resulting in popular support for Ahidjo’s regime. Section one is an overview of
the geography of the province as a backdrop to the economic activities undertaken in the
province, followed by a review of the political and economic situation in the province
and the progress made as a result ofAhidjo’s policy.
Geography of the Southwest Province
The province covers a total surface area of about 24,706 square kilometers. It
shares a common boundary with the Littoral province to the east, the Northwest province
to the north, Nigeria to the west and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. The vegetation
pattern of the province is mostly forest. Land area available for cultivation is estimated at
150,000 hectares, approximately 6 percent of the total land area. The Cameroon
Mountain is located in the province. The Southwest province has evolved from a purely
agricultural province to a producer of oil, which boosted Cameroon’s economic progress
in the early 1980s. About 67.7 percent of the population reside in rural areas. The 1976
census had the total population of the province at 620,515 people.
In 1981, the population was at 719,796 people. Today the population of the
province stands at about 1.5 million people. The province is densely populated and has
the largest concentration of plantation agricultural activities. For administrative purposes,
the province is divided into four divisions: Fako, Meme, Ndian and Manyu
Political Evolution of the Southwest Province
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The creation of the Southwest province was a result of the “glorious revolution of
20 May 1972,” in which Ahidjo claimed that federalism fostered regionalism and
impeded economic development. However, as some scholars argue, federalism in
Cameroon was not given the ultimate chance to take its course. The inequality and
disparity that existed between the federated states hampered any attempt at having a true
federal state; besides federalism was only in theory.
Ahidjo split West Cameroon into two provinces: the Northwest and the Southwest
Provinces. The politics that evolved in Southern Cameron, especially on the issue of
reunification with French Cameroon, laid the foundation for the political evolution of the
province. Two prominent politicians dominated politics in Southern Cameroons: Dr.
Endeley from the coastal region and Mr. Foncha from the grassfield region. Endeley was
the leader of the Kamerun National Congress (KNC), and Foncha was the leader of the
Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP). The KNC championed the cause of
integration with Nigeria. During the 1961 plebiscite, the inhabitants of the coastal regions
demonstrated considerable apathy for French Cameroon and sympathy for union with
Nigeria. Foncha and the KNDP, on the other hand, crusaded for secession from Nigeria.
His contention was that, “ we’ve been with Nigeria for forty years under British
administration. We have no roads, no government schools etc. It is about time we tried
the other side of the border.”^® In his effort at reunification with French Cameroon,
Foncha was heavily supported by people from the grassfield region. The support that
For a discussion, see Kamerun Times. February 11, 1963. The article was discussing an issue it ran
during the plebiscite in 1961.
116
Ahidjo received from this region during the plebiscite leading to reunification of
Southern Cameroon and French Cameroon was translated into political rewards in the not
too distant future. Since the early 1960s, elites from the Northwest region have come to
play a dominant political role in Cameroon politics while Southwesteners have been left
out.
Ahidjo’s motivation for splitting the region was partly because of the growing
dangers of a strong anglophone movement, but most likely it was because he understood
the internal contradictions within the two regions. Separation of Southern Cameroon from
Northern Cameroon made it easier for Ahidjo to breed the distrust that Southerners had
against Northwesterners. As Kofele- Kale has acknowledged the northwest elites success
in obtaining the best political positions in the Southwest provoked strong resentment
from the people in this province.^'
The above sentiment is widely held today by the Southwest Elite Association
(SWELA), a new elite organization which claims that the province suffered tremendously
at the hands ofNorthwest leaders especially the KNDP and Foncha. In fact, SWELA
contends that development projects slated for the province were diverted to the Northwest
province and Foncha, as vice president of Cameroon, deliberately retarded the
development of the province as well as refusing the province any foreign aid. The
political and economic victimization of the province propagated the emergence of
SWELA as a separate organization.
See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Tribesmen and Patriots: Political culture in a Poly-ethnic African State
(Washington D C., 1981).
For a detailed discussion, see SWELA’s Magazine, The Oracle (Limbe, April 1992), 35.
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SWELA is a progressive group in the province, which attempts to foster the true
interest and representation of the province in the nation. The creation of the organization
made it possible for Southwestemers to be represented in politics. The activities of the
organization brought to light the capabilities of the elite in the province, who before then,
were considered to be self-centered. SWELA was also instrumental in the appointment of
the present Prime Minister of Cameroon who is an indigene of the province. His efforts
further made it possible for more Southwestemers to obtain cabinet positions.This was
a major victory for the people in the province who for over 30 years were treated as
underdogs in Cameroon’s politics. As the new Prime Minister stated;
it is the first time in our history as a nation that a Southwestemer has been
appointed Prime Minister, the people in the province had to come together
to galvanize the second political awakening in the province, and to
strengthen our position and bargaining power.^'’
The above sentiment was widely held by Southwestemers who jubilated on the
appointment of one of their own as Prime Minister. They claimed that the president had
scratched their back and when the time came, they would support his reelection.^^ Today
the province enjoys a good representation in politics. The effort of SWELA made it
possible for that to happen. Although the situation looks promising for the province, there
is still the critical question of how sustainable the new- found positions within the
national government are. Of course, there is still antagonism between the Southwest and
See Cameroon Tribune (Yoaunde, 20 September and October 2 1990), for an overview and
composition of the new cabinet.
For an analysis, See the reception Southwestemers offered Peter Musonge in Buea, Limbe and
Yaounde in The Herald. 2-3 October; 11-14 November and 2-3 December 1996; Also see The Star
headlines, 20 November 1996 and Cameroon Post. 12-18 November 1996.
See Cameroon Post. 12-18 November 1996, for a discussion on the politics of “scratch my
back, I scratch yours” and “Politics na ngangi,” meaning one good turn deserves another.
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the Northwest. The Northwestemers, feel betrayed by the Southwest province,
especially in the wake of the democratization process and the loss incurred by the Social
Democratic Front (SDF), the leading opposition party with roots in the Northwest
province. As some pundits of Cameroon’s politics suggest, the 30 years of neglect
incurred by the Southwest province makes them very weary of any political move by
people of the Northwest province. As a result, total support for the ruling party is critical.
As expressed by the governor of the Southwest province during the 1996 municipal
elections, the poor performance in the Fako division by the ruling party (CPDM) was
mostly the action of the migrant population and not Southwestemers.^^
However, recent successes of the elites in the province, does not suggest that all
has been well between the Cameroon state and the people of the province. In fact, when it
came to political representation during the Ahidjo era, the only prominent politician from
the province who stayed as minister for a long time was Mr. Egbe Tabi, who controlled
the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication for over a decade. From the inception of the
United Republic of Cameroon in 1972 until 1992, only one Southwestemer had been
appointed governor of the Southwest province. Many civil servants working in the
province were from other provinces of the state. The suggestion by many critics
interviewed is that Ahidjo placed mostly civil servants from the Northwest province in
the Southwest province so as to keep a close eye on things, is to a certain degree,
accurate.
From the above it is evident that the motives behind the Cameroon state’s
intervention in the economy of the province were complex. The involvement of the state
See The Herald. Yaounde, 29-30 January 1996, 3.
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in the Southwest province was to control the resources of the province and to divert
the proceeds to other regions while neglecting the province, rather than to strengthen the
economy of the province to the benefit of its people. It seems evident that Ahidjo’s
intervention in the economy of the province was a way of compensating the
Southwesterners for the loss of formal power that they may have experienced in the
course of the country’s political development. This section demonstrates that in spite of
the province’s lack of representation in politics its economic superiority enhanced by
government intervention motivated the farmers in this region to support the Ahidjo
regime. Hence, support of the Ahidjo regime by the farmers in the province was purely
the result of economic progress realized in the province.
The Economy of the Southwest Province
The economy of the Southwest province is dominated by plantation agriculture
established during the colonial era. The favorable geography of the region in terms of
soil, vegetation and climate fostered the creation of plantations by the Germans and
British. Until the late 1970s, the economy was highly agricultural in orientation. Two
prominent companies controlled the principal plantations in the province: Pamol, Lobe-
Ndian, a privately- owned company and the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC)
a state- owned corporation in Fako and Meme Divisions. Both companies were engaged
in the cultivation of tea, banana, palm trees, and rubber. Recently, Del Monte an
American banana company, was added to the list of plantation companies, while Pamol
was almost forced to liquidate after posting negative balance sheet reports.
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Individual farmers account for the cultivation of cocoa, the leading cash crop
in the province. As many economic analysts suggest, the economy of Cameroon was
spared the painful ordeal of collapse because of the production of crude oil from the
Southwest province. The falling prices of cash crops like cocoa, coffee and banana on the
world market reduced government estimates on export earnings in the country. Cameroon
started oil production in 1978, which complemented the growth of the economy realized
from cash crop production in the early 1980s.
Despite its oil production, it is often argued that the Southwest province did not
benefit from its rich oil resources and oil revenues were used by those in power to feed
“the bellys of their allies.” The above discussion suggests that Ahidjo did not reinvest in
the economy of the province, but a critical exploration suggests that Ahidjo’s agricultural
policy in the province stimulated farmers to support his regime and account for his long
stay in power.
Agriculture
The agricultural sector remains the mainstay of the economy of the Southwest
province. It reflects the coexistence ofplantation farms especially for commercial crops
as tea, banana, rubber and palm trees, and traditional farms by small farmers who also
cultivate commercial crops like cocoa and coffee, but are mostly involved in the
cultivation of food crops like, cocoyams, plantains, cassava and yams. Until 1978, when
oil production came into the picture, agriculture accounted for 90 percent of economic
activities in the province, making it the leader in the cultivation of banana, tea, rubber and
palm oil in Cameroon.
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The main cash crops that dominate the agricultural sector of the province are
cocoa, banana, rubber, palm oil, and tea. Cocoa is grown principally in Meme, Ndian and
Manyu divisions. However, cultivation is mostly concentrated in Meme and Ndian
divisions. Cocoa production in the province reached approximately 35,000 tons in 1990.
The cultivation of this crop is solely by small farmers who depend principally on
government subsidies for fertilizers and extension services, to train and educate them on
obtaining high yielding crops. Total cocoa production for Ndian and Meme division was
30,000 tons, with Meme division accounting for more than half of this production in 1990
(Table 8).
Banana is grown mostly in Fako and Meme divisions. The Fako division
however, accounts for a large portion of its production and is through plantation
agriculture. The CDC dominates the production of banana in the province. Today, Del
Monte competes strongly with CDC in banana production. At the end of September 1963,
West Cameroon lost its subsidies for banana exported to Britain, as well as any existing
subsidies for other crops. This almost crippled the banana industry. After many years of
neglect, banana production today has increased, thanks to the policy by Ahidjo in
developing a strategy that encouraged high productivity in the banana industry. The
province accounts for more than half the total production of banana in Cameroon.
Rubber is another important crop from the Southwest province. Like banana,
rubber is produced mostly in Fako and Meme divisions and is reserved for plantation
agriculture. The CDC dominates its production but individual farmers, such as Chief
Mukete, who was able to obtain loans and financial assistance from foreign sources
especially the World Bank, was also engaged in rubber production. Rubber is mainly
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processed by agro- allied industries. The Bata shoe industry, which produces shoes
from latex, depends on rubber as its raw material. The province is among the top two in
the production of rubber in Cameroon.
Palm oil production is also by plantation agriculture and small farmers. The CDC
dominates in its production. It is produced mainly in Fako, Meme and Ndian divisions,
which also are among the leading divisions in the country. Production of palm oil is both
for local consumption and export. Over the years, palm oil production has increased
greatly in the province. Today, the aging of palm trees has led to the development of
another by-product, palm wine. Although its contribution to the economy of the province
has not been extensively researched, it accounts for a reasonable number of employment
opportunities in the province. In 1983, palm oil production stood at over 50000 tons for
the province. Today, however, with the reorganization of Pamol its production has
reduced.
Tea was introduced during colonial rule in Cameroon and mostly concentrated in
Fako division. This crop is tailored for export and demonstrates the contention by
dependency theorists that Africa was forced to produce what it did not consume and
consume what it did not produce. Tea is cultivated in Tole at the foothills of the
Cameroon Mountain. The favorable climate accounts for the persistence of this crop in
the province.
Other products of the agricultural sector include food crops, which generally are
for local consumption. The forestry sector is also very important to the province. The
province is among the leaders in the supply of logged products in Cameroon. Logging is
undertaken mostly in Meme, Ndian and Manyu divisions. Meme and Ndian are the
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leading divisions in the production of timber in this region. Deforestation of the region
has been a major concern to environmentalists, the government and foreign aid donors.
Deforestation resulted in the British Royal family purchasing a large area in Ndian.
Today, the area called “Korup,” serves as an area for forest and medicinal research.
Agriculture is important in the province because of its abundant resources and the
level of state intervention in the sector. Table 8 is an evolution of production of main
cash crops in the province for selected years
TABLE 8
EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTION OF MAIN CROPS: PROVINCIAL LEVEL IN TONS 1979-1990
Crops 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1990
Cocoa 22576 24505 28109 26898 30350 34620
Palm Oil 18886 21453 23609 50588 70298 61810
Bananas 14718 13955 14932 16390 18145 15319
Rubber 11460 12412 15294 13157 17470 14640
Tea 2015 1950 2291 1707 2492 2198
Source: Provincial year Book of studies and agricultural statistics. Provincial Delegation
of Agriculture for the Southwest. 1980 and subsequent issues.
As demonstrated by the above data, cocoa production has been constantly
increasing over the years. Of the 100,000 tons of cocoa produced in Cameroon, the
Southwest province accounted for well over one third of its production. In 1990, for
example, cocoa production was approximately 35,000 tons. Palm oil production has also
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increased over the years in production. In 1990, however, production dropped from
70,298 tons in 1985 to 61,810 tons in 1990. This was principally due to the problems
experienced by Pamol, the second largest producer of palm oil in the province. Banana
and rubber production also made great strides during these years. Tea production has
been marginal in the province because of the small land area occupied by its production.
Tea can only be produced around Tole and the limited space reduces any chance for
increased production. In all, the positive numbers shown on the table supports the fact
that the province’s agricultural sector was critical for Cameroon’s economy, and this
success was partly due to state support through public policy.
As a symbolic gesture of state intervention in agricultural development in the
Southwest, the first ever farmers’ agricultural show was held in the Southwest province
in 1973. The fanfare with which the festivities occurred demonstrated that the Cameroon
state was interested in the agricultural sector. This gesture went a long way to harness
farmers’ support for the Ahidjo regime in the province and in the covmtry throughout its
administration.
Industry
While some critics contend that Ahidjo was more committed to the development
of the agricultural sector of the Southwest province, a review of some data on industrial
distribution in Cameroon shows that the Southwest was not lagging behind in terms of
industrial location. In fact, in 1975, for instance, the province occupied fourth place in
numbers of industries in the country. Table 9 is a comparison of industrial distribution by
provinces for 1975 and 1984. With the exception of the Oil Refinery Company
SONARA, most industrial activities are carried out by agro-based industries.
TABLE 9
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Provincial Distributions of Industries for 1975 and 1984
Year 1975 1984
Province No. % No. %
Littoral 116 53.2 262 58.0
Center South 57 26.1 Na Na
East 15 6.8 3 0.6
West 7 3.3 20 4.4
North 7 3.3 20 4.4
Southwest 14 6.4 19 4.2
Northwest 2 0.9 4 0.9
Center Na Na 103 23.0
South Na Na 5 1.0
Adamawa Na Na 4 0.9
Far North Na Na 12 2.6
Total 218 100.0 452 100.0
Source: Complied from files of Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning,
Yaounde.
Table 9 demonstrates that the Southwest province occupied a comfortable
position in the country in terms of industries located in the province. From 1975 to 1984,
its fourth place position did not change. In fact, in absolute terms the province gained five
industries. This is in part due to the resources available in the province.
Agricultural industries dominate the industrial sector, with the CDC as the
primary player. The CDC was created in 1946 to take over and administer most of the
former German plantations that had been confiscated by France and Britain after the
Second World War. When the CDC played its greatest role in the economy of the
” Table 9 is a condensation of two tables. For more see Wilfred Ndongko, Reflection on the
Economic Policies and Development of Cameroon. 145, 146.
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province, it accounted for 65 percent of the export tonnage and 55 percent of export
earnings. The CDC is the next largest employer in the province behind the Cameroon
state. It has production factories and plants in many towns and cities. Many towns and
villages were created as a result of the CDC. The concept of a “Camp,” in Cameroon
today as it is understood originated from the housing structure erected by the CDC. It is
the only corporation that has successfully penetrated the Southwest province and has
greatly impacted the lives of many English- speaking Cameroonians. The CDC was
organized as a colonial corporation and still maintains the same structure. Before the
effective penetration of the federal state in this region of the country, the CDC was the
major player. Employment by the company was seen as a significant step to gaining the
good life. The CDC controlled the production of banana, rubber and palm products. The
importance of the agricultural sector to the province in particular and the country in
general made the company an important corporation.
Direct government investment in crop production projects was critical in
revamping the CDC. The CDC received high priority because it is the major agro¬
industrial complex in the province, which is responsible for the production and
processing of rubber, banana, tea and palm produce. Between 1971 and 1976, a period
that falls within the third development plan in Cameroon, the CDC received a total of 3.5
billion francs CEA, equivalent to 20.1 percent of total direct government investment in
“JQ ^
agricultural production in the country. The CDC as earlier mentioned, was the second
For a detail study, see CDC report 1961.
For further discussion, See President Ahidjo’s opening speech in the Cameroon Third five- year
development plan 1971-1976 August 11, 1971, viii
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largest employer in the country next to the government and attempts that were made to
revamp its productivity were greatly welcomed.
Agriculture has lost its importance as the major source of national income and
therefore, today, there is great competition from crude oil, which is strictly the domain of
SONARA. This parastatal is responsible for the extraction, refining and marketing of
crude oil. While the politics of oil is complicated because of the approach taken by the
government to prevent the “Dutch disease,” the contribution of oil to the Cameroon
economy is crucial. The exact production of oil remains classified and only part of the
earnings is reported for public information. Oil production from the province has been
beneficial to the economy of the country. The output of oil increased to 5.75 million tons
in 1983, from 625,000 tons in 1978, when production started. Data suggests that earnings
from oil accounted for over 25 percent of GDP in Cameroon at the onset ofproduction,
and by 1990, its contribution to GDP had increased to about 30 percent. This increase
coupled with the deterioration, in the terms of trade of agricultural goods on the world
market, caused serious economic dislocations in the economy, especially in the
agricultural sector that was the base of the country’s economic activity. The deteriorating
terms of trade of agricultural goods on the world market reduced government income,
forcing the government to rely more on the service of a new breed of civil servants for
success.
The overall goal of Ahidjo’s plan for the Southwest province was to increase
production and the level of productivity as well as to improve the conditions of living for
the people in the province. Such an objective required a calculated policy as well as
policy actors who could realize the goals. Training at ENAM therefore, became crucial
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for the creation of a cadre ofpolicy actors in the service of the state. ENAM graduates
filled policy positions in the Ministries, and most especially in the Ministry of
Agriculture where they were responsible for implementing the agricultural policy in the
province.
Training at ENAM centered on the economic ideology of planned liberalism was
critical in understanding Cameroon’s economic planning and progress. This approach
was used at ENAM to guide civil servants, but also to acquaint them to Ahidjo’s vision of
the development of Cameroon. Secondly, teachers at ENAM taught students to become
key actors in the implementation ofAhidjo’s policies in the country and the province.
These new civil servants were later sent to the provinces to implement government
policies with the hidden purpose of carving support for the state.
The Ministry of Agriculture is the main agricultural decision- making body at the
national level of government. At the lower level the sub- divisional delegate identifies
agricultural problems and priorities in their divisions. These problems are then forwarded
to the divisional delegate and the senior divisional officer who in collaboration with the
provincial chief of service (delegate), for agriculture synthesizes the information and
forwards a comprehensive document to the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRIC). The
Minister presents a report to the presidency, to the members of the social and economic
council who define the objectives of the state in the agricultural sector and the means for
implementing these objectives.
The importance of the Southwest province to Cameroon’s economy especially the
contribution of the agricultural sector to state revenues directly translated into support for
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the Ahidjo regime by the farmers. State support to farmers in terms of market and
price stabilization of crops further strengthened this support.
Another aspect of government investment in the province was in the area of
infrastructure development. To this effect, the construction of farm- to- market roads was
undertaken during this period. Seasonal roads like the Kumba- Ekondo-Titi, the Kumba-
Mamfe, and the Kumba-Tombel roads were patched to allow easy transport of
agricultural produce from the interior of the province to the ports. The roads however
have been always deplorable during the wet seasons when heavy rainfalls cause serious
mudslides and other road problems. For a province that makes a substantial contribution
to the GNP of the country the present road situation is deplorable. For instance, the
construction of the famous Kumba-Mamfe road has been echoed in Ahidjo’s speeches
but the project has never been realized. Positive results were however, realized in Fako
division where the Tiko-Douala and Tiko- Limbe roads were constantly paved and
maintained. To further satisfy the people of the province, and especially those in the
Meme division, the Muyuka- Kumba stretch was paved. During the Ahidjo presidency,
the number of seasonal roads doubled, this accounted for the reason why the province
was able to transport a large quantity of produce to the center in Kumba.
Extension workers such as researchers, and trainers were a very important part of
the implementation of the agricultural policy. In the Southwest province, Ekona served as
the agricultural research center. Today, its activities have extended beyond the basic
research of tree crops such as cocoa, banana and coffee, to include food crops such as
pepper, tomatoes and cassava. Through this research center, the government was able to
intensify research and experimentation in agricultural food crops resulting in the doubling
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of food production in the province, making it food self- sufficient in the country. The
Ministry of Agriculture mostly provided extension workers, and they oversaw training of
young civil servants from the agricultural school in Nchang and Bambili. These civil
servants were responsible for providing technical assistance to farmers as well as
demonstrate the new techniques in agricultural production. This support boosted
productivity in the rural areas of the province through a more efficient allocation of input
resources as fertilizers and pesticides, as well as the use of high yielding seeds.
Rural development agencies facilitated the implementation of rural development
projects. In particular, government control of prices in its attempt to stabilize them
provided the incentive to farmers. The creation of FONADER, the National Produce
Marketing Board and cooperatives were strategies utilized to stabilize prices of major
cash crops as well as to revitalize rural development structures. The headquarters of the
cooperative movement was in Kumba in the Meme division. The organization was called
Southwest Cooperative Organization (SOWEFCO). SOWEFCO coordinated the
activities of all the cooperatives in the province and worked in collaboration with
marketing board to purchase cocoa from farmers in the divisions. The role of the
marketing board was to stabilize prices of cocoa in the province. The mandate of the civil
servants working for the agency was to implement the agricultural policy of price
stabilization, in order to support fanners’ efforts.
Such a complex but calculated means of implementing the agricultural policy in
the province was embedded in planned liberalism, which was the country’s overall
development ideology under Ahidjo. The success with which implementation of the
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country’s agricultural policy was realized, increased production in the province’s
agricultural sector.
In summary, this section has examined the state’s agricultural policy in the
Southwest province. It has shown that farmers in the province prospered as a result of
Ahidjo’s policies of infrastructural development to transport produce to the markets, and
the policy of price stabilization in the agricultural goods sector. State support through its
investments increased the productive capacity of farmers, and as a result, advanced
research in high yielding crops, led to increased productivity. This policy motivated
farmers in the province to support Ahidjo’s regime. Also, the discussion demonstrates
that the new class of farmers on the one hand, and civil servants who were placed at the
helm of the decision making process at the provincial and sub-divisional levels in the
Southwest province, were involved in ensuring the success of the state’s agricultural
policies. The next chapter evaluates the economic performance of the national economy
with particular attention to the agricultural sector, which is critical to economic growth
and development of the country.
CHAPTER V
ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN CAMEROON
In the preceding chapters, we have examined and demonstrated to a certain extent,
the impact of colonial rule on Cameroon’s development. We have mentioned, and
discussed the significance of agriculture as the dominant sector of the economy. We have
also examined the objectives of the Cameroon state during the Ahidjo era that were to
increase the economic performance of the economy through doubling the per capita
income and raising the standards of living of the people using a twenty-year development
plan.
In assessing the performance of Cameroon’s post-independent economy therefore,
it is imperative to examine key economic indicators as growth, inflation and government
spending and their movement overtime. It is also important to examine whether the state
achieved its objectives under the twenty-year development plan and what costs were
associated with such a strategy. Unquestionably, most of the economic indicators point to
significant economic achievements during the Ahidjo regime. And why not, his
pragmatic approach to leadership, coupled with the exploitation of petroleum helped
balance and develop a nation that emerged from colonialism with one of the poorest, least
developed economies and the most diverse cultural and ethnic composition, to become
one of the most prosperous countries in Africa.
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This chapter evaluates the performance of the economy during the Ahidjo
regime and pays particular attention to agricultural performance and development. The
chapter supports the thesis of this study that the Cameroon state under Ahidjo was
successful in implementing economic policies that led to growth and development of the
economy, especially in the agricultural sector. It begins with an analysis of the economic
indicators during this period and focuses on the extent to which government policies and
plaiming efforts were responsible for the performance of the economy in general and
agriculture in particular.
5.1. The Agricultural Sector
Cameroon’s economy was relatively strong and stable during the Ahidjo regime.
The state played a major role in this success with the help of the twenty-year
development policy. However, there was ample flexibility for foreign investment in the
country through the liberal investment code adopted by the regime. Agriculture was the
dynamic force behind the economy’s development. Production of export crops such as
cocoa, coffee, bananas and cotton provided the needed foreign exchange to finance and
import capital goods and services for the development of the economy.
Cameroon’s economy showed an estimated increase in agricultural production at
an annual average rate of 3.9 percent, and an estimated inflation rate of 12 percent
annually. The rate of domestic national savings increased from 17 percent between 1973
and 1980 to 23.7 percent between 1980 and 1989, and a debt service ratio of 12 percent
was sustained in the 1970s, that later increased to 14 percent in 1985.’ In comparison to
' Data complied from Wilfred Ndongko, Reflections on the Economic Policies and the
Development of Cameroon (Yaounde, MESRES/ISH 1985); also World Bank, World Development
Reports.
134
the colonial period, the economy was based only on agricultural production with a
GDP rate of less than 3 percent and savings rate of zero, because all surpluses went to the
colonial powers. Ahidjo’s regime, therefore, transformed the country’s economy to self-
sufficiency, by embarking on increased food production. The GDP rate steadily increased
from 5.2 percent in 1960-70, to 6.3 percent in 1970-80 and then to 7.0 percent in 1980-
86.^ These growth records were the major reasons for the praise to the Ahidjo regime by
the international financial institutions as the World Bank and the IMF. These institutions
gave the country a “triple A” rating in its credit standing. This gave Cameroon a
tremendous access to international loans. The primary objective of the regime during this
period was to double the per capita income which at independence in 1960 was only
21,500 francs cfa. By 1980/81, the per capita income of Cameroon had reached 187,000
francs cfa.^ From the above figures one can say that the State and Ahidjo succeeded in
doubling the per capita income of the country and thus realized one of its objectives in
the twenty-year development plan.
Many reasons have been advanced for this rapid rate of economic growth in
Cameroon in the late 1970s. Some experts have explored the government’s policy to
move away from an import-substitution to an export- oriented economy under the
guidance of planned liberalism. Others have discussed the impact of petroleum on
Cameroon’s political economy, while another group has looked at the impact of a United
Republic of Cameroon in contrast to the impact of a Federal Republic of Cameroon on
economic growth. Although no one reason can be given to explain Cameroon’s economic
^ Data complied from World Bank, World Development Reports 1978 and subsequent issues.
^ For a discussion, see Wilfred Ndongko, 192.
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performance during this period, the policies pursued by Ahidjo did have an impact on
economic performance with implications for the political stability and prosperity of the
country.
First, after a decade of import-substitution policies that led to the dependency of
Cameroon’s economy to that of France, Cameroon began to open its trade system in the
late 1970s, a process, which included the introduction of new customs and fiscal policies.
Ahidjo was cautious in his approach to a market- oriented economy. This is seen in his
reluctance to be fully involved in the Central African Customs Union (UDEAC), of
which Cameroon was a pioneer. For Ahidjo, internal development and efficiency was
critical for Cameroon’s products to be competitive in the international market. Countries
in Asia pursue this same approach, before they finally opened their markets to
international trade. Ahidjo’s involvement in partial unrestricted international trade
resulted in the elimination of quantitative restrictions, tariffs exemptions and special
custom and fiscal policies that were common during the implementation of the import-
substitution policy. Partial trade liberalization and fiscal reform that was part of a market-
oriented reform was fueled by the production of petroleum in the country as well as the
increase in the production of agricultural export crops.
The increased incentives in the economy generated by higher foreign exchange
earnings from agricultural production and the industrial sectors increased Cameroon’s
demand for imported goods and services. Table 10 shows the evolution of merchandise
trade in Cameroon between 1976, and 1989. The quantity of good imported is a good
economic indicator gauging the standards of living in a country. This table shows that
imports of goods increased as the economic performance of the country improved. It
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suggests that all things being equal, Cameroonians were able to have a variety of
goods and services at their disposal.
TABLE 10
MERCHANDISE TRADE IN CAMEROON 1976 TO 1989 (Millions of US Dollars)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1987 1988 1989
EXPORT 511 705 803 1129 1079 1714 1639 900
IMPORT 609 768 1057 1271 1428 2168 1484 1320
BALANCE -98 -59 -254 -142 -349 -454 +155 -420
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports 1977 and subsequent issues.
The above data reflects merchandise trade in Cameroon and shows the adverse
balance of trade position that the country faced resulting from unfavorable terms of trade
for agricultural goods. It does not take into consideration Cameroon’s oil exports because
oil exploration was placed in a special account (compte hor budjet). The data does show
that imports drastically increased when Cameroon opted for trade liberalization through
the abolition of import-substitution policies that had dominated the trade patterns since
independence. In 1976 for instance, only 609 million US dollars worth of goods were
imported in Cameroon as opposed to 2,168 million US dollars of goods in 1987.
From the data, the following conclusion can be drawn with implications for the
overall development of the country. Cameroon realized a steady increase in the export
and import of goods from 1976 to 1987, which is consistent with the period of rapid
137
economic expansion and development. The data shows that economic development
through the availability of goods was attained because Cameroonians were able to
acquire a variety of goods that could not be produced locally. It thus suggests that the
standard of living of the people improved during the period of economic growth from
1976 to 1987. The data also shows that after 1987, exports and imports of goods
decreased tremendously which is consistent with the period when Cameroon began
feeling the pain of economic crisis during the Biya regime. In reviewing the balance of
trade, the data suggests that except in 1988, Cameroon always ran a trade deficit with the
rest of the world. The substantial inflow of revenue from the sale of petroleum gave
Cameroon an overall balance of trade surplus during the Ahidjo regime and accounts for
why the country had an enormous reserve in its foreign exchange.
The conservative policy pursued by Ahidjo is further visible in the type of imports
allowed to enter the country. During his presidency, only capital goods for the production
of more goods were favored into the country. Consumer goods were limited to basic
necessities. As one former senior official mentioned:
during the Ahidjo times, it was very difficult to see luxury cars as
Mercedes, Volvos and the rest, which is common today. Importation of
these goods was limited and especially reserved to Top- level
administrators. As a matter of fact, the color black on special cars was
forbidden to the public. Luxury items to Ahidjo reduced the foreign
reserves of the country and were thus restricted.'*
The above sentiment has been advanced by critics of Ahidjo as depriving the
people of their freedom of choice. For these critics, Ahidjo’s policy was similar to the
Interview with a top retired civil servant during the Ahidjo regime. The interview was conducted
December 15, 1998 in Kumba in the Southwest province.
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colonial policy of imposing on the people what, how and when to carry out economic
activities. Nevertheless, a critical look at the situation shows that this measure by the
government was aimed at curtailing the run-away imports, which seriously depleted the
limited resources of the country. Ahidjo’s cautious approach did secure an increase in
economic growth and is the reason why Cameroon was moved from the group of low-
income developing country by the World Bank, to a middle-income developing country,
in its report on the state of development in Africa.^
Secondly, the conservative approach of the Ahidjo regime toward the oil boom
helped Cameroon to avoid the “Dutch Disease” syndrome that was rampant among
African oil-producing countries. The “Dutch Disease” is a situation wherein oil
producing countries abandon their agricultural sector, critical for economic growth and
development, for the production of oil.^ The approach of the Cameroon government was
to direct most of the oil revenue abroad in an attempt to prevent the building up of
popular pressure for greater government expenditure. This measure worked in the Ahidjo
regime and although government expenditure increased by 13 percent in the late 1970s
and by 25 percent in the early 1980s, the expenditure rarely exceeded the revenues of the
state. In this respect, the government was able to run a balanced budget totally financed
in the early 1980s by domestic resources especially from the oil revenues and cash crop
^ For an analysis, see World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda
for Action Washington D.C. World Bank, 1981.
® The Dutch Disease has been widely analyzed. It entails abandoning agricultural policies because
of the gains from the oil sector. As a result, oil production is substituted for agricultural production. This
substitution eventually leads to the country to be dependent on imported food and other agricultural
products. For a detail analysis, see G. Malcolm et al.. Economics of Development (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1983); also see Nancy Benjamin and Shantayanan Devarajan, “Oil Revenues and the Cameroon
Economy,” in Micheal Schatzberg and William Zartman eds.. The Political Economy of Cameroon (New
York: Praeger, 1986), 161-80.
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production. When Biya took over, excessive government spending depleted the
resources of the country in Syears and led to the economic crisis, which dominated
Cameroon’s political economy in the 1990s.
Thirdly, and related to the policy of planned liberalism adopted by Ahidjo, was
the fact that foreign investors attracted by the liberal investment code, increased their
investment in the country. Cameroon was considered a paradise for business because of
the potential it offered and the political stability of the country. In 1969, for instance, 38
billion francs cfa of foreign investment capital was pumped into the economy. It was
represented by 133 companies, which generated about 33.000 new jobs. By 1975,
Cameroon was able to attract 84 billion francs cfa in foreign investment for its
development needs.’ France dominated foreign investment in the coimtry all the time.
French investments represented about 30 percent of total investment in the private sector.
The significance of this relationship dates back to the colonial era when France played a
major role in the country’s development especially in the provision of infrastructure. It is
this domination of foreign capital in Cameroon that induced Richard Joseph to argue that
Ahidjo’s vision of the state though civilian in form shared essential features of praetorian
rule elsewhere, and was far more the creation of foreign capital than had yet been
revealed.* For him, the creation of the Cameroon state was like most African states, the
creation of foreign capital.
The state in Cameroon was molded through Ahidjo’s vision. For instance, the
centralization of the state’s institution went beyond the basic Gaullist approach. The
’ See Wilfred Ndongko, 144-45.
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development of the state was central in Cameroon’s economic growth, which became
significant in the late 1970s. The state also focused on improving the living conditions of
the people through doubling their per capita income. The doubling of the per capita
income naturally caught the attention of critics who continuously expressed skepticism
over this indicator as a gauge of economic development. They argued that growth rather
than development occurred following the two-fold increase in per capita income in
Cameroon and further rationalized that increased per capita income in Cameroon did not
signify overall development of the people in terms of self-esteem and better standards of
living. For this group, high growth rate in Cameroon was not consistent with better
standards of living because it led to poverty. The Ahidjo regime was however, able to
provide social services as healthcare and education to improve the lives of the rural poor.
Another generally recognized feature of structural economic change and positive
economic performance in developing countries is that, as countries develop, the
proportion of the GDP accounted for by the agricultural sector tends to decline overtime.
The reason for this phenomenon is tied to the development of the country in that as
people experience an increase in their standard of living, they also experience a major
change in their consumption pattern. Preference for goods and services other than food
will increase and be followed by an increase in the sector producing the goods and
services. In other words, as living conditions improve, people will shift their demand
from basic food to other goods. This implies that the proportion of the population
engaged in the agricultural sector will reduce. In 1960, 87.8 percent of the economically
* See Richard Joseph, “Cameroon Under Ahmadou Ahidjo: The Neo-Colonial Polity,” in Joseph
Richard ed., Gaullist Africa (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd., 1978), 36.
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active population was engaged in agriculture, by 1970, there was a 17 percent
reduction with approximately 70 percent of the population engaged in agriculture.
Nonetheless, agriculture continued to provide a sizable amount of the GDP, accounting
for 35 percent and employing about 65 percent of the active population.^ Table 11 shows
the evolution of the structure of production in Cameroon from 1960 to 1989. It
demonstrates that economic performance seen through an increase in the industrial and
service sectors was consistent with the pattern of growth and development. It further
points to the fact that Cameroon’s economy recorded a similar pattern of structural
change as do different African countries as they develop.
TABLE 11
EVOLUTION OF THE PRODUCTION STRUCTURE IN CAMEROON 1960-
1989 (in percentage)
Sector Agriculture Industry Service Total
1960 48 10 42 100.0
1965 33 20 47 100.0
1976 33 20 47 100.0
1977 32 25 43 100.0
1978 32 24 43 100.0
1980 27 28 45 100.0
1987 24 34 42 100.0
1988 26 43 31 100.0
1989 27 42 31 100.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports 1978 and subsequent issues.
’ See Wilfred Ndongko, 158.
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Table 11 shows a gradual decline in the proportion of production in the
agricultural sector of the economy and a gradual increase in the industrial sector, which
increased in the 1980s following the exploration of petroleum. The gradual reduction in
agricultural contribution to the production structure confirms the fact that Cameroon’s
economy did perform positively. The industrial sector accounted for much of the
economic growth in the 1980s, but agriculture continued to play a significant role. The
fall in the proportion of the service sector to the economy in 1988 reflects the reduction
of government expenditure in the economy following the first austerity budget adopted
by the Biya regime in the beginning of the economic crisis.
The preceding discussion supports the writer’s contention that agriculture was the
sector of the economy producing the needed foreign exchange earnings, which was used
for the development in the country during the Ahidjo regime. In following the program of
economic growth and development through agricultural development, the Ahidjo regime
utilized the necessary means to not only increase cash crop production, but to also
discourage rural exodus by providing and supporting the development of rural projects.
As Ahidjo stated, “the dynamics of the agricultural sector will be organized at two levels:
on the one hand, intensification of intervention in the area of organization and teaching of
farmers, and on the other hand, to give a vigorous push to increase production.”The
main objective of the government is to increase its export earning potential by increasing
export production. Table 12 provides data on the production of a selected number of
export crops from 1961 to 1979. As the table demonstrates production of some export
Plan.
For a discussion, see Ahmadou Ahidjo, policy speech in the Fourth Five-year Development
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crops show an interesting result critical for the agricultural development and economic
performance of the economy. It further highlights the desire of the state to diversify its
export crop production to earn foreign exchange.
TABLE 12
VOLUME OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS FROM 1961 TO 1979 (Metric
Tons)
Crops Cocoa Coffee Cotton Bananas Rubber
1961 65630 35480 504 51280 4940
1963 79600 43990 3677 121300 4240
1965 77800 48280 3722 119090 10510
1967 69810 63210 3692 48480 11670
1969 72026 62556 10831 46510 10740
1971 81598 71066 4708 61817 12812
1973 88928 100722 2986 75481 16380
1975 72476 93733 Na 74243 15488
1977 62157 53228 14471 84839 18157
1979 80508 72338 11845 80000 14600
Source: FAO, Year Book 1963 and subsequent issues.
From the data in Table 12, total cocoa exports increased from 65,630 metric tons
in 1961 to 80,508 metric tons in 1979. Similarly, cotton and rubber exports increased
from 504 metric tons and 4,940 metric tons respectively in 1961 to 11,845 metric tons
and 14,600 metric tons in 1979. The data presented above show a general performance of
exports from the agricultural sector in terms of its contribution to the economy; it also
show the fluctuations in the production of some crops. Within the period examined the
144
data show that between 1967 and 1977, cocoa production fell to 69,810 metric tons
from 77,800 metric tons in 1965, and 62,157 metric tons from 72,476 tons in 1975,
respectively. The severe weather conditions that affected the Southwest province and the
Central-South provinces, was a major factor accounting for the reduction in the
production of cocoa. Rubber production however, experienced a steady increase
throughout the period indicated by to the data.
Agriculture, in spite of petroleum production, still occupied a significant position
in the economic development of the country. Price fluctuations in this sector however,
were rampant, and in some cases reduced government projected revenues from this
sector. Cameroon was fortunate that oil revenue complemented the reduction incurred
from price fluctuations in the agricultural sector.
Like cash crop production, food crops such as rice, cereals, wheat flour and
potatoes posted a strong recovery from years of low production and dependence of the
country on imported food. Cameroon is presently about 96 percent food self-sufficient.
The desire for the government to reduce its dependence on imported food, which at this
time accounted for a large portion of imports, has been in part due to its objective of
increasing the standard of living of the people. Most growth in food production was due
to increase in the production of three main staples; rice, com and millet. Rice production
increased at an average rate of 39.4 percent from 4,000 metric tons in 1961 to 16,000 tons
in 1966. Similarly, com production increased at an annual average rate of 17.4 percent
from 312,000 metric tons in 1961 to 381,000 tons in 1966.*' The “green revolution”
" For further discussion on food crops growth rates in Cameroon, see V. P. Loginova, Studies on
Developing Countries: United Republic of Cameroon (Budapest. 1976).
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program, initiated by the Ahidjo regime in 1973 was the watershed in production as
well as more research and development of high yielding crop varieties. For instance, the
government increased its involvement by instituting an agency to oversee the production
of rice in the northern province of the country thereby increasing production
substantially.
The point here is that intensified and continued food production in Cameroon as a
dominant factor in agricultural development has been greatly supported by large-scale
cash crop production that for the most part has been coordinated by the state. The
performance of food crops in the country revealed an 8.8 percent rate of increase.
Overall, between 1969 and 1979, growth rate of the volume of food production was 3.3
percent, an impressive record for an African country with a population growth rate of
about 2.8 percent. This significant performance accounted for Cameroon’s ability to
realize food self-sufficiency.'^ The green revolution program and the determination of the
regime to realize a reduction in imported food all contributed to the increase in food
production. This was realized at a time when many African countries were experiencing
serious food shortages.'^ Cameroon’s ability to increase its food production and to sustain
production efforts to the point of having a surplus for export to neighboring Nigeria and
Gabon, made the country by the late 1970s one of the few countries to be food self-
sufficient.
During Ahidjo’s regime, population growth was encouraged up to the mid- 1980s
when the World Bank suggested that Africa had serious population problems. Higher
12 Ibid.
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population growths undermine any progress realized in the domain of food production
because, as the dependency ratio of food production increases, the level of rural/ urban
exodus, and the pressure on farmers increases as well. As pointed out earlier, many rural
farmers have small-scale farms of less than 3 hectares, with a majority involved in the
production of cash crops. Female farmers, who for the most part are not generally favored
in the traditional land tenure practice, largely dominate food production in Cameroon. In
addition, access to loans from FONADER is difficult for this gender group who for the
most part are discriminated against. The recent resurgence of “Njangi groups” is an
attempt by women to provide the necessary funds for the production of food crops.
“Ngangis” serve as the source of income for a large number of women. Government
attempts at providing access to credit for female farmers have been limited to only cash
crop producers. Today, the works ofNGOs target rural female food crop producers who
are generally left out in the disbursement of farm loans.
So far, the analysis on economic performance in Cameroon has been limited to
the performance of the agricultural sector. Other major economic indicators influencing
economic performance in Cameroon include monetary and fiscal indicators and policies.
Cameroon was a member of the Francs CFA zone and membership to this zone
meant that France controlled the monetary policy of Cameroon. The significance of this
policy is that price movements in Cameroon tended to follow those in France. Inflation in
Cameroon as in other member states of the zone was much lower than in other countries
because of the monetary policy of the French government. To incorporate Cameroon into
Food crisis that plagued most of Sub-Saharan Africa was widely analyzed in the 1970s and
1980s. Low production caused by drought was blamed for massive starvation especially in Sudan and
Ethiopia, where international support became necessary.
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the money economy, France in 1948, created the “Banque Des Etat de L’Afrique
Centrale” (BEAC). It was the central bank for the Central African region, which oversaw
the question of stability and convertibility of the franc CFA. Tight monetary policy of the
French government was also seen in the fixed- exchange rate between the French franc
and the CFA.*'*
Before the exploitation of petroleum in the late 1970s, commercial banking in
Cameroon was the domain reserved principally for French banks. The early 1980s
however, saw a massive influx of United States and British banks. Bank of America,
Chase Manhattan and First Boston National banks, all established agencies in the country
to benefit from oil revenues. The strict discipline of the franc zone and the credit ceiling
imposed by BEAC made it difficult for other foreign banks to operate successfully in the
country. The economic crisis in the country in the mid-1980s forced most non-French
banks to pull out of the country. France’s tight control of the monetary system exercised
through BEAC placed the Biya government in a precarious position during the latter part
of the 1980s. It became increasingly difficult for the government to finance its internal
borrowing or print money. Most of the borrowing was external, largely on its operating
accounts in the French Treasury. By 1987, Cameroon’s poor economic performance had
forced it to incur a huge debt, which triggered the debt crisis in the country. In spite of the
austerity budget that the government adopted, it was forced to succumb to the pressures
of the World Bank and the IMF to adopt a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) package
The French Franc guaranteed the convertibility of the cfa. 1FF= SOfrs cfa. Today, because of
pressure from the European and the subsequent devaluation of the cfa, 1 FF= 1 OOfrs cfa.
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as early as 1992. In other words, Cameroon’s economic performance that Ahidjo had
put on track took less than a decade to dismantle.
It is important to mention here that during the Ahidjo era, a conservative and
pragmatic approach was critical to the progress of the economy. His desire to double the
income as well as improve the living conditions of citizens influenced the budget choices
and did not create any run-away government expenditures. As analyzed by prominent
local economists in the country, the only extravagant expenditure that Ahidjo carried was
the building of a new presidential mansion. In fact, Cameroon ran a balanced budget for
the most part of his regime and in 1982/83 fiscal year, the budget of 410 billion francs
cfa, the last presented by the regime, was entirely financed from Cameroon’s resources
without loans from any foreign country.’^ This was an impressive record especially as
many African countries were running budget deficits financed from external borrowing
following the Eurodollar fever.
Important progress was also realized in the area of health, education and transport
with a lasting impact on economic performance in Cameroon. Improvement in health was
a priority of the government because a healthy population meant an increase in
productivity. Medical care during colonial rule in Cameroon was mostly provided by
traditional medicine. The bulk of the population relied on this practice because of the
absence ofmedical facilities and because of the reservation of the rural population toward
For a detail analysis, see Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series
19, 10 (October 15- November 14, 1982), 6611.
The existence of huge reserves from the revenues accruing in the sale of oil caused countries in
the Middle East to flood the European money market with excess. Banks willing to make profits from
interest on the loans were quick to turn to the countries of South America and Africa experiencing financial
problems. It is through this way that many African countries were entangled in the debt problem and
Cameroon was no exception.
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modern medicine. When Cameroon gained independence, the rate of mortality was
still high and access to medical care was limited to only major cities. The rural areas were
disadvantaged. Medical doctors were scarce and doctor/patient ratio was very
discouraging. In fact, some reports hold that in West Cameroon, there was one doctor for
every twenty- thousand people. Colonial governments were not interested in this sector
and as a result, most hospitals were controlled by voluntary agencies such as churches.
To accelerate the process of access to medical care by the population, the number
of doctors was increased during the Ahidjo regime and it continued to increase as time
went by. To assure this, the government established a medical school at the University of
Yaounde in 1974. This school guaranteed an increase in the number of doctors who were
trained to meet the needs of the mral population. Before then, students aspiring to
become doctors had to go to neighboring Nigeria or as far as Britain, the United States
and France to study. To ensure adequate training, tuition was free to all successful
prospective candidates. This important policy made it possible for low-income citizens to
gain access into the medical profession as entrance to the school was, to a certain extent,
based on merit.
In addition, the number of hospital beds more than doubled during this period,
from 10,000 beds in 1962 to 24,541 beds in 1980.Increase in the number of beds meant
patients could stay in the hospital for longer periods of time and in large numbers. It also
meant that the number of nurses was increased. To accommodate this, the government
opened nursing schools throughout the country. This policy not only created jobs for
’’ For an analysis, see Joseph Takougang and Milton Krieger eds., African State and Society in
the 1990s: Cameroon’s Political Crossroads. 56.
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nursing school graduates in the country, but it also freed some of the labor in the
agricultural sector accounting for the move of the population away from agriculture as
seen earlier. The government further subsidized health care by providing free medications
to poor patients. This was especially critical in rural areas where access to medical care
was limited partly because of the poor road conditions as well as the lack of doctors, but
mostly, because of the traditional practices in rural Cameroon.
Government’s attempt at medical care provision saw the establishment of health
care centers and mobile clinics capable of serving people in the rural areas that were
deprived of good and valuable transport systems. Although the allocation of these
facilities was political, this gesture by the regime had lasting implications for the state.
Support for the regime was always massive. In the 1972 referendum for instance, voters
approved of the regime’s policy by a 99.97 percent, for Cameroon to become a United
1 o
Republic. This vote, as in previous and subsequent elections, characterized the regime’s
approval rating by the Cameroon people.
Another important indicator measuring economic performance is the level of
education. Educational development took great strides during the Ahidjo regime. State
intervention in education increased the number of students enrolled in schools. A major
policy in education during this period was the establishment of tuition-free government
primary, secondary and high schools as well as the university education. During colonial
rule in Cameroon, the French and British imposed their educational systems on East and
West Cameroon respectively. These systems were designed to educate an elite group to
'* The 1972 referendum in Cameroon marked the end of a Federal Cameroon. Critics attest to the
fact that Ahidjo bullied his way to having such a political structure and the mass support was from apathy
of politics rather than admiration of the regime.
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serve as assistants to colonial government authorities. As a result, the level of
illiteracy in Cameroon was high. In West Cameroon for instance, education was mainly
in the hands of philanthropic organizations, usually missionary agencies such as Catholic,
Baptist and Presbyterian missions. By mid-1963, only three schools were owned by the
government. In East Cameroon on the other hand, the government financed most
educational undertakings, and a much larger student body received primary and
secondary education because of state intervention.
Improvement in education in Cameroon actually started in 1965, after the
conference of Ministers of Education of French-Speaking Black African countries in
which an African approach to mass education was initiated. During this period,
Cameroon gradually constructed one of the most generous and extensive educational
systems in Africa. The literacy level in the country was relatively high for Africa, at 54
percent of the adult population, reflecting a national school attendance rate of 73 percent.
The number of students increased from 42,774 pupils in 1966/67 to 462,225 in 1980.*^ In
1990, the number of students enrolled in nursery, primary and secondary schools was
estimated at 3 million. At the university level, the creation of the Federal University of
Cameroon in 1962 saw the increase in enrollment, which jumped from 2,572 in the
1970/71 school year, to more than 6,000 in the 1973/74 school year. Today that number
is over 25,000.
The overcrowding of this facility caused the government to decentralize the
university system. In Douala, a college for economics and commercial studies, and a
This information is based on data available at the Ministry of Education in Yaounde. It deals
especially with the general policy implication of the twenty-year development plan and specifically on
educational development in the country.
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training college of technical education for teachers was created. In Dchang, the
college of agriculture that trained agricultural engineers to carry out research in
agriculture and forestry. In Ngoundere, a center that trains engineers in research on food
crops as well as hotel management was opened. Finally, there is the University of Buea,
which originally was slated to train students in the area of translation and interpretation,
but today is a full-fledged university giving the English-speaking Cameroonians a real
chance at university education.
The dynamic performance of the economy through increase in agricultural
production provided the foreign exchange critical for free education in Cameroon. Critics
however, argue that education in Cameroon has been marginalized for two reasons: first,
the curriculum design and emphasis was not made relevant to the realities of the country.
The difference between the West and East Cameroon curriculum before unification made
it difficult for planners to have an integrated system in the country. This was aggravated
by the political desires of West Cameroon to maintain its English or British heritage,
which they considered superior to that of the French. On the other hand, the move
towards harmonization meant some compromise for an integrated system was necessary.
The education debate in Cameroon is an emotional one because it influences the
fundamental linguistic and cultural disparity that is visible in the country. Attempts at
harmonization have been limited to only instituting a Cameroonian secondary and high
00
school leaving certificate examination (GCE).
Until 1977, West Cameroon schools continued to prepare for the University of London General
Certificate of Education (GCE) examination. In 1977, the Cameroon GCE was initiated and has continued
over the years. East Cameroon however, adopted the Baccalaureate exams.
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Secondly, the desire of the government to fill public service positions vacated
by colonial administrators forced a large portion of the population to focus on education
leading to civil service employment. Students favor general education for government
employment, especially as civil service employment represented prestige and power in
Cameroon. Public service application and employment also increased from about 72,481
in 1974/75 to about 135,117 in 1984.^' This showed a 46.4 percent increase in ten years.
It also emphasizes the importance that the state of Cameroon placed of educational
attainment.
Despite the impressive growth statistics and economic performance of the
Cameroon economy during the Ahidjo regime, there were questions regarding the
sustainability of the rate of growth. Economic dependence on the revenue from the sale
of petroleum increased in the mid-1980s. The falling international prices of agricultural
products such as cocoa and coffee greatly reduced government earnings. Added to this
was the excessive government expenditure on projects that were consumption rather than
production oriented. Public mismanagement through corruption and embezzlement of
government funds by senior state officials was rampant. There was a total breakdown of
the civil service in Cameroon as regionalism took precedence over nationalism. Regional
inequality seen in the appointment of top civil servants, as well as in the allocation of
projects to selected regions rejuvenated the old cultural, linguistic and ethnic rivalry that
the Ahidjo regime had successfully minimized in favor of national unity.
This was an estimate of employment in the public service. To increase the number of
government employment, the state has carried out two major employment schemes known as "operation
1,000 and 1,500," denoting the number of graduates employed in 1980 and 1985 respectively. For more,
see the Cameroon Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, fourth five- year development plan,
1985.
154
Rural/urban disparity in Cameroon brought about by regional inequality saw
the resurgence of rural exodus. In 1970, for instance, 16 percent of the population lived in
urban areas. In 1980, some 34 percent lived in urban areas, and in 1990, an estimated 65
percent of the population lived in urban areas. Cameroon’s rate of urbanization
represents one of the fastest in Africa. Some studies claim that the high rate of
urbanization in Cameroon has increased the poverty of the country in the course of the
late 1980s and 1990s. The increase in the cost of education and health care has almost
certainly led to a reduction of the services for a majority of the people. This is very
visible in the rural areas and prompts rural dwellers to seek comfort in the urban areas.
The deep economic crisis that engulfed Cameroon in the late 1980s and went on into the
1990s forced the government to reluctantly accept SAP as a measure of redressing the
economic hardship. The impact of SAP on poverty, standard of living, government
expenditure and overall economic performance has been widely researched. The general
consensus is that pressure from SAP on state expenditure increased the level of poverty in
the country and accounted for the rate of rural exodus. It is this low economic
performance coupled with the hardship brought about by SAP that partly accounts for the
political instability affecting the Biya regime.
5.2. Impact of Economic Performance on the State
A major proposition of this study is that Cameroon’s economic performance is
directly related to the intervention of the state and this economic performance is partly
what has led to the country’s political stability throughout its post-independence years. In
For an analysis, see Jean-Claude Williame, “The Practice of a Liberal Political Economy:
Import and Export Substitution in Cameroon (1975-1981),” in William Zartman ed.. The Political
Economy of Cameroon. 111.
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pursuing the twenty-year development plan, the Ahidjo regime developed objectives
that were rational and attainable as well as beneficial to the population. The country’s
colonial experience, cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity as well as regional
differences were factored into the development plan to reduce conflict and violence.
The objective of doubling the per capita income through increasing productivity
in the agricultural as well as industrial sectors was aimed at raising the standards of living
through the provision of education, health care, lower prices for basic necessities and a
good infrastructure. For the Ahidjo regime, an improvement in the performance of the
economy attracted foreign investment and improved people’s appreciation of the role of
the state in their lives. These policies eventually led to the formation of the “Cameroon
Nation” in the course of time. A lot of emphasis was therefore placed on the development
and improvement of the agricultural sector, which to the regime was the cornerstone of
the economy because it employed a vast majority of the population.
Two important questions raised in this study relate to the ability of the state in
Cameroon to implement development programs as well as its commitment to sustainable
growth and development. The analysis in this chapter indicates that economic growth and
development was sustained during the Ahidjo regime and into the early years of the Biya
regime, with the help of the twenty-year development plan.^"* Government proclamations
Ahidjo strongly believed that the agricultural sector was important to the economy. In his
various policy speeches, he stressed this significance and was critical of those who wanted oil to dominate
the economy of Cameroon after it was discovered.
For a discussion, see Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, development planning
in Cameroon.
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of reducing rural poverty were supported by actual policies. Cameroon’s social policy
in the twenty-year development plan rested on four fundamental principles:^^
i) Self-reliant development through an increase in local participation in
development;
ii) Balanced development through an equal development of the different
sectors of activity in the economy, as well as an equal development of the
different regions of the country;
iii) Social justice aimed at redistributing equitably the fruits of development
between the different groups and giving each citizen an equal opportunity
within the framework of national unity; and
iv) Planned Liberalism through the promotion and encouragement of private
initiative under the guidance, mobilization and coordination of the
Cameroon state.
Directly related to economic performance during this period, the execution of the
social policy improved the standard of living of the rural population, whose livelihood
depended on government involvement in economic activities. A balanced development
policy was used for the development of neglected areas of the country especially in the
northern region. Social justice led to the partial redistribution of income. A case in point
is the creation of the Social Insurance Fund to provide fixed incomes to families with
children.^^ This policy was especially popular among civil servants living in urban areas
For an analysis, see Ministry of Planning and Regional Development; also see Wilfred
Ndongko, 156-62.
“
Existing data is very spotty, but it is widely believed in Cameroon that the Social Insurance
Fund was critical in doubling the population. However, many people are still of the opinion that civil
servants were the beneficiaries and farmers living in rural areas were left out of the redistribution process.
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and those Cameroonians who were conversant with political affairs. Farmers in rural
areas utilized it to a limited extent. The policy supplemented the incomes of families with
children by increasing their purchasing power.
Clearly, there was a strong correlation between the proclamations of the
goverrunent in terms of development and the actual development of Cameroon during the
Ahidjo era. To maintain the momentum and sustain development, government
involvement in the economy was expanded through the ideology of plarmed liberalism.
Institutions as the Presidency and the National Assembly had extensive regulatory
capacity to control and influence policy. Although government involvement was
significant, its limits were defined and tied to the pragmatic character of the leadership
provided by Ahidjo.
Strong economic performance meant increase in government expenditure. It
further signified consolidation of the alliance formed by Ahidjo to sustain the Cameroon
state. Some scholars point to the fact that in Africa, it is political power that precedes
economic power. In Cameroon however, political and economic power have both been
mutually reinforcing. Top-level positions in government meant more money and power.
Common wisdom among top management had it that, “the goat grazes where she is
attached.The governing elite, which we denote in this study as the progressive clan
because of its composition and structure, was greatly manipulated by Ahidjo.
The president under the constitution ensured the management of the affairs of the country. In
this capacity, he defines the overall policy and makes critical decisions. For more, see the Cameroon
Constitution of 1972 and 1996.
For an analysis of the different views, see Richard Sklar, “The Nature of Class Domination in
Africa,” Journal of Modem African Studies 17 (4, 1979), 531-52; Also see Van de Walle, “The Politics of
Non Reform in Cameroon,” 1990.
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Incorporation into this group over the years was through education in the School of
Administration and Magistracy (ENAM), created by Ahidjo and which continues to play
a significant role in perpetuating the state through the production of loyal supporters sent
to the provinces to implement government policies.
5.3. The Role of the International Community
The role of the international community especially France, the World Bank and
the IMF deserves attention, since they had an impact on the economic performance of
Cameroon. France, for instance, has been very active in the economic development of
post-independent Cameroon. Within the French-speaking African countries, Cameroon
ranks very high in the flow of official aid from France. As far back as 1966 and 1971,
Cameroon received about 47 percent of official grants and loans from France. French
planners were responsible for drafting the first and second five-year development plans.
In the industrial sector, French investment accounted for over 30 percent of total
investment in the country. The major industries and the aluminum smelting company at
Edea and the agro-based industries all over the country have a strong French presence
and investment. It, therefore, suggests that France had a stake on Cameroon’s economic
development and would do anything to guarantee its success. France also impacted the
economy through granting of scholarships for higher education for French-speaking
Cameroonians to study in France. Although trade between France and Cameroon has
always been to the disadvantage of Cameroon, France remains Cameroon’s largest
trading partner during the period under study. France also maintained a military presence
in the country following the terms of the military accord signed during the 1960s. It was
For a discussion, see Jean Francois Bayart, L’Etat au Cameroun ( Paris: Presses de la Fondation
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no exaggeration when Richard Joseph suggested that the Cameroon state was the
creation of foreign capital. Within this period, French involvement was limited to the
former East Cameroon. The only significant involvement in West Cameroon was the
creation of a French cultural center in Buea. Nonetheless, indirectly the Southwest
province benefited through the construction of the oil refinery in Limbe, with a
substantial French investment.
The World Bank contributed tremendously to the economic and political
development of Cameroon. The economic policies of the bank in the 1960s and 1970s
were tailored to help progressive leaders in Africa who were committed to development.
Ahidjo and Cameroon benefited from the bank’s expertise, loans and aid donations. The
objective of the World Bank President in the 1970s was to reduce and eradicate poverty
in developing regions. Through his policy of partnership with African states in
development, the bank increased its involvement in rural development in Cameroon.
Construction of roads was realized with World Bank loans and, the improvement of the
Douala to Tiko road was the result of the bank’s involvement. In the same token,
improvement of feeder roads to transport agricultural products from rural to urban areas
was also backed by the bank.
Education was another area of economic development that received critical bank
support in Cameroon. Illiteracy was reduced through the bank’s involvement in primary
and secondary school education. The bank supported the Cameroon state in its effort at
free education in the 1960s and 1970s. It also provided expertise in curriculum
formulation and classroom furniture for comfortable learning. The bank had been
Nationales des Sciences Politiques, 1985).
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supportive of Cameroon’s development especially the great strides the country made
in doubling the per capita income as well as sustaining its development throughout the
1970s and early 1980s. In its 1981 report, the bank placed Cameroon among the middle
income countries after its impressive economic performance under Ahidjo.^°
In the late 1980s however, with the chronic economic development crisis
engulfing most of Africa, the bank changed its position of partnerships with states in
development, to that of a reduction in state involvement in economic development. This
change, consistent with the liberal view of the market as the prime mover of economic
development, led to the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) in Africa
in the late 1980s. Cameroon under the Biya regime reluctantly accepted the conditions of
SAP imposed by the bank in 1992. SAP programs in Cameroon consisted of short-term
demand management policies and exchange rate adjustments. It includes restrictive
monetary and credit policies and cuts in government, intended to restore fiscal
balance.^’
The main goal of SAP was to stimulate long-term supply and growth by
improving the incentive system and creating a more efficient price structure.The
specific policies include devaluation, trade liberalization, and privatization of
unprofitable state owned enterprises. These policies are intended to address development
issues. For example, devaluation can result in lower prices of cocoa, coffee and banana
products that in turn will stimulate demand from overseas. According to the bank’s logic.
Before 1981 World Bank classification put Cameroon was among the low-income countries of
the world. For more, see World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for
Action (Washington D.C. World Bank, 1981).
World Bank, Trends in Developing Economics (Washington D.C., 1990), 40.
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producers in Cameroon will be motivated to increase production to meet external
demand, thus improving overall productivity. For economic development to be attained,
via higher standard of living, free trade, and competitive markets must be the optimal
strategy.
The evidence after years of SAP is one of concern in many African countries and
Cameroon in particular. SAP has led to hardship in the country through cuts in
government involvement that have precipitated political instability and state collapse in
parts of Africa. In Cameroon, it caused a sharp dislike for the state, which over the years
played a significant role in the lives of people.
In summary, this chapter has examined Cameroon’s economic performance
during the Ahidjo era, often referred to as one of the “success stories,” in Africa.^^ The
dynamic performance of the economy was promoted by the state under the policy of
planned liberalism, which was the pragmatic approach in which leadership minimized the
importance of petroleum and promoted the significance of the agricultural sector in the
country. Economic performance encouraged popular support for the state as well as
granting the Ahidjo regime the ability to increase its support base through employment
into the public service. A good economy was therefore critical for the perpetuation of the
state in Cameroon.
It is imperative, therefore, to conclude that within the period under study, the
Cameroon state was able to implement economic policies that raised the national savings
rate, doubled the per capita income and sustained an economic growth rate of over 6
32 Ibid., 45.
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percent. All this was made possible because of the pragmatic and realistic
development approach undertaken by Ahidjo that was based on the ideology of plaimed
liberalism. The chapter supports the thesis advanced earlier in this study that Ahidjo’s
vision of a strong state capable of intervening in development was the only path through
which Cameroon could realize rapid results in its political and economic development
endeavors after many years of colonial neglect. Increase in agricultural production by
modem techniques was instmmental in providing the needed foreign reserves that
Ahidjo's regime guarded comfortably through its policy of calculated expenditure. As this
chapter suggests, it was no surprise that Cameroon became a model for economic
development in Africa during this period.
Consistent with this thesis, the next chapter analyzes that data on the Southwest
province collected for this study, arguing that the economic successes of Ahidjo’s regime
was paramount and critical in building the overwhelming support that he received from
the people of the Southwest province.
A similar policy and strategy was used in the Ivory Coast within this period and the results were
significant to both political and economic development of that country leading to a long period ofpolitical
stability and economic prosperity.
CHAPTER VI
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This chapter examines the data collected during a survey of the political attitudes
of farmers in the Southwest province and a sample of civil servants in Yaounde towards
the state in Cameroon. The use of civil servants from Yaounde and not those in the
Southwest province is attributed to the centralization of government policies in the
capital, which reduced the decision-making powers of civil servants at the provinces.
This strategy was adopted to understand the dynamics of decision making by civil
servants the in state. Data collection was undertaken during the Biya presidency. Many
civil servants contacted were reluctant to participate because they were skeptical of the
outcome and what it might do to their political careers. The resurgence of political parties
and especially the activities of the opposition party the Social Democratic Front (SDF)
created an atmosphere of fear and doubt in the minds of those interviewed.
The purpose of this data is to shed light on the reason for the massive support
Ahidjo received, from this class of farmers and civil servants whose support was directly




The study emphasizes the use of a qualitative research technique, which allows
greater access into the agricultural sector and especially farmer’s lives. As Robert Yin
notes, a researcher is able to observe and record the irregularities as well as the
regularities of life, which occur in an unstructured fashion.' A case study approach is
appropriate in this study because it allows the researcher to investigate contemporary
phenomenon within its real context and permits the use of qualitative as well as
quantitative data. Information was sought through old data, interviews and
questionnaires. In this study, in order to maintain consistency in data collection, the
principle of data collection as explained by Robert Yin in his book titled Case Study
Research: Design and Methods, was followed. The principles arrived at by Yin are the
following: a) the clear explanation of linkages between variables in order to ensure
internal validity; b) the creation of a retrievable and replicable data base to ensure
reliability of data and to allow other investigators the opportunity to retrieve the
evidence; c) the establishment of the domain in which the study can be generalized; and
d) the use of multiple sources of evidence and types of methods in order to certify
construct validity.^
Data collection in Cameroon was carried out during the months of November,
December 1998 and January 1999. Questionnaires were distributed to 650 farmers in
' See Robert Yin, Applications of Case Study Research (Newsbury Park, CA: Sage Publications,
inc., 1993), 61.
^ Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, foreword by Donald T. Campbell
(Beverly Hills, London & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), 30.
^ Ibid., 36.
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Ndian and Meme divisions in the Southwest province. Another set of questionnaires
was distributed to civil servants in Yaounde. Data collection was accomplished through
the help of three researchers from the Ministry of Transport in Yaounde, whose
responsibilities included the distribution and explanation of certain aspects of the
questions to respondents."* In the Southwest province, ten “common initiative,” group
leaders were retained to assist in data collection.^
The sample of civil servants in the survey was identified unscientifically. We
could not utilize a random sample approach because selection was based on the
acceptance of respondents to participate. A pre-test exercise showed that using a random
sampling approach to determine the research population was not practical because of the
sensitivity of the subject matter and the political climate of the country at the time.^ To
determine the political attitudes of civil servants towards Ahidjo’s regime, a total
population of 300 people was surveyed. Selection of civil service positions to be studied
was based on the Cameroon civil service hierarchy with a slight modification to
accommodate the study. Chiefs of services and assistant directors were grouped under
middle management. Directors and Secretary-Generals were grouped under top
management.
An explanation of some aspects of the questionnaire was necessary to give respondent the pledge
that information was for academic purpose only.
^ “Common initiative,” groups are popular NGO in the Southwest province. With the demise of
cooperative in the country, this new group has stepped up the plate to organize and coordinate the activities
of farmers. To this effect, the input of leaders of these groups was significant in this research because of
their proximity to large number of farmers in the region under study.
*
Many civil servants contacted during the test sample were reluctant to participate for fear of
loosing their position in government. The resurgence of political parties and especially the strength of the
opposition party the Social Democratic Front (SDF) made some civil servant to question the essence of the
study. Some strongly argued it was carried out to embarrass the current president.
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The questionnaires were administered at a time when some respondents had a
deep fear and suspicion about Ahidjo. The political tension that occurred between Ahidjo
and Biya in 1984, leading to the first- ever coup attempt in the country and the
subsequent political development created a bias against the Ahidjo regime.’ Cameroon’s
longest ruling party the CNU was renamed CPDM in 1986, to symbolize a disconnection
from Ahidjo’s regime. As some Cameroonian commentators conclude, this was a gesture
by Biya to solidify his rule in the country. Two hundred and fifty nine civil servants out
of the three hundred responded fully and 41 questionnaires were discarded for incomplete
information. 86 percent responded and 14 percent did not. Both French and English
speaking civil servants were surveyed.
Findings
Of the Two Hundred and Fifty Nine civil servants surveyed (N= 259), 184 were
men and 75 were women. As a percentage, 71 percent of those surveyed were men and
only 29 percent were women. This is typically true of senior administration in Cameroon.
Appointments to middle and top management generally favor men.* While the number of
women in high positions is small, Ahidjo understood the fact that women were critical to
the success of his regime. To increase their participation in politics, he created an organ
in the CNU party for them called the WCNU, which practically portrayed him as a firm
defender of women rights.
^ There is widespread belief that Ahidjo was behind the 1984 coup attempt in the country. He
vehemently denied any involvement. For more, see West Africa, cover story April 1984.
*
Although women were generally considered loyal to Ahidjo, their representation in government
was small. This however, was a reflection of societal perception of women in Cameroon during this period.
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To accurately assess the composition and structure of Ahidjo’s support base in
Cameroon, questions relating to recruitment and the political process were asked. In
responding to this question, 52.1 percent of civil servants strongly agreed that the
political process was open for the recruitment of capable Cameroonians to top positions
in government (see Table 13). Ahidjo used this medium to create a more representative
government. Although not highly educated, Ahidjo surrounded himself with intellectuals
and it is this inclusive tendency that broadened the support base of his regime. This
supports the suggestion in this study that Ahidjo formed a coalition of all the major ethnic
groups in the country.
TABLE 13





No. % No. % No. %
Strongly Agree 135 52.1 120 65.2 15 20.0
Agree 20 7.7 20 10.9 - -
Disagree 34 13.1 24 13.0 10 13.3
Strongly
Disagree
70 27.1 20 10.9 50 66.7
Total 259 100.00 184 100.0 75 100.0
Source: Field Study, 1998.
The data in Table 13 indicates that 65.2 percent of men strongly agreed that the
political process for recruitment was open, and only 10.9 percent strongly disagreed. For
women, 20 percent strongly agreed and up to 66.7 percent strongly disagreed that the
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process was open. The explanation for the high number of disagreement among
women comes from the political culture at that time in Cameroon that generally favored
men in politics. When respondents were asked whether membership into Ahidjo’s
support base was open to anybody, 57.9 percent strongly agreed and 19.3 percent
strongly disagreed. This is very interesting and further supports the claim made above
that the Ahidjo regime was very inclusive. Table 14 is a summary of data on this
question.
TABLE 14
Summary of Responses to the Question: How Inclusive is the Support Base of Power in
Cameroon
Total Men Women
No. % No. % No. %
Strongly Agree 150 57.9 141 76.6 9 12
Agree 32 12.4 24 13.1 8 10.7
Disagree 27 10.4 14 7.6 13 17.3
Strongly Disagree 50 19.3 5 2.7 45 60
Total 259 100.0 184 100.0 75 100.0
Source: Field study, 1998.
The data in Table 14 indicates that Ahidjo’s support base was very inclusive. 57.9
percent of respondents strongly agreed to that fact while only 19.3 percent strongly
disagreed. It is also evident that the number of Northerners who occupied top positions
during Ahidjo’s regime was significant. In almost all aspects of the civil and military
services, they played a dominant role. In an interview with Mr. Ngome, a director of
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operations with the Ministry of Agriculture, he observed that during Ahidjo’s
presidency the civil service at the top was dominated by people from the north, which is
Ahidjo’s region of origin. From ministers to secretary-generals, directors and senior
divisional officers, more than half came from the north. However, they were mostly
assisted by civil servants from the south. In the case of the Southwest province, where
Mr. Ngome hails, senior civil servants were very instrumental in mobilizing the
population especially in the agricultural sector. Through their interaction with farmers in
their capacity as extension workers and trainers, a network developed thus expanding the
support base of the regime. Civil servants in administrative positions were highly
respected and because of their relentless effort in implementing the agricultural policy,
farmers were indebted to them and would go the extra mile to support them. To this
effect, the mass mobilization of farmers by civil servants was critical to the survival of
Ahidjo’s regime source.
However, not everyone was happy with this situation. As the data in Table 14
indicate, there was a serious disparity between those who strongly agreed and disagreed.
A possible explanation for this disparity comes from the political climate at the time
when the survey was administered. The results were even more interesting when a
comparison was drawn between men and women. Of the 75 women surveyed, only 10
percent strongly agreed that membership into the support base was open. For male
respondents, 80 percent strongly agreed. This findings is of interest since it is consistent
with the claim that top male managers in Cameroon find it difficult, and often resist any
reform that will make them share power with others. This behavior is not only limited to
Cameroon society but is a pattern that can be found in many African countries.
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This study contends that Ahidjo systematically created a support base through
the establishment of institutions that produced loyal supporters of the state, who were
willing to sustain and perpetuate the state and its institutions through a web of
clientelism. A similar argument was made by a notable scholar of Cameroon’s political
economy, Bayart Jean Fran9ois, studied the “hegemonic alliance,” created by Ahidjo and
concluded that it was the most intense and sophisticated in Africa. Another scholar of
Cameroon’s political economy, Nicolas Van de Walle, maintains that from independence
to 1982, Ahidjo cemented a complex intra-elite accommodation process with access to
state resources and rent seeking activities to ensure the regime’s stability. Both scholars
indirectly acknowledge the fact that Ahidjo was willing to work with everybody to have a
one and indivisible Cameroon. To this effect, they support the argument advanced in this
study that Ahidjo’s regime was inclusive of civil servants and others, a suggestion seen in
Table 14.
In addition to the fact that Ahidjo’s support did not only come from the elite, and
from the grass roots such as farmers, whom he attracted through government policies
Ahidjo created a clan of loyal supporters whose support was crucial for stable state
institutions in Cameroon.
To assess the impact of one of the institutions: the National School of
Administration and Magistracy (ENAM), on Ahidjo’s support base, it was necessary to
ask questions relating to the role of the institution in training future civil servants. Of the
civil servants surveyed, 59.8 percent strongly agreed that ENAM played an important
role in training top civil servants and only 21.2 percent strongly disagreed (See Table 15).
The strong disagreement is evident because of the existence of university graduates
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whose perceptions are important. A possible explanation for Ahidjo’s preference of
locally- trained civil servants is that in some other African countries, state employees
who studied abroad were more likely to institute ideas obtained from outside than local
ideas. This in some instances, led to confusion and civil disorder. Ahidjo wanted a
peaceful country and did everything possible to train local civil servants by creating
institutions such as ENAM.
TABLE 15




No. % No. % No. %
Strongly Agree 155 59.8 70 27 34 13.2
Disagree 49 19 100 38.6 134 51.7
Strongly Disagree 55 21.2 89 34.4 91 35.1
Total 259 100.0 259 100.0 259 100.0
Source: Field Study, 1998.
The data in Table 15 indicates that most civil servants know that training at
ENAM is a prerequisite for membership into the inner support base. As indicated by the
data, only 27 percent of respondents suggest that university education is critical for
membership. This is an interesting observation because it suggests that while higher
education is important in the development process of Cameroon’s political economy,
Ahidjo’s ideology of planned liberalism necessitated the establishment of institutions that
would train individuals to follow his principles and guidance. It therefore, became
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apparent that training at ENAM was critical in creating a loyal civil service capable of
implementing Ahidjo’s policies.
Another interesting observation from the data is the fact that it was not easy for
anybody to become a member of the support base at the top level. Only 13.2 percent of
respondents strongly agreed that anybody could become a top member, while more than
50 percent disagreed. Ahidjo’s pmdence and suspicion eliminated the chance of unknown
people in his inner support base. A member had to be known either because of his
training at ENAM or his university education.
Mr. Nana, a director of rural-development in the Ministry of Agriculture, asserted
that unknown individuals found it difficult if not impossible to enter the core of the
support group. In fact, he concluded that, “one had to be presented by his ‘godfather,’
before one was considered for any position.” This sentiment was indicative of the fact
that Ahidjo’s pragmatism necessitated the use of capable and loyal individuals to
implement his policies according to his ideology ofplanned liberalism. At ENAM, civil
servants were “programmed” to follow the ideology embedded in planned liberalism and
the success realized in economic progress suggests that these policies were effectively
implemented.
When respondents were asked if university education or training at ENAM
accounted for their current positions, 70 percent agreed that their training at ENAM was




Summary Responses to the Question: Who occupies an Administrative position
ENAM University Networking
No. % No. % No. %
Strongly Agree 182 70.3 54 20.9 23 8.9
Disagree 48 18.5 98 37.8 113 43.6
Strongly Disagree 29 11.2 107 41.3 123 47.5
Total 259 100.0 259 100.0 259 100.0
Source: Field Study, 1998.
The data on Table 16 indicates that very few civil servants obtained top-level
positions in government because of networking, and most acknowledge that training at
ENAM was crucial. This explains why the government prefers those who study at ENAM
than those with university education to occupy top positions. One director in a Ministry
remarked that:
ENAM received a high and delicate task of training men that the state
greatly needed to ensure its match toward progress. It was an institution
structured to train people to be loyal to the state. Those who showed signs
of loyalty were rewarded handsomely.^
The above sentiment is indicative of the political and power situation in
Cameroon during Ahidjo’s presidency. It further attests to the fact that the new civil
servants were capable of implementing policies in keeping with the ideology of planned
liberalism that guided the country’s political economy during the Ahidjo regime.
® Interview with a director 8 January 1999, in Yaounde.
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To assess the effect of loyalty on political aspirations, it was necessary to ask
questions relating to the determination of the state to maintain a coalition with loyal civil
servants. Of those surveyed, 59.5 percent strongly agreed that those who played by the
rules of the game in politics stayed longer in office. In contrast, only 26.6 percent
strongly disagreed. Table 17 presents the data to this question.
TABLE 17









No. % No. % No. % No. %
Strongly Agree 154 59.5 25 35.7 30 33.3 99 100.0
Disagree 36 13.9 26 37.1 10 11.1 - -
Strongly Disagree 69 26.6 19 27.2 50 55.6 - -
Total 259 100.0 70 100.0 90 100.0 99 100.0
Source: Field Study, 1998.
The data on the table indicates that 59.5 percent of respondents strongly agreed
that playing by the rules was critical during Ahidjo’s presidency, to ensure one’s
successful political career. This data is strongly corroborated by another scholar of
Cameroon’s political economy. In his study of who governs in Cameroon Ngayap
concluded that loyalty was paramount during Ahidjo’s regime. Ministers who were loyal
to the president stayed in power as long as they wanted. As an example, he gave the case
of the Minister of Defense during Ahidjo’s regime named Sadou Daoudou, who served
for two decades as the country’s Chief Armed Forces minister from June 20, 1960 to July
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17, 1980. Another important figure was Mr. Egbe Tabi from the Southwest province
serving as Minister of Posts and Telecommunication for over ten years.The
significance of this finding is that loyalty to Ahidjo’s regime resulted in a lot of
compensation to supporters whose loyalty kept the state strong and viable.
The findings are interesting when age was factored in.*' Of those surveyed in the
age group (46-55), all 99 respondents agree that during Ahidjo’s regime, those who
played by the rules stayed in office (see Table 17). This is significant because most of
those in this age group were involved in politics during the period under study and their
insights were, therefore, significant to this study. This finding also lends credence to this
study’s proposition that loyalty was instrumental in ensuring the success of Ahidjo’s
regime (see Table 17).
Interestingly, however, a contrast between the Ahidjo and current Biya regimes
reveals that those who do not play by the rules of the game in politics under Biya stay in
office longer than in the Ahidjo period. As one senior official stated:
the more corrupt a senior official is in the Biya regime, the higher his
chances of staying in power, because he will have the necessary
cormection to stay in office. Take for instance top ministers; if a minister
embezzles money, he is not removed from office, but transferred to
another ministry or sometimes sent out of the country as an Ambassador to
a foreign country.*^
Another official of the government further stated that; “it is even more interesting
if you look at the treasury scandal. Government treasurers impose a 30 percent kickback
For an analysis, see Ngayap, Cameroun: Qui Goveme? 42.
"
Age was crucial because elderly respondents also served under Ahidjo’s presidency and their
responses were important.
Interview with a senior official 8, January 1999 in Yaounde.
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on the incomes of poor civil servants as well as small businessmen, if they wanted to
cash their payroll checks or cash their government checks. Such a practice was never
allowed during Ahidjo’s regime.” The significance of these revelations is that in
analyzing why in 1990, Cameroon was plunged into a frenzy of multiparty politics, and
why Biya’s government was disliked by the populace, one cannot ignore the callousness
with which civil servants treated the public and the monies that they stole from the public
coffers. It also explains the resurgence of tribalism and factionalism, which greatly
undermine national unity and integration, both of which were developed and cherished
under the Ahidjo regime.
The comments by these officials seem to be supported by the evidence. Many
Cameroon scholars agree that Ahidjo was a shrewd and prudent manager than Biya. In
spite of the growing foreign reserves, Ahidjo was careful not to engage in risky schemes
that would have depleted the country’s resources. It is partially for this reason that by
1985, the Cameroon economy was able to grow at a rate of 7.0 percent.
Popular Support for Ahidio’s Regime
To assess the relationship between Ahidjo’s economic policies in the agricultural
sector, on the one hand, and increasing support for his regime, it was necessary to analyze
the farmers’ perception of their economic empowerment by the political structure. The
Southwest province was chosen and, in particular, farmers in the Meme and Ndian
divisions. The rationale for this analysis was to see if economic empowerment of the
farmers by the government led to the latter supporting the Ahidjo’s presidency
Data from Farmers
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Of the 650 questionnaire distributed to farmers, 550 were accepted and 100
discarded for incomplete information. Of the 550 respondents, 350 were from Meme
division and 200 from Ndian division. Information gathering was much easier in Meme
division because of the highly developed farmer’s associations as well as the accessibility
of farmers. The process was much more difficult in Ndian division because of the
dispersion of farmers. The choice of farmers was made based on the proximity of the
farmers and the availability of a common initiative group leader.
Findings
Demographic Data: Demographic data is critical in determining the ability of the
individual being questioned to provide an accurate response. This data generally reflects
the perception of the individual and thus the extent to which the person will or will not
support the state. For instance, the level of education of the respondent is important in
understanding whether or not the individual is aware of the political implications of
agricultural reform. Education not only empowers the individual, it further expands the
horizon of the individual to make better judgements, and also increases the ability of the
individual to take advantage of the policies available, and to increase productivity. To
this effect, an educated farmer is better placed to utilize the information provided to him
by civil service extension workers, as well as take advantage of available credit at his/her
disposal to increase productivity. Such a farmer will be less critical of the state and, thus,
more likely to support it. On the other hand, an uneducated farmer will be less attached to
13 Ibid.
the state and thus be more disconnected from it. Table 18 represents the educational
levels of the respondents in Meme and Ndian divisions.
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TABLE 18
Educational Levels of Farmers in Meme and Ndian Divisions
Level of Education Total Meme Division Ndian Division
No. % No. % No. %
None 165 30.0 55 15.7 110 55.0
Primary School 250 45.5 180 51.4 70 35.0
Secondary School 85 15.5 70 20.0 15 7.5
High School 50 9.0 45 12.9 5 2.5
Total 550 100.0 350 100.0 200 100.0
Source: Field Study, 1998.
Table 18 demonstrates that the illiteracy rate is slightly lower for the total
respondents in the study area. It is however, higher in Ndian than in Meme division. On
Table 18, the total percentage of illiterate farmers in both divisions is 30 percent, but in
comparing the two divisions, Meme division had 15.7 percent as against 55 percent for
Ndian division. This shows that more farmers are illiterate in Ndian than Meme division.
In addition, 51.4 percent of respondents had some primary education in Meme division,
while only 35 percent could say the same in Ndian division. With respect to secondary
education, only 20 percent of respondents in Meme and 7.5 percent in Ndian had attained
secondary education level. In fact, the percentage fell to 12.9 percent in Meme and 2.5
percent in Ndian for those with high school education.
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The finding on the level of education has direct implications on farmer’s
perception of both their economic and political empowerment. Farmers with formal
education are more likely to benefit from the agricultural policies because they are more
aware of important policy announcements and programs than fanners without formal
education are. This conclusion is critical for this study.
To ascertain the validity of the above proposition, we asked questions relating to
economic empowerment of farmers in the Southwest province. The essence was to obtain
the perception farmers had of the agricultural policies during Ahidjo’s regime. One way
to obtain this was to review two critical areas of the agricultural policy under the twenty-
year development plan; the use of fertilizers and the accessibility of credit to farmers.
From this, a representation of farmer’s perception on the agricultural policy of the
government and the subsequent political implication of this evaluation can be ascertained.
Farmers with formal education were more likely to use fertilizer and ask for loans
from FONADER than were farmers with no education because the former were more
exposed to state policies than the latter. Table 19 is illustrative of this point. Farmers in
Meme division were economically better off than their counterparts in Ndian division
because they benefited more from the use of fertilizers and loans from FONADER. The
reason for this is that more farmers in Meme have formal education and the more
educated a person is the more informed he/she becomes. This is especially true of the




Economic Empowerment of Farmers in Meme and Ndian Division (in percentage)
Economic Empowerment Meme Division Ndian Division
S. A S.D. Total S. A. S. D. Total
Use of Fertilizer 84.3 15.7 100.0 45.0 55.0 100.0
Access to Credit 90 10 100.0 25 75.0 100.0
Payment of Bonus for Cocoa 100.0 - 100.0 80.0 20.0 100.0
S.A.= Strongly Agree; S.D. = Strongly Disagree.
Source: Field Study, 1998.
The findings of Table 19 suggest that the availability of economic opportunities in
Meme division had a great impact on the perception of farmers about their economic
empowerment. The relatively high percent of farmers with access to credit from
FONADER in Meme division is indicative of the economic opportunities at their
disposal, to improve not only their productivity, but also well being. Mr. Itoe Francis a
prominent farmer in Ndian and an aspiring politician with the opposition party supported
this finding by stating that
Meme division has always been blessed to have access to credit facilities
like FONADER and well-trained extension workers because of its
proximity to Buea and its accessible roads. Ndian division on the other
hand is further away from Buea and the roads are not well developed. In
fact, for a long time, transportation from Meme to Ndian division was by
water because there were no roads linking the two divisions. Added to this
is the fact that many farmers are illiterate and are generally employed to
work on plantations for a small salary. This lack of ownership of land
reduces their desire to utilize the wonderful opportunities that the
government made available through its agricultural development
program.
Personal interview with Mr. Itoe Francis in Kumba on his way to Ekondo Titi January 13, 1999.
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Mr. Itoe’s comments on proximity to the decision-making center (Buea) has
been corroborated by Ndiva Kofele-Kale in a study titled An African Experiment in
Nation Building. Ndiva Kale concluded that regions that are closer to the national
decision-making centers tend to receive more amenities than those further away from the
center do. In his analysis of the political awareness of camps, villages and towns, he
concluded that more than 75 percent of respondents from towns and camps and only 50
percent from villages stayed close to governmental and political centers.'^ Interestingly,
however, the educational background of the respondents was not taken into
consideration. As the data on Table 19 suggests, because of the high illiteracy rate in
Ndian division, 55 percent did not use fertilizers and more than 75 percent could not get
access to credit. This suggests two things. First, farmers in the division either do not
receive the proper training from extension workers, or they are in remote areas where
lack of roads and other communication facilities make it difficult for them to embrace the
benefits from government policies. Secondly, and closely related to the first, is the fact
that a majority of farmers in this division are less educated.
The general picture presented so far suggests that farmers in Meme division
experienced a positive and direct impact from governmental activities than farmers in
Ndian division. This is very significant because it supports the claim made earlier in this
study that the two provinces had different levels of development. It is also for this reason
that Ahidjo initiated the balanced development policy in his development plan, to
For an analysis see Ndiva Kofele-Kale, “The Political Culture of Anglophone Cameroon;
Contrast in Rural-Urban Orientation Towards the Nation,” in An African Experiment in Nation Building
Ndiva Kofele-Kale ed., 1980, 72.
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accommodate areas like Ndian division that were lagging in development. Such a
policy had important implications on the province’s support for the state.
To ascertain whether farmers’ support for government in Ndian division is related
to the agricultural policy leading to economic growth and development, we asked
respondents why they supported Ahidjo’s regime. Two questions with enormous
implications for the study were particularly important. The first dealt with support for the
government because of its good economic policies, and the second dealt with support for
the government because of its reprisal if one did not support its policies. The first
question supports, in general, the argument in this study that it was the good economic
policies under Ahidjo that increased popular support for the regime. Responses to the
second question contradict the suggestion by some notable scholars that Ahidjo was a
tyrant and an authoritarian whose regime was peaceful and stable only because he
employed repressive measures to control people.
Table 20 illustrates the perception of farmers in Meme and Ndian divisions about
their support for the state and its institutions during Ahidjo’s presidency. This is
important because it supports the argument that economic prosperity was realized during
Ahidjo’s regime, and his economic policy in the agricultural sector was partly responsible
for popular support of the state, thus contributing to the stability of the Cameroon state.
This finding also refutes the claim made by some scholars such as Jean Fran9ois Bayart
and Ngayap that Ahidjo was able to maintain a stable Cameroon only because he was an
authoritarian ruler. Finally, this finding sheds new light on the history of Cameroon’s




Farmers Support of the State in the Southwest Province
Meme Division Ndian
Division
No. % No. %
Economic Development 250 71.4 90 45.0
Love for Ahidjo 80 22.9 100 50.0
Fear for Life 20 5.7 10 5.0
Total 350 100.0 200 100.0
Source: Field Study, 1998.
The data on Table 20 reveals that 71.4 percent or 250 respondents in Meme
division associated their support for the state to good government economic policies that
led to economic growth and development; only 5.7 percent or 20 respondents supported
the state because they were afraid for their lives. In fact, more people in Meme division
supported the state because they admired Ahidjo’s charm and respectability than they
were afraid for their lives because of his authoritarian policies. This finding is revealing,
especially for Meme division, where during the early part of the post colonial years, a
prominent opposition party to Ahidjo’s regime (the UPC), had a base with a visible
April 6, 1984, was the day Cameroon experienced a coup d’etat. It was alleged that Ahidjo was
involved as a result most of Ahidjo’s contribution to Cameroon’s development were undermined. It was
forbidden to even mention his name on the radio and television. To illustrate this, during a televised
interview with President Biya, who succeeded Ahidjo, the question of Ahidjo was brought up, and he had a
terrible time calling Ahidjo’s name. After being pressed on the issue, he reluctantly said, “. .. and see the
name is not a taboo because I will call it now, Ahidjo.”
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support from sympathizers in west Cameroon. The overwhelming support for the state
because of its economic policies in this sector supports the thesis of this study.
The situation is even more interesting when data from Ndian division was
analyzed. Ndian division has serious infrastructure problems. Many roads are seasonal,
making transportation of cash crops like cocoa and palm oil difficult especially during the
rainy season. The efforts made by Ahidjo in terms of incorporating the division into the
Southwest province by granting special treatment to people from the division contributed
to their support for the regime. Farmers in Ndian division supported the state because of
their admiration for Ahidjo’s charismatic qualities and fair judgement. In several
inter\'iews, respondents in Ndian supported the state because Cameroon was stable during
Ahidjo’s reign. As Mr. Itoe Francis notes
Ndian division has a border with Nigeria, making it vulnerable to attacks.
Ahidjo was always successful in avoiding military confrontation with
Nigeria, as with neighboring countries. In fact, military presence in the
division was minimal during his regime. Ahidjo preferred peace and
stability to conflicts and for that reason, many people in the division
supported him. Take the case of the Bakasi crisis today in Cameroon, if it
wms during Ahidjo’s period, nothing like this would have occurred.’^
Similar sentiments were widely held by farmers in the division. From the data on
Table 20, 50 percent or 100 farmers in Ndian division supported the state because of
Ahidjo and 45 percent or 90 farmers supported the state because of the economic policies
leading to economic growth and development. Interestingly, however, only 5 percent or
10 respondents supported the state because they were afraid of reprisals. For a division
with minimal economic opportunities, such a huge support for Ahidjo’s regime is
significant. The level of support for the Ahidjo regime may have been due to the illiteracy
Interview with Mr. Itoe Francis, in Kumba, December 1998.
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of the farmers for, it is very easy for a politician to use his charismatic abilities to win
over an illiterate population. This is what may have happened in this division.
The above findings also suggest that support for the Ahidjo regime was not
because of fear of reprisal as suggested by some scholars of Cameroon’s political
economy. It was mainly because of the sound economic policies of the Ahidjo
government that brought about economic development and a higher standard of living for
Cameroonians in the regions, leading to popular support for the regime. An important
question asked during the survey as to what contributed to peace and stability in
Cameroon showed overwhelmingly that Cameroonians enjoyed peace and stability
during Ahidjo’s presidency because of his good economic policies.
Ndiva Kofele-Kale had earlier reached a similar conclusion in his study titled
“The Political Culture of Anglophone Cameroon: Contrast in Rural-Urban Orientations
toward the Nation.” His findings suggested that rural and urban dwellers tend to consider
the impact of government to be favorable especially in the light of the stable political
climate and the strides in the area of socioeconomic development. One can deduce from
this study that the positive strides in Cameroon’s socioeconomic development led to
favorable support for the government by the people and hence a stable political regime.
Based on the analysis of the data in this section, it is thus important to
acknowledge the fact that Ahidjo’s economic policies contributed to economic growth
and progress in Cameroon, which was beneficial to its people and to the Southwest
province.
For a discussion, see Ndiva Kofele-Kale, 72.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this study, the writer set out to investigate the political economy of
development in Cameroon, especially the perception of Ahidjo’s agricultural policies in
the Southwest province, arguing that Ahidjo’s economic policies brought economic
prosperity to Cameroon and the Southwest province in particular. The writer, in addition,
maintains that it was the success of Ahidjo’s economic policies that contributed to
popular support for the Ahidjo regime, and that it was not the authoritarian or repressive
system of government of the Ahidjo era, as some Cameroonian scholars have argued in
the past.
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that colonial rule in Cameroon
resulted in the incorporation of the country’s economy into the international economic
system, as one of the producers of raw materials. Cameroon’s agricultural activities were
generally limited to plantation and cash crop agriculture to support the colonial economy.
In addition, there were small- scale farming activities undertaken by local farmers. After
Cameroon gained independence in 1960, Ahidjo adopted a twenty-year development plan
to attempt to restructure the post-colonial economy, which had been exploited for years
by colonial rulers. Under the auspices of the Cameroon state the main thrust of this policy
was to increase the level of production in the agricultural sector, increase education and
health amenities and raise the per capita income. The adoption of the development plan
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led to a strong performance of the general economy and in particular, to an increase in
the standard of living of the people as seen in the increase in per capita income as well as
the general increase in productivity. The high growlh rates in the agricultural sector
increased the country’s GDP and accounted for its positive economic progress during
Ahidjo’s presidency. As a result of this successful economic development, this study goes
on to examine: 1) the impact of government intervention in agricultural development in
Cameroon and especially in the Southwest province; 2) the effect of economic prosperity
in Cameroon on farmers’ perception of the state during Ahidjo’s presidency; and 3) the
impact of the new civil servants in Cameroon, in terms of their ability to implement
policies that shaped farmers perceptions of the regime in the Southwest province.
The study, therefore, makes the following findings; 1) the new civil servants
created by Ahidjo through training at ENAM was the agent for implementing the
agricultural policies under the twenty-year development plan. These policies supported
credit facilities for small farmers through the establishment of institutions such as
FONADER, and increased the supply of agricultural inputs as fertilizers, to farmers in
this sector of the economy. The success of this policy as seen in increased productivity in
the agricultural sector, as well as the overall economic prosperity of the nation, was
critical to the farmer’s support of Ahidjo’s presidency.
2) President Ahidjo believed in having a strong state if national integration, unity
and prosperity were to be achieved. His ideology of planned liberalism provided
guidelines as to how economic prosperity and national unity were to be integrated into
the twenty years development plan. For Ahidjo, the state was critical for Cameroon’s
development. Therefore, the state had to serve as the driving force for development by
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providing the necessary capital for development. It is within this domain that the
central question of Ahidjo’s “big government,” approach to Cameroon’s development is
crucial. Planned liberalism made big government in Cameroon productive at a time when
many other African countries with big government were having problems. Furthermore,
the colonial heritages of its peoples (French and British) required the guidance of a strong
state and a charismatic leader. Consequently, the state under the leadership of Ahidjo
proved critical for nation building and economic development.
The state during Ahidjo’s presidency identified the need for balanced
development, social justice and equitable distribution of the resources. It adopted the
policy of balanced development that diversified state resources in both urban and rural
areas, and undertook an equitable distribution of medical and educational resources to the
Cameroonian people. Such policies broadened the support base of the state to include not
only the elite, but also people at the lower strata of society.
3) Through the implementation of the twenty-year development plan, the state
targeted rural farmers in the provinces including the Southwest province, to improve
economic growth and thus earned their support for the state. Ahidjo’s policies were
instrumental in propelling growth rates in Cameroon, which by 1985, attained a rate of
7.0 percent per annum.
Samuel Huntington has argued that rapid economic development is detrimental to
a new country, especially because it leads to political destabilization.’ The question, then,
is how did Ahidjo succeed in preventing such instability in Cameroon. One school of
thought points to the authoritarian nature of the Ahidjo regime as the only possible reason
' For a discussion, see Samuel Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay.”
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why Ahidjo prevented political instability in Cameroon. They demonstrate that the
“police state,” sustained by Ahidjo and supported by a few elites was able to manipulate
the ignorant Cameroon public. In the case of the Southwest province, the coalition
formed between Ahidjo and some Northwest elites was able to silence the Southwest for
a very long time. This school essentially ignores the positive strides Ahidjo made in
economic growth, reconciliation, education and other social advances in the country.
This study rejects this thesis by examining Ahidjo’s record in the area of
agriculture. His aggressive but cautious development program anchored in the ideology
of plarmed liberalism and his pragmatic approach to management was guided by his
vision of a strong state presence with a private sector, visible enough to encourage
foreign investment through joint ventures. His cautious approach to foreign investment
proved crucial to Cameroon’s economic development, and led to mass support for the
regime.
4) It was Ahidjo’s agricultural policy and particularly the green revolution policy
initiated during the first agricultural show in the Southwest province that laid the
foundation for his agricultural policy in the country and which ultimately ushered in
economic development and prosperity in Cameroon.
The evidence analyzed in this study leads to the conclusion that economic
progress and prosperity during this period contributed to stability in Cameroon. Popular
support demonstrated by the farmers’ perception of Ahidjo’s policy in the Southwest
province, overwhelmingly attest to this fact. Ahidjo forged a development plan for
Cameroon taking into consideration the historical, political and cultural factors. Planned
liberalism proved successful because it was tailored to the needs of Cameroon. At a time
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when many African countries were suffering, Cameroon had a set agenda to follow for
its development. This was Ahidjo’s vision of a strong Cameroon. It was the reason why
he preferred to build a strong state.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The 1982 peaceful transfer of power to Biya from Ahidjo failed to strike an
appropriate balance between the need to sustain a strong and powerful state capable of
intervening in the economy, and the need to sustain the pace of economic growth and
development initiated under the Ahidjo regime. Biya was ineffective in capitalizing on
the progress made by Ahidjo in the area ofpolitical and economic development. This is
evident in the demise in the problems faced by Cameroon’s economy after 1987, and the
subsequent political developments after 1990, that seriously undermined the Cameroon
state. One of the reasons for Biya’s failures was his inability to control corruption and
excessive government waste. Government waste was minimal during the Ahidjo regime
because of the ideology of planned liberalism that called for calculated investments by
the government. Another reason was Biya’s callous approach to the question of tribalism.
During Biya’s regime, 90 percent of directors of state owned enterprises (SOE) were
from his tribe.^ Such an action created resentment from other tribes and was amplified by
the constant mismanagement of state resources under these corporations. Cameroon’s
economic crisis under Biya forced people to resent the state, and it was no surprise that in
the 1992 presidential election Biya, barely won.
^ Information obtained from discussion with senior government officials and retired civil servants
in Cameroon.
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From the discussion in this study, the following recommendations are made to
guide leaders towards implementing policies that would lead to economic prosperity and
development in Cameroon and the Southwest province in subsequent years.
1) The most important problem facing the Southwest province in particular and
Cameroon in general is the lack of adequate infrastructure. Road construction and
maintenance is crucial for the timely delivery of agricultural products as well as the
movement of people. Good roads are critical to farmers in Ndian and Meme divisions for
the prompt movement of crops. The government needs to invest in road infrastructure in
the southwest province. This province is the third largest producer of cocoa in Cameroon.
Meme and Ndian divisions account for two thirds of cocoa production in the province but
the conditions of the roads are deplorable. In addition, oil is produced in the southwest
province but the benefits are not visible in the province. Government neglect of
agriculture is evident in the management of resources geared for road maintenance and
construction. Feeder roads are crucial in Ndian division where the lack of roads forces
farmers to transport agricultural products with human labor.^ Many respondents
complained of lack of roads especially in Ndian division where all roads are seasonal.
From their narration, during the rainy season, which coincides with harvesting and drying
of cocoa, the deplorable nature of the roads increases transportation costs and delays the
prompt delivery of cocoa by farmers.
Some respondents applauded the activities of cooperatives in utilizing heavy
trucks to transport cocoa and other products from farms to the market at reasonable costs.
However, the limited resources of these cooperatives reduce their sphere of influence.
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Good roads will attract civil serv'ants and extension workers who are reluctant to go to
Ndian division and other remote regions of the province because of the lack of roads.
Their fear of being cut off from family and friends will diminish. Such a measure will
improve not only good relations between the government and the inhabitants of the
division, but to a large extent, it will change the negative perception the people in the area
have of the government. Extension workers will further improve the technical aspects of
production in the region leading to increased productivity. The end result will be that
farmers in the region will benefit from having good roads.
2) The provision of credits to farmers through FONADER, the extension services
in the Ministry of Agriculture, the provision of fertilizers and marketing policies through
the marketing boards should revamp Cameroon’s agricultural sector now in crisis under
the Biya regime. In implementing this policy, two critical factors should be considered;
the need for an efficient credit system and competent extension workers. FONADER was
the only institution structured by the government to provide credit to farmers. Ndian
division, because of bad roads had no such facility; hence, farmers are forced to go to
Kumba in Meme division for financial transactions. Banks are beyond the reach of small
farmers who, for the most part, are illiterate and ill informed as to where to go for credit.
Government should expand its credit facilities to all areas with significant farming
populations because rural farmers seldom have access to its credit. Most mral farmers
surveyed do not know that such a credit system existed. Government should embark on a
campaign to inform farmers of the possibilities of acquiring credit. This could be
accomplished through radio campaigns in the local languages of the people.
^ In many areas visited, respondents complained of having to carry their products on their heads
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The second issue is the use of extension workers in remote regions of the
province. The recent construction of the Mundemba-Ekondo-Titi road will greatly
improve movement of not only goods, but also people. It is hoped that with improvement
in transportation, extension workers sent to Ndian division will be able to relocate their
families there. Other incentives as higher pay and housing facilities should be factored
into the relocation package of the extension workers; simple service transportation such
as motorcycles should be provided to these workers. Extension workers in the Provincial
Delegation of Agriculture in the Southwest province had about 550 workers, and only 20
motorcycles, and only 8 were in good working conditions. As the provincial delegate
noted, it is a serious problem that needs to be addressed. Extension workers are critical in
the province and especially in remote areas with few educated farmers. The shortage of
extension workers hampers the province’s ability to increase productivity in agriculture.
3) Non-governmental organizations as common initiative groups should be
encouraged by government to respond to the needs of farmers who are also members of
the association. The difference between these groups and the old cooperatives is that
cooperatives were introduced by colonial governments but common initiative groups are
grass-roots associations subsidized by foreign and non-governmental organizations,
which essentially promote the independence of farmers and encourage them to improve
production through better techniques. In support of common initiative groups in the
province, the government created the Southwest Development Authority (SOWEDA),
which plays an active role in the province’s development projects. SOWEDA’s activities
therefore supplement those of the common initiative groups. Many farmers contacted
for many miles to the nearest market or cooperative facility.
194
were familiar with common initiative groups. Their presence was more effective in
Meme than in Ndian division. SOWEDA has been instrumental in identifying areas for
improvement in agricultural development and subjecting the government to provide the
necessary budget.
4) It is further suggested that the agricultural culture in the southwest province be
changed. The findings in this study point to the fact that farmers in the province are
generally illiterate. The situation is different if one looks at the other divisions. The
comparison ofNdian and Meme division showed that more farmers were less educated in
Ndian than Meme division. As such illiterate farmers are conservative, traditional, and
very reluctant to change. Hence, changes in technology as the use of fertilizers and crop
rotation that have been associated with increased productivity are less likely to be
adopted by farmers. As demonstrated in this study, farmers in Ndian division were less
likely to use fertilizers, and because they were ignorant of what policies were available
through government agencies, they did not take full advantage of credit facilities.
Another area of change is in farming techniques. Farmers in the province were known to
burn grass, which is detrimental to the soil. Crop rotation methods were practiced by only
a few. It is, therefore, recommended that farmers be educated and also that elites be
encouraged the undertake farming. Such a measure will reduce the number of graduates
who today are unemployed and leave in overcrowded cities. What the government needs
is to encourage young graduates to engage in agriculture and attempt to be independent
from the government. By increasing the opportunities for farmers, the government will
rejuvenate this respectable occupation that during Ahidjo’s presidency was instrumental
in providing economic progress and development.
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Having an agricultural population that is willing to accept technological
change such as the use of fertilizers, better farming practices, and the use of high yielding
crops will improve productivity. It is the suggestion of this study that more attention be
given to improving and sustaining agriculture that for over 30 years has sustained the
Cameroon economy and accounted for its prosperity.
Finally, the twenty- year development plan adopted by Ahidjo attempted to
address some of the development problems faced by Cameroon after independence. The
Southwest province and especially Ndian division did not benefit from this balanced
development policy. Separate policies to address particular needs of regions must be
developed and incorporated in the development package. With this in mind, every region
will be developed according to its needs. It is hoped that with SOWEDA, such a policy
strategy will be developed. This will reduce excessive waste in government expenditure
and thus reduce the possibility of corruption, which unfortunately is rampant when it
comes to budget allocations to government agencies.
Cameroon’s development in recent years has not been human-centered, as seen in
the widespread misery and suffering of the rural people. Improving the lives of people
should be the ultimate goal of Cameroon’s development policy. Development must be
targeted to ensure that the benefits of economic growth be distributed equitably to all the
people. In the case of the Southwest province, farmers in rural areas who form the
majority of the population in these areas must be assisted to meet their basic needs. It is
only when the basic needs of people are met that one can conclude that development has
been effectively attained and sustained.
APPENDIX A
A Survey of Farmers in the Southwest Province
Questionnaire
The researcher, who is a student at Clark Atlanta University, Georgia, USA, is undertaking this project as
part of his Ph.D. degree Program in International Affairs and Development.
Please Circle the Appropriate Response accordingly. All answers remain confidential andyour identity
will remain anonymous. Your time and effort with this study is greatly appreciated.
Personal Characteristics





3. Age of Respondent
a. under 20
c. 31-40
















What in your opinion is the size ofyour farm
a. 1 - 4 acres b. 5-10 acres
c. 11-20 acres d. 21 and above
What is/are your source(s) of Income
a. Agriculture only
b. Agriculture and informal trade
c. Social Insurance
d. Informal trade (Buy and Sell) only.
Perception on the Economic Empowerment of Farmers in the Southwest Province
Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD).
7. 1 increased the use of fertilizer when the government subsidized its price.












I increased the use of fertilizer when its benefits were explained to me.
SA. A. D. SD.
The use of fertilizer has increased my total output.
SA. A. D. SD.
It was easy for me to obtain credits from FONADER.
SA. A. D. SD.
It was easy for me to obtain credits many times from FONADER.
SA. A. D. SD.
It was easier for me to obtain credits from my private association (Njangi) than
FONADER.
SA. A. D. SD.
The credit I received was enough to satisfy my needs.
SA. A. D. SD.
I did not obtain credit because nobody told me I could get credit somewhere.
SA. A. D. SD.
Government paid our bonus regularly.
SA. A. D. SD.
Government never paid our bonus.
SA. A. D. SD.
Perception on the political empowerment of Farmers in the Southwest Province.
17. 1 supported the government because it always increased the price of cocoa.
SA. A. D. SD.
18. I supported the government because it provided more schools and health facilities.
SA. A. D. SD.
19. I was forced to support the government because I feared for my life.
SA. A. D. SD.
20. The assistance given to me by the government motivated my support for it.
SA. A. D. SD.
21. I think my support for the government brought peace and stability to Cameroon.
SA. A. D. SD.
22. What in your opinion accounts for the peace and stability in Cameroon?
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APPENDIX B
A Survey of Civil Servant in Yaounde
Please circle the Appropriate Response accordingly.
Personal Characteristics
















e. 56 and above









Perception on the Political Economy of Cameroon
Please circle one of the following Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly
Disagree (SD).
7. I am an active member of the party in my community.
SA. A. D. SD.
8. I hold a position in the party.
SA. A. D. SD.
My training at ENAM was a condition for me to occupy this position.
SA. A. D. SD.
9.
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10. My understanding of the political system was a precondition for my current position
in government.
SA. A. D. SD.
11. ] supported the government because I was afraid of losing my job.
SA. A. D. SD.
12. I was forced to support the government because my position warrants me to support the
government.
SA. A. D. SD.
13. I supported the government because I wanted to make a difference in policy
implementation.
SA. A. D. SD.
14. I supported the government because I feared for my life.
SA. A. D. SD.
Perception of Leadership Formation and Empowerment
15. ENAM plays an important role in training future managers in Cameroon.
SA. A. D. SD.
16. The political process is open for the effective recruitment of capable Cameroonians to
political positions.
SA. A. D. SD.
17. People who play by the rules of the game in Cameroon politics stay in office longer.
SA. A. D. SD.
18. There is a Professional elite in Cameroon politics.
SA. A. D. SD.
19. Membership into this group is based on training from the University.
SA. A. D. SD.
20. Membership into this group is based on training from ENAM.
SA. A. D. SD.
21. Membership into the elite group is open to anybody.
SA. A. D. SD.
22. I think that my support for the government brought peace and stability in Cameroon.
SA. A. D. SD.
23. What in your opinion accounts for the peace and stability in Cameroon?
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